Auto and truck purchases give conflicting signals on expansion vs. recession

 

 - by New Deal democrat

The typical post-jobs report lull in the data is amplified this month (of course) by the fact that there was no jobs report this month! If there is a tiny silver lining beginning to appear, it is that the Administration is making noises about reinstating the health care subsidies that has been the key “ask” by Congressional Democrats. We’ll see.

One important data point that came out last week that I didn’t report on was vehicle sales. To recap, after housing, vehicle sales are typically the next sector to roll over before a recession begins. And within those sales, heavy truck sales typically roll over first and most decisively vs. car and light truck sales, which fade later and are much noisier.

The update last week, for August, indicated a very sharp -5.2% decline in heavy truck sales for the month, bringing the total decline from their April 2023 peak to -27.4%. Here’s what the entire historical trend looks like:

Typically any sustained decline of -10% from peak has been enough to signal a near term recession is more likely than not, so this is a very serious number.

When on a YoY% basis, both housing under construction (blue in the graph below) as well as heavy truck sales (red) are off more than -10%, with no false positives and only one (non-pandemic) false negative, in 2000 (note graph adds 10% to both values so that is shows at the 0 line):

The above recession indicator has been triggered for the last two months.

But no recession indicator is perfect, and two other components are missing from this picture.

First, as per above, car and light weight truck sales have also always rolled over before the onset of recessions, although they are much noisier. Thus the below pre-pandemic YoY graph shows monthly sales in light blue, and the quarterly average in dark blue:

There are plenty of false positives here, but no false negatives. Which is important when we look at the post-pandemic graph:

The latest three month average of car and light truck sales is higher by 4% YoY. This is simply not recessionary.

Also, the “third leg of the stool” in leading durable goods is the wider manufacturers’ new orders component, which I reported on last week. To reiterate, here is the pre-pandemic historical record:

While these did roll over well in advance of the 2001 recession, they were still weakly positive going in to the 2008 recession.

Here is the post-pandemic look:

As per my report last week, these are up roughly 5% YoY through August.

In short, while housing and trucking are plainly recessionary, the broader manufacturing orders outlook and consumer purchases of vehicles are not.

Using tabulated State data, estimated initial and continuing claims last week continued in neutral range

 

 - by New Deal democrat

As we all know, initial and continuing jobless claims were not reported last Thursday. Which, by the way, is interesting, because they were reported during the lengthy 2013 shutdown and for at least part of the 2018-19 shutdown.

A large part of the reason they likely continued to be reported is that all the Federal government does is collect the information from the States, add it up, and then supply a seasonal adjustment. Which in turn means that we ought to be able to reconstruct the data by going to the States directly.

And on Friday, FRED helpfully posted all of the 50 States’, plus DC, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands’ data. While it didn’t add them up, your trusty correspondent is capable of addition, which means that I can now present you with the YoY% changes in initial and continuing claims for last week, as well as what should be an extremely close estimate of the seasonally adjusted data.

Let me begin with the raw data. For the week ending September 27, unadjusted initial claims from all of the jurisdictions totaled 178,763 vs. 181,017 one year ago, or -1.3% less. Once we have this data, by adding it to the three previous weeks we arrive at a four week moving average of 4.2% higher. Continuing claims with the typical one week delay totaled 1,696,961 vs. 1,616,527 last year, or 5.2% higher. 

Since the YoY% changes are the most important, here are the FRED graphs through September 20 of that metric:

Note that both initial and continuing claims have been running in the vicinity of 5% higher YoY all year long, with the exception of most of July and August for initial claims (likely due to changes in the layoff and rehiring schedules for school districts). In other words, this past reporting week both the four week average of initial claims and continuing claims are right in line with their recent averages, while weekly initial claims were lower.

Now let’s turn to the seasonal adjustments. First, here is the comparison of seasonally adjusted weekly initial claims (dark blue) vs. non-seasonally adjusted claims (thin gray line):

Now here are SA (gold) and NSA (thin, grayish) continuing claims:

Both of these metrics are in the time of year where there is a hefty higher seasonal adjustment. Last year in the reference week, for initial claims, the adjustment was *1.2569; for continuing claims it was *1.1310. 

