October JOLTS report: red flag warning for employment sector in worst report since the pandemic

 

 - by New Deal democrat

This morning’s JOLTS report for October is now the most current official monthly indicator for the jobs sector.

And it was emphatically not good. In fact, it was red flag recessionary.

In the past year, in contrast to much other data in the jobs sector, the JOLTS reports had been very much consistent with a “soft landing” jobs scenario. Not so this month.

The survey decomposes the employment market into openings, hires, quits, and layoffs. The first of those, openings, is soft data that can be influenced by stale or false postings, and trolling for new resumes. It has been on a general uptrend ever since the inception of the series 25 years ago. In contrast, the other series are hard data representing actual actions - and all of those were bad.

Let’s begin with job openings (blue), hires (red), and quits (gold) all normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic:

The “soft” data of openings has been rangebound between 7.103 million and 8.031 million for the past 18 months, and this month came right down the middle at 7.670 million. But actual hires declined a sharp -218,000 to 5.149 million, the lowest reading since the pandemic except for June of last year and August of this year.  But quits were at their worst level of all since the pandemic, down -187,000 to 2.941 million.

And the bad news doesn’t end there. Layoffs and discharges, which while noisy lead both continued jobless claims (gold) and the unemployment rate (red) rose 73,000 to 1.854 million, except for one month a four year high:

Finally, the quits rate (left scale), which typically leads the YoY% change in average hourly wages for nonsupervisory workers (red, right scale), also declined -0.2% to a post-pandemic low of 1.8%:

This suggests that nominal wage growth, which has already been trending slightly downward, is likely to decelerate further in the next several months. Since inflation has been rising, it will put a further squeeze on ordinary working Americans, and may cause real aggregate payrolls to turn negative.

This was a bad, even recessionary, report consistent with actual job losses in October, which every other non-governmental survey has suggested as well. Unfortunately, since most other new releases are stale data from September, we will have to await better data for October and November to be more confident that we have arrived at a turning point.

While capital spending increased sharply, yet more evidence of consumer weakness

 

 - by New Deal democrat

On Friday I noted that real personal spending on goods, especially durable goods, had declined in September. If we have reached a tipping point on that metric, a recession in the near future looks much more likely, even as spending on services continues.

Late last week we also got further evidence of the bifurcation between the consumer economy and the AI-fueled production economy, in the form of durable goods orders and motor vehicle sales.

Let’s look at motor vehicle sales, updated right through November first. On a month over month basis, both light vehicle (sedans, SUVs, pickup trucks) increased, as did sales of heavy weight trucks:

That’s the good news.

The bad news is when we put this improvement in perspective by looking at the long term historical data:

Heavy truck sales carry much more, and more reliable, signal than light vehicle sales, and they always turn down sharply first. Which is exactly what they have done in the past few months. The long leading signal of housing construction turned recessionary many months ago, and now the next shoe has clearly dropped.

But the other news last week, on manufacturers’ new durable and capital goods orders, told a completely different story, as both increased to among their best readings since the pandemic:

In the case of core capital goods orders, it was the best reading since the pandemic except for one month. This is a strong uptrend that began over a year ago and really accelerated this year.

But the intersection between these two metrics is production of, and spending on, consumer durable goods. Here is headline durable goods orders (blue) vs. consumer durable goods orders (red), updated through September:

As per the above, the former was in a strong uptrend. But the latter remained flat, just as it has been for two years.

So let’s compare consumer spending on durables YoY (blue) vs. manufacturers orders for consumer durables YoY (red):

Since the latter are much noisier and more volatile than the former, I have supplied the quarterly average as well as the monthly YoY change, divided by 1.5 for scale.

In general, consumer spending on durables turns first, giving manufacturers their cue to produce more or less. This was complicated by the “China shock” beginning in 1999, where goods imports from China increased sharply, and for a generation.

Finally, here is the post-pandemic look:

Consumer spending on durables increased last autumn and winter, particularly in anticipation of T—-p’s tariffs. The YoY comparisons are still positive, but less so. As per usual, the producer response occurred afterward. 

It is especially important to reiterate than the most recent durable goods and spending data has only been released through September. The motor vehicle data, as well as other types of data such as tax withholding, have indicated a sharp slowdown since. But we’ll have to wait at least one more month to see if that has truly broadened into a contraction in consumer spending on goods.

