Monday, June 10, 2019

Scenes from the May employment report: expect more lackluster reports, and layoffs in manufacturing


 - by New Deal democrat

Three months ago when the poor February jobs report came out, I was just about the only commentator who saw it as a harbinger rather than an outlier. On Friday the naysayers got silenced.

Let’s see how the more leading aspects of the employment report played out, with an eye towards the near future. To cut to the chase, expect more lackluster total payroll gains in the coming months, and further, it is a near certainty that there will be layoffs in manufacturing, probably totaling at least 50,000.  

But first, let’s take a quick look at wage growth, which has pulled back slightly from the beginning of this year. Nominal wage growth is significant because employers do not give out inflation-indexed wage increases, and the pattern is that, as underemployment decreases below about 9%, wage growth increases:


That isn’t cause for concern yet, given the noise in the series, including at least two prior temporary downturns in this expansion alone. But on the other hand, note that an extended period of a slowdown or flatness in growth has tended to occur in the final stage of expansions. This is best shown when we track the YoY change in percent of wage growth itself (i.e., the second derivative), averaged quarterly in the graph below:


After a mid- to late-cycle acceleration in wage growth, there has been a sharp deceleration to near or past zero in each of the last three cycles. So far there is no significant such deceleration, but if growth-in-the-growth falls to 0.5% or below, that would be a yellow flag for wages and for an oncoming downturn in the economy.


Now let’s turn to the “leading” metrics in the report. Here is the alternate household report jobs number (blue) vs. the establishment report jobs number (red):


While the headline establishment report is much less noisy, it is thought that the household report may lead at turning points. If that is so at present, we can expect more poor headline jobs numbers in coming months to “resolve” the disparity.


Next, here’s an update on the m/m% change in manufacturing, residential construction, and temporary employment:


The sharp slowing since the beginning of this year is apparent. Still, manufacturing and temporary jobs held on to positive numbers in May. Earlier this year when I took a lengthy look at those sectors, I suggested that gains of less than 0.2% m/m were a yellow flag, while negative numbers by at least two sectors over a number of months were a red flag. For now, we have a slowdown, but no imminent sign of recession.

Here is the broader goods sector of which manufacturing and construction are big parts vs. the service sector:


Note that goods-production jobs are much more cyclical, and have turned negative YoY before each of the last three recessions. They are still well into positive territory now.

Finally, expect significant layoffs in manufacturing.

The most leading metric of all is the manufacturing workweek. This turns down before manufacturing jobs themselves turn down (I.e., hours are cut back before jobs are cut back). These are now down -0.8 hours from peak (blue). The below graphs compares them with manufacturing employment (red):



While a downturn of -0.8 hours is significant, there have been six prior occasions (1952, 1966-68, 1978, 1985, 1996, and 1998-99) when there were declines of at least as much for more than one month without a recession ensuing. Unsurprisingly, these have usually coincided with economic slowdowns and yield curve flatness and inversions.

On the other hand, as you can see (if you squint a little!) all of these occasions, including those that did not result in recessions, have coincided with an actual decline in manufacturing employment. The smallest of these was a loss of -85,000 jobs in 1995 vs. for example, a loss of -170,000 in the 2002-03 slowdown.

This is a warning that manufacturing jobs, which have not turned down yet, are likely to do so in the months ahead. Since only about 2/3’s as many people work in manufacturing as in the 1990s, an equivalent loss to the 1995 loss would be a little less than 60,000 jobs.

Another way to look at the same relationship is the YoY% change in each (averaged quarterly to cut down on noise, hours*2 for scale):


Going back 70+ years, every time there has been a cumulative YoY decline of 2% in hours, a YoY decline in manufacturing jobs has followed, on all but two occasions between zero and two quarters after YoY hours turned negative. [In 2015-16, there was a cumulative -1.9% decline in hours, and just barely a YoY loss of manufacturing jobs four quarters later.] If there is no improvement in the manufacturing workweek in June, that 2% threshold will have been reached. In that case we should expect at least about 30,000 job losses in manufacturing by the end of this year.