This gives us estimated weekly initial claims of 224,000, +6,000 higher week over week. Adding this to the previous three weeks of seasonally adjusted data already available gives us the four week moving average of 234,500, down -3,000 from the prior week. And estimated seasonally adjusted continuing claims were 1.919 million, -7,000 from the previous week. For graphic comparison purposes, here is are the seasonally adjusted numbers through the last federally reported week:

So long as the State by State data continues to get picked up, I will update this each week for the duration of the shutdown. In the meantime, the takeaway this week was a continuation of the recent “neutral” slightly higher YoY readings in the four week average of initial claims and also continuing claims.

Weekly Indicators for September 29 - October 3 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

All of the high frequency data that I gather in those posts comes from the Fed or its regional banks, the States, or private firms. That means it is almost completely unaffected by the federal government shutdown, and can be continually updated for as long as the shutdown lasts.

While the majority of the short leading and coincident data in the set continues to indicate expansion, there are underlying signs of increasing weakness, masked by a declining US$ and increased spending by the top income brackets.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and reward me a little bit for my efforts.

Alternate sources of employment data point to job losses, steady to higher unemployment rate in September

 

 - by New Deal democrat

As we all know by now, there is no US jobs report today due to the government shutdown. But there are a number of alternative measures which can give us a good estimate of what the jobs situation is.

Let me start first with the unemployment rate. Here is an update through last week of initial and continuing jobless claims, which lead the unemployment rate:

With the exception of late July and August, jobless claims have been consistently forecasting an increase of 5% (note: a percent of a percent) in the unemployment rate. Since last autumn the unemployment rate was 4.1% or 4.2%:

this forecasts a rate of 4.3% or 4.4% for September.

Which, as it happens, is exactly the mean forecast of the Chicago Fed’s new unemployment rate forecasting tool:

In contrast, the Challenger layoffs report indicated a lower number of newly jobless in September than in previous months, although the 2025 average remains elevated over 2024:

Now let’s turn to the jobs number itself.

The ADP employment report deservedly got a lot of attention several days ago when if indicated a loss of -32,000 jobs in September. Including revisions, the ADP report generally tracks close to the jobs report. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the ADP report already incorporates the preliminary benchmark revisions based on the QCEW, that won’t be included in the official jobs data until next February.

Justin Wolfers points out that the initial, unrevised ADP numbers do not correlate so well with the official jobs report:

But aside from early 2023, the three month average of the two series remains pretty close. And in the last three months, the ADP’s unrevised reports have averaged 42,000 jobs gained per month, compared with the 50,000 average for July and August in the official report. As revised for July and August - which Wolfers acknowledges is closer to the official BLS numbers, the ADP’s two month average was also 50,000, and its 3 month average including September is 23,000.

In short, the ADP does forecast very little if any jobs growth  at best “officially” in September.

Next, let’s look at the ISM manufacturing and services reports employment subindexes. To cut to the chase, here’s the graph for both covering the past three years (via TradingEconomics):

Since February, only in May has the employment weighted average of the two surveys (86% services, 14% goods producing), indicated growth. In September, manufacturing came in at 46.3 and services at 47.2, averaging 47.1, which is still better than the low average of 46.0.

Finally, let’s look at the employment components of the regional Fed manufacturing and services reports. There is very little graphic information available, but here is the average of the Empire State and Philly manufacturing numbers:

Here is Richmond’s:

And here is Texas’s:

The Kansas City Fed does not publish a graph for employment. But note that among the four that do, all trended down, 3 were negative, and 2 were close to or at their worst levels.

So the best way I have to present this to you is showing your the month over month change, and the actual number for September:

Manufacturing:

Empire: -5.6 to -1.2

Philly: -0.3 to +5.6

Richmond: -4 to -15

KC: +7 to +7

Texas: -12.2 to -3.4

AVERAGE: -3 to -1

Services:

NY: n/a

Philly: +13.2 to 9.4

Richmond: +1 to 0

KC: -14 to -12

Texas: -4.8 to -2

AVERAGE: -4.6 to -2

In sum, the alternative data sources all point to another weak, and likely contractionary, month for September. The unemployment rate likely held steady or ticked up 0.1%, and all three alternative sources for jobs information - ADP, ISM, and the regional Feds - indicate an actual decline in jobs.