Weekly Indicators for December 1 - 5 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

There are some minor changes, but no big turns in trends. But the recent change in trend that has been further reinforced is the sharp deceleration in growth in withholding tax payments that began in October. The bulk of the evidence suggests that this is not a result of end of year tax planning, but real signal of a slowdown in labor force and payroll growth.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to date on all of the relevant economic data, and bring me a little pocket change for my efforts.

Real income rises, but real spending on goods may be turning down

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Personal income and consumption is one of the two big monthly reports on the state of the average American, in addition to the jobs report. This month it has the added virtue of being the “least stale” monthly report, as it was issued only five weeks later than scheduled. Ever since “Liberation Day” in April, I have looked for the impact of tariffs on both personal spending and manufacturers’ sales. Additionally, there has been evidence since January that income and spending might be slowly rolling over in any event. This morning’s data for September added at that concern.

Nominally income rose 0.4% and spending 0.3%. But since the PCE inflation gauge rose 0.3%, real income only increased 0.1% and real spending was flat:

[Note: with the exception of the personal saving rate, and one YoY graph, all of the data in the below graphs is normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic.]

Since real spending on services (blue, right scale) rarely turns down, even in recessions, I focus on goods (red, left scale), and on an even more granular basis on durable goods spending. In September real spending on goods (red) declined -0.4%, and on durable goods (gold) even more, by -0.6%:

Because the monthly data can be noisy, I have been particularly looking at the three month average. For durable goods, this looks like it peaked in March through May. For goods spending as a whole, the three month average only increased 0.2% for July through September, and was only up 0.5% since March through May. This is very close to rolling over into contraction.

But if the real spending side of the coin merits a yellow flag, the real income and savings side was more sanguine. 

I follow the personal savings rate because just before and going into recessions it tends to turn up as consumers get more cautious. After revisions this was unchanged at 4.7% in September:

Additionally, one of the two coincident indicators from this report which the NBER pays close attention to in dating recessions is real income less government transfers. This increased 0.1% to a new record high (blue, right scale):

On a YoY basis (red, left scale) after decelerating for almost three years, the latest data shows stabilization since May. Hence the relatively good news on the income side of the coin.

Normally the second coincident metric looked at by the NBER, real manufacturing and trade industries sales, is also reported with a one month delay at the same time as personal income and spending, but this month that was not the case.

In summary, this was a mixed report. On the positive side, although growth has slowed, the positive trend in real income is intact, as is the neutral trend in personal saving. On the negative side, real spending on goods and in particular durable goods declined, with the latter having made at least a temporary peak back in springtime. The former must increase at least 0.1% (subject to revisions) in the next report in order for the three month average not to decline.

Jobless claims: Holiday seasonality enters in a big way

 

 - by New Deal democrat

The good news is, we are back to the normal weekly jobless claims releases. The really good news is that this week’s number, except for one week in 2022, was a new 50 year low! The bad news is that Holiday seasonality is very much in play, so take the good news with multiple grains of salt.

To give you an idea of how much seasonality, look at the decline that was seasonally “expected” vs. the actual number, per this week’s report:

“The advance number of actual initial claims under state programs, unadjusted, totaled 197,221 in the week ending November 29, a decline of 49,419 (or 20.0%) from the previous week. The seasonal factors had expected a decrease of 21,172 or -8.0% from the previous week.”

But to the numbers: seasonally adjusted initial claims declined -27,000 to 191,000 last week, and the four week moving average declined -9,500 to 214,750. With the typical one week delay, continuing claims declined -4,000 to 1,939,000:

To show you the seasonality at work, here are the last two years starting November 1 of non-seasonally adjusted claims (orange) vs. seasonally adjusted (blue):

A big decline in claims always occurs during Thanksgiving week. This year’s decline was signficantly bigger than the two prior years.

As per usual, the YoY% changes are more important for forecasting purposes. So measured, initial claims were down -15.1%, the four week average down -1.9%, and continuing claims up 3.6%:

Needless to say, this is positive. But I strongly suggest we wait for next week’s inevitable big seasonal increase, and average the numbers before popping any champagne corks.

ISM services for November generally positive and improving

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Probably the most important economic news this entire week was this morning’s ISM services report. Services are about 75% of the economy, and this report was for November, which means it is the most wide-ranging and current datapoint we have at the moment.

