Tuesday, January 6, 2026

Real wages and consumer spending have been crucial positives; here is the most updated look


 - New Deal democrat



We are still suffering the aftereffects of the government shutdown, with no data today, but a helping of mainly stale government data tomorrow and Friday. Tomorrow we get up to date private data from the ISM for services, and from ADP for private employment, along with manufacturers’ orders for October. On Friday we get the official employment report for December along with the very stale housing permits, starts, and construction data for September and October. And if there is another government shutdown in February, these will likely be the last government updates on those subjects until that is over. My plan is to report on the current data on the dates of release, but delay one day until Thursday and Monday to look at the already stale data.

In the meantime, let me do an update on the overall economy and focus on the components of a crucial employment indicator that will be updated as part of Friday’s jobs report.

Let me start by reporting a link to a graph I put up last Friday , which norms nonfarm payrolls, industrial production, real manufacturing and trade sales, and real income less government transfers to 100 as of July. As I noted then, only two of the four - real income and payrolls - exceeded their July readings only once, in September, by 0.1%. All other readings since July have been either flat or down, with several not updated yet since the shutdown. In general the four series, taken together, have been largely stagnant since March or April:
Thus, as I noted, it is possible that July was an expansion peak, with at least a brief shallow recession lasting through the government shutdown.

On the other hand - again as I noted last Friday, by way of Redbook’s weekly retail spending data, one crucial component of the economy has held up well: consumer spending. The official government reporting on this is also very stale, with the last updates only through September, and no further updates scheduled (as of now) until January 29. 

With that major drawback, here is a link to real personal consumption on goods (red), services (blue), and real retail sales (gold) through September, normed to 100 as of last December:


As shown in this graph, both real retail sales and real spending on goods have barely budged since then, with the highest reading only 0.4% higher, in August; while real spending on services has continued to climb on trend. As I have noted in the past, real spending on services tends to continue to increase even through most recessions. And the three month average of the other two measures has continued to increase throughout 2025 at least as of the last reading for September. It appears that, at best, we won’t know if this average turned down in October or November until the end of this month.

Another metric that has continued to rise in 2025 has been real average hourly wages. 

As you probably recall, one of my headline leading indicators is real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls. This shows the aggregate amount of $$$ in real terms that average American households have to spend, and have reliably peaked (though no indicator is perfect!) a few months before the onset of recessions. Indeed it is likely that consumers pulling back in reaction to shrinking real payrolls is a main driver of most recessions.

In that regard, the below link goes to a graph which shows the two components of that measure: aggregate hours worked (blue) and real average nonsupervisory hourly wages (red). Becuase there was no update for inflation for October, I also show nominal hourly wages (gold) through November. These are all normed to 100 as of March: 


Since then, aggregate hours worked by nonsupervisory workers have been all but stagnant, higher by only 0.2% as of November. Through September, real hourly wages had risen at best 0.4% in July. Together these meant that real aggregate payrolls were all but stagnant. 

Then, due to the CPI report for November (which featured a seriously anomalous low reading for the large shelter component of inflation), real hourly wages jumped by another 0.4% to 0.6% higher than in March. This contributed to a 0.8% increase over March of real aggregate payrolls as well. 

Let me draw this together. The number of jobs and hours worked in 2025 through November was almost completely flat. But wages, both nominal and real, continued to improve - at least through September - helping to drive consumer spending and in particular, on a three month averaged basis, on goods. It is this spending which *may* have kept us out of recession, depending on how the data is reported for the months of the government shutdown. 

Which also means that on Friday I will be paying particular attention to the nominal increase in nonsupervisory wages, both monthly and YoY. This will be important in estimating whether real aggregate payrolls have continued to increase, or whether November’s spike was an outlier and possibly a peak.

Monday, January 5, 2026

December ISM manufacturing report: continued contraction, continued stagflation, poor employment

 

 - by New Deal democrat


We are still suffering the data aftereffects of the government shutdown. Normally we begin each month with reports on both construction spending as well as manufacturing. But the construction report even now has only been updated through August, and won’t be updated for September and October until January 21. And by the way, the current spending bill expires on February 1, so another shutdown may be around the corner.

Which means, as I have said repeatedly for the last month or more, that the regional Fed manufacturing and services reports, as well as the ISM manufacturing and services reports, are our best contemporary picture of the economy.

And this morning’s ISM manufacturing report for December confirms what the regional Fed reports were telling us: the forward-looking situation is improving, in the sense of being “less bad,” while prices paid increased remain widespread, even if not so much as earlier in 2025, and employment in the goods producing sector continues to contract.