Finally, let’s put this in some context for the economy. Here are the official jobs numbers, and real personal income excluding government transfer payments, both normed to 100 as of April:

Real income is flat to down, while jobs have increased by at best 0.1% in the 5 months since. This points to the economy being kept from recession by consumer and business spending, concentrated in AI-related industries and stock market wealth created by that boom (or, perhaps, bubble). 

Final August durable goods orders: more evidence that the AI related buildout is keeping the economy afloat

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Oddly, even though the government shutdown has crippled most reporting, the Census Bureau did update the durable goods report for August today, and it does reveal an essential bifurcation in the state of the economy.

First, here are the topline leading indicators: total durable goods orders (blue), core capital goods orders (red), and consumer durable goods orders (gold, right scale):

The difference between the first two and the last one is striking, and even more descriptively so when we measure them YoY:

As of the last report, consumer durable goods orders were dead in the water, down -0.1% YoY. By contrast, headline durable goods orders were up 7.6% YoY, and core capital goods orders up 4.0%.

The difference between the core and headline numbers is almost all driven by transportation orders (i.e., Boeing) (blue), not defense (red):

And a more detailed breakdown of new orders by industry reveals that the biggest increases have been computer-related (red) and communications (gold), although other sectors have grown significantly as well:

This is yet more evidence that the AI buildout in data centers and electronics updates are the driving force behind the continued expansion in the economy, fueling outsized stock price gains in the sector (and providing the fuel for wealth effect consumer spending); while the larger consumer sector is not growing at all.

EDITED TO ADD: And just to put an exclamation point on the data, here is Joe Wiesenthal with a breakdown of spending on AI data centers and everything else:

A note on initial jobless claims

 

 - by New Deal democrat

It’s Thursday, which typically means it’s time for the weekly initial and continuing jobless claims update. As we all know, the Federal government has shut down, because there is no budget for this fiscal year that began yesterday.

BUT, I went back and checked, and during the extended government shutdown in 2013, initial jobless claims were reported, and they were also reported at least for one week during the 2018-19 shutdown as well. 

Which makes sense, because they are simply compiled by adding up reports from the 50 States plus DC and Puerto Rico, and then using a seasonal adjustment.

But there has been no report this morning. 

As usual, my impulse is to find a workaround, which in this case is to get the raw data from the various States’ Departments of Labor or similar.  While I have neither the time nor the patience to do this for all jurisdictions, if enough of the bigger States publish their information, we should be able to arrive at a fairly reasonable estimate.

So far this morning none of the States I have checked, have updated their information for the last week. I will check later today, and if by then they have updated with claims through the week of September 27, I will follow up with a second post. Here’s hoping . . . .

In the meantime, via Carl Quintanilla, here is the latest graph on how the AI Boom (or bubble) in the stock market is fueling spending by the top 10% of consumers, which is what is keeping the economy afloat:

ISM manufacturing index continues to show slight contraction, as new orders retreat

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Typically the new month begins with important manufacturing and construction reports; but this morning the construction spending report for August became the first casualty of the government shutdown. 

The ISM manufacturing report has been a recognized leading indicator for the past 60+ years, although of diminished importance since the turn of the Millennium and China’s accession to regular trading status. While any number below 50 indicates contraction, the ISM itself indicates that the number must be under 42.8 to signal recession. 

Because of the report’s diminished importance, for forecasting purposes, I use an economically weighted three month average of the manufacturing and non-manufacturing indexes, with a 25% and 75% weighting, respectively. That briefly justified a “recession watch” during the summer, before the strong August rebound mainly in the services sector.

Today’s report continued the string of contractionary readings, although it rose slightly to 49.1. The more significant news is that the more leading new orders subindex, which rebounded to 51.4 in August, sank back into contraction at 48.9. Here is a look at both the total index (blue) and new orders subindex (gray) for the past three years (via Tradingeconomics.com):

Note that both remain slightly better than their low points in 2022-23, which is noteworthy because there was no recession then.

Hare the last six months of both the headline (left column) and new orders (right) numbers:

APR 48.7. 47.2

MAY 48.5. 47.6

JUN. 49.0. 46.4

JUL 48.0.  47.1

AUG 48.7. 51.4

SEP. 49.1. 48.9

The current three month average for the total index remains at 48.6, while the new orders rose slightly to a still contractionary 49.1. This is in accord with the recent regional Fed reports, which turned positive during August, but retreated somewhat in September.