And the news on this front was almost all good. The headline number (blue in the graph below) improved to 52.6 from last month’s 52.4. Employment was less bad, improving to 48.9 from 48.2. Prices paid decelerated (a good thing) from 70.0 to 65.4. The only (slight) disappointment was that new orders (gray) were less positive at 52.9 vs. last month’s strong 56.2 [note: all graphs via TradingEconomics.com]:

My short term economic forecast gives 75% weight to this metric (gray) and 25% to the manufacturing survey (blue), and also averages over 3 months to cut down on noise. For the headline number, the three month economically weighted average was 51.0:

For the more leading new orders metric, the economically weighted three month average was 52.0:

Needless to say, both of these were expansionary if weakly so, but with evidence of a slightly improving near term forecast.

The retreat in the prices paid metric was particularly good news in comparison with preceding months:

But as with the manufacturing survey, the regional Fed surveys, and this morning’s ADP report, the bad news (even if “less bad”) is that employment appears to be contracting:

For the working and middle class as a whole, the question is whether payroll gains via wages more than make up for th apparent slight loss in the number of jobs. Unfortunately, for that at the moment we only have shadows on the wall.

Production weakens while private employment declines

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Although not published by the federal government itself, the Fed’s measure of industrial production relies on some federal data, and thus it was not updated during the government shutdown - which means that this morning’s update is likewise stale, being for September.

Industrial production has been much less central to the US economy since the “China shock,” but it remains important for the goods producing sector. In September, headline industrial production rose 0.1%, while manufacturing production was unchanged. The above graph normalizes both measures to April 2022. As you can see, between spring 2022 and late 2024, production generally declined before surging in the first six months of this year. Total production exceeded that level just barely in July, while manufacturing production has stalled without reaching that level:

Here is the longer term historical look since before the “China shock”:

Finally, I would be remiss without noting the poor ADP employment report for November this morning. The below graph shows industrial and manufacturing production for this year, together with the ADP employment trend and the official payrolls number, all normed to 100 as of April:

Employment has stalled since then, and production *may* have during this summer, but there have been plenty of noisy such periods before. So far consumer spending fueled by the surging stock market and the resulting “wealth effect” have more than counterbalanced that weakness.

Still flying blind

 

 - by New Deal democrat

There are no significant updated data releases today - which is disconcetering, considering how far behind we are over three weeks after the end of the government shutdown.

How far behind are we?

One area that is important for determining if the consumer economy is close to a turn is spending on big ticket items - vehicles and other durable  consumer goods.

Courtesy of Redbook, which updates retail shopping weekly, we know that last week was the best YoY comparison in almost three years, up 7.6%:

But this does not cover the expensive items which tend to turn down first. Real retail sales, which do include motor vehicles, have been updated through September (blue), but manufacturers new orders for consumer goods are only updated through August (red):

Even worse, while nominal manufacturers sales have been updated through August (blue), but real manufacturing and trade sales (red) are only available through July:

Nominal motor vehicle sales have just been updated this morning through August:

And the BEA’s last update of the number of light weight vehicles (blue) and heavy truck sales (red) is only available through August as well:

The lag is just as bad for the very important housing sector, where housing permits, sales, and units under construction are only updated through August:

And real residential fixed investment as a share of real GDP was last updated for Q2:

But the biggest laggard of all is the QCEW, the “gold standard” for growth in the jobs sector, to which the monthly reports are ultimately benchmarked, which was last updated in August for Q1:

Hence my continued focus on the regional Fed manufacturing and services reports, as well as the nationwide manufacturing and services ISM surveys, as it does not appear this situation is going to be remedied for another month at least.

November ISM manufacturing report indicates deepening stagflationary contraction

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Normally we begin each month with reports on both construction spending and manufacturing. But even though th federal shutdown has been over for more than three weeks, data releases have been both very sparse and very stale. In particular, construction spending for August was just released two weeks ago. There was no updated report this morning, and as far as I can tell no target date for the September release. 

Which means that the ISM manufacturing and services reports will continue to be of heightened importance this month and probably next month as well.

Last week I updated the regional Feds’ manufacturing reports, which showed something of a rebound, but with widespread increases in prices paid and stagnation in employment.

Today’s ISM manufacturing report was significantly weaker. There was contraction across the board, except for prices paid, which increased to 58.5 (a reminder that 50 is the dividing line between strength and weakness). New orders declined to 47.2, employment to 44.0, and the headline number to 48.2. 

For forecasting purposes, I use an economically weighted three month average of the manufacturing and non-manufacturing indexes, with a 25% and 75% weighting, respectively.