In more detail, the headline number declined -0.3 to 47.9 (recall that any number below 50 means contraction), the lowest reading since October of 2024; but higher than most readings in 2023 and 2024:


The more forward looking new orders component increased 0.3 to 47.7, generally continuing the “less bad” trend of the latter part of 2025 and more broadly, since 2023:


On the other hand prices paid were steady at 58.5, lower than the readings approaching 70 last spring, but aside from that higher than all but one reading in 2023 and 2024:


And employment remained dismal at 44.9, up 0.9 for the month, but on a three month rolling basis continuing the declining trend since the middle of 2024.


This suggests a further decline in goods-producing jobs when we get the December employment report at the end of this week.

For forecasting purposes, I use an economically weighted three month average of the manufacturing and non-manufacturing indexes, with a 25% and 75% weighting, respectively.

With today’s report, the three month average for the headline number is 48.3. The more significant news is that the three month average of the more leading new orders subindex declined slightly further to 48.2. At the same time, both remain slightly better than their low points in 2022-23, which is noteworthy because there was no recession then.

As I have noted in all of these monthly reports for the past year, for the economy as a whole the weighted index of manufacturing (25%) and non-manufacturing (75%) indexes is more important. In the non-manufacturing report, the averages of the last two months for the headline and new orders numbers have been 54.4 and 54.5, respectively. Needless to say, if the services sector remains as strong in December as it has been in October and November, then the weighted average is going to remain signficantly in expansion territory.


To sum up, the ISM manufacturing report for December, to which I would give more wight, confirmed the average of the regional Fed manufacturing reports for the month. Those indicated a stabilizing to slightly contracting manufacturing sector, with contracting employment,  and also facing continuing stagflationary price pressures. 

There has been a very significant divergence in 2025 between the regional Fed services reports, which have indicated pronounced weakness, vs. the ISM services reports, which for all months but one this past summer have indicated good growth. On Wednesday we will see if this continues, or whether services are also beginning to weaken.

Saturday, January 3, 2026

Weekly Indicators for December 29 - January 2 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat


My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.


As 2025 ended, all of the important trends seemed to intensify. The US$ is down 10% YoY by one measure, commodities are higher by the same or more, oil prices continued to fade, and the recent waning in the YoY growth of withholding tax payments - by at least one measure - intensified.


As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and reward me with a penny or two for my efforts collecting and collating it for you.

Friday, January 2, 2026

Economic year end summary for 2025: housing, jobs, and real income stagnant, while spending powers forward

 

 - by New Deal democrat


There is no new noteworthy data today; and the ISM manufacturing index, normally released on the first workday of each month, won’t be released until Monday, so today is an ideal time to check in on the state of the economy in general, and of housing in particular, at the end of 2025.

On Tuesday, both the FHFA and Case Shiller repeat home sales indexes were released for October, with both rising 0.4% month over month on a seasonally adjusted basis. The former index did make a new high, while the latter is still slightly below its February 2023 peak:


On a YoY basis, both are up roughly 1.5%, among the lowest such comparisons of any time outside of recessions:


Thus 2025 closes out on a very weak note for housing, which has been a theme throughout the year.

On a broader scale, it is possible that the October and November government shutdown constituted a brief recession, with July as the peak of the post-pandemic expansion:


As shown in the graph, which norms nonfarm payrolls, industrial production, real manufacturing and trade sales, and real income less government transfers to 100 as of July, only two of the four - real income and payrolls - exceeded their July readings only once, in September, by 0.1%. All other readings since July have been either flat or down, with several not updated yet since the shutdown.

Indeed, taken together, the four series generally show stagnation since March or April. 

It is commonly said that expansions don’t die of old age; they are murdered. If so, the combination of T—-p’s tariffs and the government shutdown may have done the trick, at least briefly.

On the other hand, one item which has consistently held up, however, has been consumer spending, best shown by the weekly Redbook index:


This has shown strength throughout the year, typically up by over 5% YoY nominally. This in turn has probably been goosed by the wealth effect from the appreciation in affluent and wealthy peoples’ stock portfolios, with the S&P 500 up 16.4% in 2025:


Indeed, as per the last ISM reports, for November, manufacturing continued to be in contraction, while services, which were oscillating between slight expansion and contraction through summer, picked up some strength in October and November:


This is the “K shaped” economy, where the lower 80% or so are feeling pinched by inflation and a stalling jobs market, while the top 10% can power forward with spending.

I expect that in 2026 the forces of stagflation will continue to conflict, with a politicized Fed lowering rates to please its mob boss, while inflationary pressures mount, and the average household is caught in between.