To sum up, Friday’s jobs report showed us multiple signs of present weakness in leading sectors, suggesting continued and more widespread weakness to come, and while there are no signs of an imminent actual downturn in the economy, if past patterns are followed, there will be significant losses in manufacturing employment in the months to come.

Sunday, June 9, 2019

For party voting preference, which is more important, age or education? Looks like we have an answer


 - by New Deal democrat

For all the slicing and dicing that has been done in voting metrics for 2016 and 2018, one quandary has stood out. We know that higher educational attainment has strongly correlated with voting for Democrats, and we also know that there was a stark age difference in votes between Clinton and Trump in 2016: a majority of voters younger than 45 voted for Clinton, while a majority over 45 voted for Trump.

But the level of educational attainment has not remained static over time. With each passing generation, more and more students are getting a college degree, and advanced degrees as well.

So are the voting patterns mainly showing us that more younger voters have college degrees? Or is it really about generational experience? For example, is a Silent Generation or Boomer college graduate more likely to vote Democrat than a GenXer or Millenial with no college? This week I finally saw a graphic that spells out the answer, and here it is:



Age is more decisive, hands down. The only anomaly that even comes close is that voters aged 30 to 44 with a high school degree were only slightly more likely to vote Democratic than voters aged 45 to 64 without a high school degree.

Now, before you draw the conclusion that voters grow more conservative with age, remember that the Greatest Generation voted Democratic until the day they died. And keep in mind this demographic of the 2014 vote:


Mid-GenXers voted GOP just as much as early Boomers, and moreso than mid-Boomers (who have always skewed slightly Democratic). And late Boomers and early GenXers have voted more GOP than either early or mid-Boomers. The same pattern also shows up in the demographics of the 2012 Presidential vote:



By 2020, most of the very-right wing (and very pro-Trump) Silent Generation cohort is going to have passed from the scene.

Saturday, June 8, 2019

Weekly Indicators for June 3 - 7 at Seeking Alpha


 - by New Deal democrat

My Weekly Indicators post is up at Seeking Alpha.

Last year’s (relatively) high interest rates, along with Trump’s chaotic tariff and trade policies, have weakened the economy enough that lower mid- and long-term interest rates have arrived, and lower Fed funds rates are all but a certainty.

But will that be enough?

As usual, clicking over and reading should be educational for you, and reward me with a few pennies for my work.

Friday, June 7, 2019

May jobs report: this is the kind of report you see at negative inflection points



 - by New Deal democrat

HEADLINES: 
  • +75,000 jobs added
  • U3 unemployment rate unchanged at 3.6%
  • U6 underemployment rate declined -0.2% from 7.3% to 7.1% (new expansion low)

Leading employment indicators of a slowdown or recession

I am highlighting these because many leading indicators overall strongly suggest that an employment slowdown is coming. The following more leading numbers in the report tell us about where the economy is likely to be a few months from now. These were mixed m/m, but several are now sending significant negative signals.
  • the average manufacturing workweek declined -0.1 from 40.7 hours to 40.6 hours. This is one of the 10 components of the LEI. It is down -0.7 hours from its peak during this expansion. This has now crossed the threshold to being consistent with an oncoming recession.
  • Manufacturing jobs rose by 3,000. YoY manufacturing is up 184,000, a big deceleration from last summer’s pace.
  • construction jobs rose by 4,000. YoY construction jobs are up 215,000, also a deceleration from last summer. Residential construction jobs, which are even more leading, fell by -100, the second monthly decline in a row, a signal that the housing slowdown from last year has finally bled through into jobs.
  • temporary jobs rose by 5100, but April was revised down by about 4500. YoY these are up +44,000.
  • the number of people unemployed for 5 weeks or less rose by 243,000 from 1,904,000 to 2,147,000. The post-recession low was last month.

Wages and participation rates

Here are the headlines on wages and the broader measures of underemployment:
  • Not in Labor Force, but Want a Job Now: declined by -76,000 from 5.121 million to 5.045 million
  • Part time for economic reasons: declined by -299,000 from 4.654 million to 4.355 million
  • Employment/population ratio ages 25-54: unchanged at 79.7% (down -0.2 from its peak in January and February).
  • Average Hourly Earnings for Production and Nonsupervisory Personnel: rose $.07 from  $23.31 to $23.38, up +3.2% YoY.  (Note: you may be reading different information about wages elsewhere. They are citing average wages for all private workers. I use wages for nonsupervisory personnel, to come closer to the situation for ordinary workers.)  