With today’s report, the three month average for the headline number is 48.7. The more significant news is that the three month average of the more leading new orders subindex declined to 48.6. Here is a look at both the total index (blue) and new orders subindex (gray) for the past three years (via Tradingeconomics.com):

Both remain slightly better than their low points in 2022-23, which is noteworthy because there was no recession then.

As I indicated above, for the economy as a whole the weighted index of manufacturing (25%) and non-manufacturing (75%) indexes is more important. In the non-manufacturing report, the averages of the last two months for the headline and new orders numbers have been 52.1 and 53.3, respectively. Pending the ISM report on services on Wednesday, the economically weighted headline number is 51.2, and the new orders average is 52.1. These containue to be expansionary if only weakly.

Last month I started to report on the prices paid and employment subindexes, as in the absence of current employment or inflation data are more important now. 

Prices paid (the ISM does not report on prices received downstream) increased from 58.0 last month to 58.5 this month, although it remains substantially lower than the 60.0+ readings from this summer, suggesting as with the regional Fed indexes that there is still widespread pricing pressure, but it is getting integrated into companies’ models. The graph below shows the last five years better to compare the current situation with the immediate post-pandemic inflation):

The low point remains employment, which sank from 46.0 last month to 44.0, among the lowest readings since the pandemic:

To sum up, unlike the regional Fed manufacturing reports, the ISM manufacturing report for November indicates a manufacturing sector sinking further into contraction on both the production and employment fronts, but facing stagflationary price pressures. Because this report is national in scope (vs. only 5 Fed districts) I would give this measure more weight. And given the pronounced weakness in the regional Fed services reports, Wednesday’s ISM services report assumes even greater importance.

Weekly Indicators for November 24 - 28 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

In the aggregate, consumer spending remains robust. On the other hand, as I pointed out yesterday with my aggregation of the various regional Fed reports on manufacturing and services, the largest sector of the US economy appears to be stagnant, or even shrinking somewhat. Another big sign that there may have been another ratchet downward in the economy is the deceleration in the YoY withholding tax payments since the beginning of the fiscal year in October (also when the government shutdown started. 

Of interest is the latest update from early November from California, which is 1/8th of the entire US population. There, withholding tax payments have continued to be very strong, up almost 10% YoY in October. If tax changes from the “Big Beautiful Bill” were driving the recent deceleration, i.e., taxpayers waiting until more favorable treatment next year, I would expect tech-heavy California to have lower comparisons than the rest of the country. But the reverse is true, suggesting that it is sluggish job growth that has been driving the sharp deceleration in payments. 

In any event, as usual clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and reward me a little bit for my efforts collecting and collating it all for you.

Regional Fed manufacturing and services indexes for November show manufacturing rebound, continued rampant price pressures, and stagnant employment

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Although the federal government has resumed reporting economic data, it is spotty and woefully stale, from August and September. As a result, the two big sources for current data remain the regional Feds and the ISM surveys. The latter will be reported next week for November, but all five regional Feds surveys of both manufacturing and services conditions have been reported. While they certainly aren’t perfect (to begin with, they are diffusion indexes rather than absolute numbers; and do not cover all ten regions), they provide a good sketch of current conditions in both economic sectors.

Last month they showed an upward trend in both manufacturing and services production and new orders, but Prices paid were increasing broadly, with prices received also increasing, but less broad. Finally, employment was at a standstill or worse. The only significant difference between the two sectors was the perception that manufacturing conditions were positive, and services negative. This month continued those trends.

Let’s take each sector in turn.

Manuacturing

The below chart includes, in order, NY, Philadelphia, Richmond, Kansas City, and Texas. Month over month changes are in parentheses, with the absolute values for November following. The final number is the average change and absolute number for all 5 together.

Regional Fed:     NY.           PHL.           RVA.       KC.    TX.    Avg

Headline:     (+8) 18.7; (+11.1) -1.7; (-11) -15; (+2) 8; (+15.3) 20.5; (+1.2) 4.7          

New Orders (+12.2) 15.9; (-26.8) -8.6; (-16) -22; (-3) -2; (+3.1) 4.8; (-1.4) 1.6 

Prices Paid  (-3.4) 49.0; (+6.9) 56.1; (+1.0) 6.8; (-5) 36; (+1.9) 35.3; (+7.6) 36.6 

Prices Rec’d (-3.2) 24.0; (-9.1) 17.7; (+0.1) 3.1; (-6) 13; (+3.1) 7.7; (-3.0) 13.7