As I indicated above, for the economy as a whole the weighted index of manufacturing (25%) and non-manufacturing (75%) indexes is more important. In the non-manufacturing report, the average of the last two months for the headline and new orders numbers has been 51.0 and 53.2, respectively. Pending the ISM report on services next Monday, the economically weighted headline number is 50.4, and the new orders average is 52.2.

If the ISM services report next week does not indicate any further downturn, this means that the economy as a whole continues to expand, albeit just barely.

August JOLTS report was weak, but foreshadows little

 

 - by New Deal democrat

In the past year, in contrast to much other data in the jobs sector, the JOLTS reports have been very much consistent with a “soft landing” jobs scenario. In the August report released this morning, the trend weakened slightly.

As a quick refresher, this survey decomposes the employment market into openings, hires, quits, and layoffs. So to begin, here are job openings, hires, and quits all normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic:

I regard openings are “soft” data. While they have trended down for several years, they have remained above their pre-pandemic levels, and are not of much concern to me. They improved slightly this month. The trend for the past 15 months has been flat to slightly downward. Meanwhile both openings and quits declined, the latter to the lowest level since December 2024, but the former came in at the lowest level since June 2015 except for June 2024 and the pandemic lockdown months! These are both “hard” data, and were both weaker readings.

Now let’s look at several components are slight leading indicators for jobless claims, unemployment and wage growth.

Layoffs and discharges, which have trended slightly higher since last summer, but have been rangebound since last autumn, remained so again, although the three month average was the highest in the past 12 months:

This generally accords with both the increase in the unemployment rate in 2023-24, as well as its plateauing this year (red, right scale), as well as the recent trend in continuing jobless claims.:

Next, the quits rate (left scale) typically leads the YoY% change in average hourly wages for nonsupervisory workers (red, right scale):

In August the quits rate declined slightly, tying its lowest in the past 12 months. This suggests that nominal wage growth may decelerate slightly further in the next several months.

Finally, I want to discuss why I don’t pay much attention to the “Beveridge curve,” which is the relationship between job openings divided by the number of unemployed, and the unemployment rate.

In the past several months there has been some modest hysteria about the number of unemployed exceeding the number of job openings (i.e., the ratio has fallen below 1:1), leading to speculation that the unemployment rate will increase.

But the historical view shows that there is no magic ratio of the Beveridge curve which is consistent with rising or falling unemployment. Rather, it is the *trend* in openings vs. the number of unemployed which has generally correlated with the *trend* in the unemployment rate. As shown below, with the Beveridge curve inverted for ease of comparison, the ratio was *always* below 1:1 for the entire period before 2018, and yet there were two extensive recoveries during which the unemployment rate declined:

Now here is the post-pandemic view. Again, we see that the *trends* correlate well, but there is nothing magic about the 1:1 level:

Just like the layoffs and discharges metric, this suggests that the unemployment rate may increase slightly. 

In short, this was a weak report. But it was a report for August, and we already have the August jobs report. It tells us very little about what to expect for September (if it is released, given the likelihood of a government shutdown before then), except that possibly the unemployed ent rate may increase.

Repeat home sales as measured by Case Shiller and the FHFA confirm price deflation

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Last month the indexes of repeat home sales from the FHFA and S&P Case Shiller were the final confirmation that the housing market was in deflation.

That continued in this morning’s reports for July. On a seasonally adjusted basis, in the three month average through June, both the Case-Shiller national index (light blue in the graphs below) and the FHFA purchase index declined -0.1%. The peak for the FHFA index (blue in the graphs below) was in March, while that the Case-Shiller Index (gray) was in February. (note: as per usual, FRED hasn’t updated the FHFA information yet):

The actual *de*flation in the house price indexes has been -0.7% in the FHFA Index and -1.1% in the Case Shiller Index:

On a YoY basis, price gains in both indexes continued to decelerate, at 1.7% for the Case Shiller index, and 2.3% for the FHFA index; but these were the lowest YoY% increases since 2012 for both indexes excluding 5 months in 2023 for the Case Shiller index:

Because house prices lead the shelter component of the CPI by 12 - 18 months, this also indicates that they will continue to decelerate over that period. Here is the same graph as above (/2.5 for scale) plus Owners’ Equivalent Rent from the CPI YoY (red):

The last time the Case-Shiller and FHFA Indexes were in this range, excluding the Great Recession, was in the 1990s, during which time Owners Equivalent rent was in the 2.5%-3.5% range (vs. 4.1% as of the most recent CPI report).