Holding Trump accountable on manufacturing and mining jobs

 Trump specifically campaigned on bringing back manufacturing and mining jobs.  Is he keeping this promise?  
  • Manufacturing jobs rose an average of +14,500/month in the past year vs. the last seven years of Obama's presidency in which an average of +10,300 manufacturing jobs were added each month.   
  • Coal mining jobs rose by 500 for an average of +75/month in the past year vs. the last seven years of Obama's presidency in which an average of -300 jobs were lost each month
March was revised downward by -36,000. April was also revised downward by -39000, for a net change of -75,000.

Other important coincident indicators help  us paint a more complete picture of the present:
  • Overtime was unchanged at 3.4 hours.
  • Professional and business employment (generally higher-paying jobs) rose by 33,000 and  is up +498,000 YoY. This has also decelerated from last year’s pace.
  • the index of aggregate hours worked for non-managerial workers fell by -0.3%
  •  the index of aggregate payrolls for non-managerial workers rose by 0.1%  
Other news included:            
  • the  alternate jobs number contained  in the more volatile household survey rose by 113,000  jobs.  This represents an increase of 1,219,000 jobs YoY vs. 2,350,000 in the establishment survey. This survey, which has been negative three months this year, was a major disconnect from the establishment number. The household survey has a tendency to turn first, and this month it showed up in the establishment survey.
  • Government jobs fell by -15,000.
  • the overall employment to population ratio for all ages 16 and up was unchanged at 60.6% m/m and is up 0.2% YoY.          
  • The labor force participation rate was unchanged at 62.8% m/m and is unchanged YoY.

SUMMARY

The household survey has a reputation of turning first at inflection points. For the first four months this year, the household survey was poor, while the establishment survey was on a tear. This month, proving the adage, the establishment survey punted, even as the household survey improved somewhat.

Let me start with the positives: although it was small, job growth held up in the construction, manufacturing, and temporary jobs sectors (although residential construction jobs did decline slightly). On the margins of the employed, both involuntary part time employment, and those who aren’t looking but want a job now, declined, causing the underemployment rate to fall to yet another expansion low.

But there are plenty of negatives: not just the poor headline number, but the big negative revisions to the last two months (this is also something that tends to happen at turning points). The most leading of all the employment measures, the manufacturing workweek, is now down -0.7 hours from peak. Over the past 70 years, this has more often than not signaled a coming recession. The prime age employment to population ratio is now significantly down from its expansion peak at the beginning of this year. Aggregate hours for non-managerial workers also declined, as did the rate of YoY wage growth.

So far this year jobs have grown by an average of 164,000 a month. YoY job growth has now significantly turned down from its peak at the beginning of this year.

This kind of report does not scream “recession,” but on the other hand it is consistent with the onset of recession by the end of this year. Because inflation is under the Fed’s target, it will make it very easy for the Fed to justify a rate cut, possibly as early as this month’s meeting.

Thursday, June 6, 2019

Initial claims still show no signs of stress


 - by New Deal democrat

As you may recall from last week, I am starting to monitor initial jobless claims to see if there are any signs of stress.

My two thresholds are:
1. If the four week average on claims is more than 10% above its expansion low.
2. If the YoY% change in the monthly average turns higher.

Let’s take a look through today, and also see how that might play out in tomorrow’ jobs report.

First, the four week average is only 7.5% above its recent low:

Second, the YoY% change in the monthly average is still lower by about -2.5%:

Finally, since initial claims tend to slightly lead the unemployment rate, here’s a look at the YoY% change in the four week average (blue) compared with the YoY change in the unemployment rate (red):

Since initial claims have still been generally trending lower - at least slightly - YoY, I am anticipating that the unemployment rate will remain slightly lower than last May’s reading of 3.8%. I suspect it will tick up from 3.6% to 3.7%. In any event, we’ll find out tomorrow morning.