Wages* (n/a) n/a; (n/a) n/a; (+9) 24; (n/a) n/a; (+1.2) 14.2); (+5.1) 19.7

Employment  (+0.4) 6.6; (+1.4) 6.0; (+3) -7; (+10) 11; (-0.8) 2.0; (+2.8) 3.6

____

* only 2 of the banks report this information

On Wednesday durable goods and core capital goods orders were reported for September, showing the second highest levels for both since the pandemic:

This confirmed the upswing we already saw in the regional Feds at the time. The above chart suggests that the improvement has continued since then. FRED does cover the NY, Philly, and Texas manufacturing surveys. Here is the average of the headline number for the three:

Next, here is the Services sector:

As with the manufacturing chart above, month over month changes are in parentheses, showing momentum (the 2nd derivative), with the absolute diffusion values for November following. The final number is the average change and absolute number for all 5 together.

Regional Fed:     NY.           PHL.           RVA.       KC.      TX.       Avg

Headline:  (-2.3) -21.7; (+5.9) -16.3; (-14) -15; (-2) -7; (+7.1) -2.3; (-1.1) -12.5     

Cap Ex   (+22.9) 16.3; (-11.3) 6.2; (-4) -3; (-19) -5; (7.4) 13.2; (-0.8) 5.5

Prices Paid  (-4.5) 61.9; (-1.1) 34.7; (-0.7) 4.8; (-3) 32; (+4.6) 27.6; (-1.0) 32.2

Prices Rec’d (-6.3) 20.1; (+9.1) 22.0; (-0.7) 3.1; (-7) 14; (+0.7) 6.5; (-0.6) 13.1  

Wages (-0.5) 25.4; (+11.0) 49.3; (-5) 12; (+3) 24; (+4.0) 14.7; (+2.5) 25.1 

Employment (-3.4) -8.6; (+3.0) 2.5; (+1) 1; (-12) -16; (+8.9) 3.1; (-0.4) -3.6

The only trend that showed month over month improvement was in wages. All other measures - headline business conditions, capex, prices paid and received, and employment - softened. At the same time, only the headline business conditions sentiment and employment were negative.

When we examine both the manufacturing and services sector in full as reported by the regional Feds in November, we see expanding manufacturing and services capex, but a divergence in the headline numbers. Prices paid continue to show widespread inflation, on some of which is being recovered as pass-throughs to consumers. And while wage growth remains strong, employment averages to flat at best.

The housing market continues to be recessionary: repeat home sales edition

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Note: there was a good advance manufacturers’ new orders report for September this morning. I’m going to save discussing it until Friday, when I dissect the regional Fed reports, which are now all in through November.

Neither building permits and starts, nor new residential sales, were updated this morning, which means that only the NAR’s existing home sales report is current, as I noted last week. What did get updated yesterday was price information for repeat home sales, by both S&P Case Shiller, and the FHFA.

On a monthly basis, the Case Shiller National Index rose 0.2%, while the FHFA Index was unchanged (note: for some reason FRED still hasn’t updated the latest FHFA data):

The above graph shows that in the last 10 years, house prices have almost doubled, while both average hourly wages and median household income have only risen about 50%. The big breakout was during the 2021-22 post pandemic inflation. 

This year house price gains have completely stalled, and are still under their nominal peaks:

The same downdraft is apparent in the YoY% comparisons, going all the way back to the inceptions of the two respective series:

House price gains have only been this weak in the past 35 years in the vicinity of the two consumer recessions, and briefly during 2023. Although not updated by FRED, the FHFA index only increased 1.7% in the past 12 months.

As I always point out, prices follow sales, and this year we have seen a pronounced downturn in permits, starts, and units under construction, as well as new home sales. The market typically rebalances as inventory follows prices, and as I discussed last week in terms of the NAR’s existing home sales report, inventories continue to slowly grow on a YoY basis.

In sum, the housing market continues to be generally recessionary, and yesterday’s price reports were consistent with that scenario.

Jobless claims continue recent trends, do not suggest any worsening of unemployment

 

 - by New Deal democrat

With the end of the government shutdown, jobless claims are fully updated and back on their regular schedule.

And this week, there was more of the same.

Initial jobless claims were down -6,000 to a very low 216,000, and the four week average declined -1,000 to 223,750. With the typical one week delay, continuing claims rose 7,000 to 1.960 million:

Typically my graphs have been of the last two years, but since there was some ballyhooing about the low 216,000 number, I thought a comparison with the last four years  puts it in more perspective, i.e., very good but not especially unusual.