Similarly, the latest “National Rent Report” from Apartment List for August, released yesterday, showed a decline of -0.8% YoY. While this is only new leases, and the combined experimentsl all rent index published by the Census Bureau does not show a decline yet, after two years of YoY declines the trend continues to be that of sustained deceleration:

My conclusion this month is the same as that of last month: all phases of the housing market are either at or near their low points (sales, permits, starts), or declining (prices, construction, employment, and new spec units for sale). What is different is that the manufacturing side of the goods-producing sector has shown renewed vigor in the last couple of months. If that fades as well, it is hard to see how we avoid a recession in the next 12 months.

Weekly Indicators for September 22 - 26 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

Not much change this week, but there are signs that consumer spending is beginning to cool off again.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and reward me with a penny or two for my efforts in collecting and organizing it for you.

August personal income and spending: positive, but with several important yellow flags and revisions

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Personal income and consumption is one of the two big monthly reports on the state of the average American, in addition to the jobs report. In the past several months, I have looked for a rebound from April and May’s “Liberation Day” aftermath of a cutback in spending. In July we did get a rebound, and this morning indicated that it has continued. 

Nominally income rose 0.4% and spending 0.6%. Since the PCE inflation gauge rose 0.3%, real income increased 0.1% and real spending rose 0.3%. As a result, real spending is at new record high, while real income is only below its peak in April:

[Note: with the exception of the personal saving rate, and one YoY graph, all of the data in the below graphs is normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic.]

Since real spending on services (blue, right scale) rarely turns down, even in recessions, the focus is on goods (red, left scale). In August they rose a strong 0.7%, also to a new record high:

Additionally, there is authority for the fact that spending on durable goods usually turns down before spending on non-durable goods. In July, this rose 0.9%, but the absolute level remained below that of March and last December:

While this is positive, the three month moving average (which unfortunately I can’t show with FRED tools) has been almost completely stagnant since April, so we may still be topping here.

Incidentally, while I was traveling yesterday, manufacturing new orders and core capital goods orders were both reported, and these were also very positive, with core capital goods orders hitting a new near 3 year high:

This is a major reason why no recession appears imminent, although I would very much like to see what this statistic looks like without the potentially “bubble”-like capital goods spending on AI data centers.

Next, here is the personal savings rate. I follow this because just before and going into recessions it tends to turn up as consumers get more cautious. This month the Census Bureau made major revisions going back three years. As a result, what last month looked like a “typical reading of 4.4%, along with many previous months, was revised substantially higher. Thus the 4.6% rewind for August was not a significant increase, but rather a significant *decrease* from readings in the past year:

A decline in savings is typically a bullish reading for the present, indicating consumer confidence, but when near new lows is also a sign that consumers may be stretching themselves too thin. Since the revisions may be due to the income side of the equation, or the spending side, or both, I will have to take a deeper look at each before commenting in more detail.

Finally, let’s take a look at two coincident indicators from this report which the NBER pays close attention to in dating recessions. First, here is real income less government transfers:

This was unchanged from July, and further is only 0.2% above its March and June levels, as well as below April’s (blue, right scale). On a YoY basis (red, left scale) the decelerating trend dating back almost three years has continued. Should this trend persist several more months, that would be recessionary.

Second, here is real manufacturing and trade industries sales, which is delayed one month and so if for July. This rose 0.6% for the month to a new all time high:

In summary, this was mainly a positive report, but with several yellow flags. Real personal income and spending both rose, one to a new record. Real sales (delayed one month) also made a new high. This confirms the recent rebound shown in capital goods orders, as well as the Regional Fed new orders reports. This is all good.

But, there are several cautionary elements. In addition to the substantial backward revisions, the three month average on durable goods spending may be on the cusp of rolling over, and as mentioned just above, real income less government transfers has essentially flatlined since March.