As per usual, it is the YoY% changes which mean the most for my forecasting purposes. Just for example, a 260,000 number would have been great in the 1990s or 2000s, but would be very worrisome now. And in that regard, initial claims were unchanged YoY, the four week average was up 2.6%, and continuing claims were up 3.6%:

Higher comparisons YoY mean weakening, but unless they cross the 10% threshold, they don’t even raise a yellow flag. In other words, the economy is continuing to expand at a very low rate.

Because jobless claims lead the unemployment rate, which isn’t going to be reported at all for October, and November is almost over, they assume a greater importance for exploring that facet of the jobs market. Here’s what this week’s data adds to the update:

Initial claims are noisier but a more leading indicator, while initial plus continuing claims are less noisy but also much less leading. Either way, they are not forecasting any further deterioration in the unemployment rate over the next several months of monthly data - which we probably won’t have until January.

Real retail sales for September decline slightly, but within range of trend noise

 

 - by New Deal democrat

With the continued delay in the official release of the more comprehensive personal income and spending report, retail sales, which is normally one of my most important indicators, assumes even more importance. Additionally, with employment growth all but dead in the water since April, consumer spending - which leads future employment - is the single most crucial of whether or not the economy has reached a turning point. Unfourtanely, of course, because this release is for September, it is somewhat sale.

In any event, in September nominally retail sales rose 0.2%. There was no revision to August. After taking into account the 0.3% increase in September consumer prices, real retail sales declined -0.1% for the month from their post-pandemic high in August. Because real pesonal spending on goods historically tracks the trend if not the amplitude of real retail sales, that is also included in the below graph (gold, right scale):

So far there is no information as to when the latter series might be updated.

Historically, with the notable expection of 2022-23, in the past 75 years whenever real retail sales turned negative YoY, a recession was about to begin or had just begun. If it was positive and not sharply decelerating, a recession was unlikely in the immediate future. At present real retail sales are higher YoY by 1.2%, so there they are not forecasting any imminent downturn in the economy:

Further, because consumption leads employment, here is the updated graph of real retail sales YoY, together with real personal consumption of goods compared with nonfarm payrolls (red):

The last time I reported on this over two months ago, I wrote that “Based on historical experience, after the last two good months, real retail sales now suggest that YoY jobs growth will not roll over, but remain in a similar weakly positive range for the next several months.” That has been borne out so far, and that remains my conclusion for the next several month of data when they are reported (i.e., October and this month) as well.

Finally, because of the lag in the official data due to the shutdown, I have been paying extra attention to alternate indicators, and in this case the weekly Redbook Index of consumer spending. This was up 5.9% YoY this week, and has been trending gradually higher YoY since summer:

This likely reflects the wealth effect for the most affluent households due to the AI Boom in the stock market, which at least for now is counterbalancing the constricting effect of tariffs on spending by lower income households.

Producer prices in September told a tale of goods vs. services (plus; programming note)

 

 - by New Deal democrat

First, a scheduling note. Several data releases have been made this morning, and several more delayed releases having to do with housing *might* be released tomorrow. Alas, the very late Q3 GDP report is not going to be released at all until the end of December. There will be no releases on Thanksgiving Day and none of note on Friday.

Today I will take a look at the PPI and retail sales reports. I’ll save reporting on the Case Shiller and FHFA house price indexes until tomorrow, integrating that with any construction or new home sales reports which might also be issued. I’ll also update jobless claims.

Because of the sportiness and continued delays in the federal data, the regional Fed manufacturing and services indexes continue to be of greater importance. The last of these have also been reported yesterday and today, so I will take a comprehensive updated look at those on Friday.

Now … here is a quick look at the producer price index for September. In this case I can add little to the graphs that were supplied by the Census Bureau, below:

There is a distinct upward trend in goods prices (thank you, tariffs!), with a countervailing deceleration in service price inflation for producers. The latter is interesting because it suggests a cooling of the forces driving the services economy, which after all is the largest part of the consumer economy.

Further upstream, commodity prices increased only 0.1% in September, after being unchanged in August (blue, right scale). On a YoY basis, commodity prices are only up 1.7%, a deceleration from the 1.9% back in July (red, left scale) [note the below graph has not been updated through September yet, and there were minor changes in the prior few months]:

Recall that prices paid and received are part of the regional Fed reports. These are all now current through November, so the update on Friday is considerably more important than this two month old data.