A tariff-triggered recession would likely be led by a decline in purchases of consumer durable goods, which will be updated in the next two weeks. Here’s what it looks like currently:

In addition a to the ISM reports and jobs report which will be released next week, this is the next big item I will be looking for.

Initial jobless claims: on the road again . . .

 

 - by New Deal democrat

I’m on the road today, and won’t have time to update anything until tonight.

So here is what to look for in initial and continuing jobless claims.

Remember that the most important figure for forecasting purposes is the YoY% change. One year ago, initial claims came in at 221,000, the four week average at 225,250, and continuing claims at 1.831 million.

A positive result would be numbers lower than those. A neutral result is any number in the weekly and four week average of initial claims lower than 10% higher YoY. For initial claims, depending on revisions to last week’s number of 221,000, 10% plus higher would be 244,000. More importantly, YoY 10% plus higher for the four week average of initial claims would be 248,000, again depending on revisions to last week’s numbers.

Continuing claims + initial claims are good for forecasting the near term trend in the unemployment rate, so any number higher than 1.831 in continuing claims plus 221,000 in initial claims, or 2.052 million total) suggests a higher trend in the unemployment rate vs. one year ago. Last week that combined figure was 2.151 million. 

New home sales: despite the noisy sharp increase in August, the last pre-recession metrics are firmly negative

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Have I mentioned before that new home sales, while perhaps the most leading of all the housing data, suffer from being very noisy and heavily revised? Yes, I think I have, just about every month. And this month’s report is a good example of why.

Let me start with prices this month. Last month it was reported that the median price for new houses sold was $403,800. This month that number was revised down -2.2% to $395,100, and this month itself jumped $18,400 from there to $413,500, a 4.7% increase! This number is not seasonally adjusted, so the best way to look at it is YoY (red in the graph below, left scale), which was higher by 1.9% this month:

The three month average takes out most of the volatility, and so measured prices are down -2.8% YoY, and the declining trend in the absolute number (blue) is intact as well.

But the volatility in the price metric is chicken feed compared with sales (blue in the graph below), which jumped just over 20% (!) from an upwardly revised 664,000 last month to 800,000 seasonally adjusted and annualized this month, a 3+ year high:

I’ll come back to houses for sale (red) in a moment. But while mortgage rates did decline to 10 month lows in August (and more since):

that hardly suggests a complete turnaround in the market. For example, mortgage rates were lower last October, and there was no comparable jump in sales. So, to return to the theme of “noisy and heavily revised,” let’s see what next month’s revisions are before we make a champagne toast, because it is perfectly likely that this is an outlier.

Now let’s return to the number of houses for sale (red in the graph above), which declined another -7,000 from a downwardly revised July to 490,000 annualized, a declined of -2.8% from peak. This is nearly certain confirmation that this metric, which along with employees in residential construction is one of the last to turn in the cycle, has decisively turned down.

Here is the long term historical YoY look at new houses sold (blue) and new houses for sale (red):

It is easy to see that the former (blue) always turns first. Further, it almost always has been negative for a year or more before a recession occurs. The latter (red) - the number of houses for sale - typically turns negative YoY close in time to when a recession actually begins.

Now here is the post-pandemic look:

This month for the first time in a year, the number of houses sold zoomed higher to 15.4% YoY, while the number of houses for sale declerated to a paltry 4.0% higher YoY. It could easily turn negative by about the end of this year.

In sum: housing is recessionary, and the last shoes to drop, have dropped.

The State of the Consumer: the nowcast recession forecasting tool

 

 - by New Deal democrat

In addition to my system of long and short leading indicators, and the weekly high frequency data, the third system I use to mark to market my views of the economy is what i call “the consumer nowcast.”

Consumers are 70% of the economy. Their sources of new spending include wages and salaries, refinancing existing debt at lower rates, and cashing in or borrowing against appreciating assents. When the spigots for all of these are turned off, and consumers start getting more cautious, a recession ensues.

Yesterday and today, for the first time in many months, I updated that tool, and it is posted over at Seeking Alpha. While it isn’t negative, the situation of consumers is more precarious than it might appear on the surface.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring me a penny or two in lunch money, as well as hopefully being educational for you.