Have any impacts from Tariff-palooza! shown up in hard data yet?

 

 - by New Deal democrat

A few days ago Prof. Menzie Chinn at Econbrowser posted the below graphs comparing the time that hard vs. soft data reacted to economic shocks:

As you know, I have been looking at hard “high frequency” data to see if any of the effects of Tariff-palooza! have shown up yet.

And so far, the signs are meager.

Here is this morning’s update of consumer retail spending YoY from Redbook:

In the last week, it has slowed down to a 5.4% increase YoY, about average for the past 12 months.

And I won’t even bother with the graph of restaurant reservations, one of the easiest things for consumers to cut back on. Suffice it to say that they are up about 8% YoY.

If consumers aren’t cutting back on their discretionary spending, what about effects on the supply side?

Here is the latest graph from the AAR of rail traffic for the week of May 10, showing both the comparison of the same week YoY, and cumulatively this year so far vs. 2024:

The only sign of weakness here is that at the beginning of April cumulative 2025 intermodal traffic was higher by 8.7% YoY. Since then almost every week that number has declined, such that last week it was only up 7.9%.

And what about shipping? A month ago there was a flurry of reporting about collapsing inbound ship traffic. So I have been paying attention to the weekly inbound numbers for the Port of Los Angeles.

Here’s what the last 7 weeks look like in TEU volumes:

WEEK. 2025. 2024

4/26.    119.8. 76.8
5/3.        85.5. 95.5

5/10.      74.9. 111.4

5/17.      86.6. 98.6

5/24.    103.1. 66.0

5/31.      60.8. 91.9

6/7.        96.1. 98.9

TOTAL 626.8  638 (-1.9%)

Ex-4/26 507.0. 562.0 (-9.8%)

Note that the traffic that arrived during the week of April 26 probably started its journey before “Liberation Day,” which is why I included the second figure. But even so, while there has been a decline, it has not been as drastic as first reported.

And Wall Street has rebounded sharply on the “TACO” trade, which stands for “T—-p Always Chickens Out”:

As of the close yesterday, the S&P 500 was only down -2.9% from its all time high.

The bottom line is that so far almost no hard data is reflecting an impact from Tariff-palooza! - at least, not yet.

In Q1, bank conditions for loans appear to have darkened

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Until Thursday we are once again in a data drought this week. In the meantime, there are a few points I want to address, including the very important Moody’s downgrade of US debt.

But there was one important piece of data that came out last week that I didn’t discuss yet: the quarterly Senior Loan Officers Survey published by the Federal Reserve.

The ease or difficulty in obtaining a loan is an important long leading indicator. Banks generally ease credit terms earlier in the cycle, and tighten them as they become incrementally more cautious about loan repayment. In general they turn relatively cautious more than 12 months before a recession.

I have not placed a lot of weight on the long leading indicators for several years, because their information was confounded by the massive kinking and then unkinking of the supply chain during COVID. While that ended at the beginning of 2023, the problem for, e.g., interest rates, has been whether I should base a forecast during this entire expansion including the supply chain problem years, or only since the beginning of 2023? There is simply no good answer.

But the Senior Loan Officer Survey does not have that conundrum. Since the beginning of 2023, there either has or has not been more demand for loans, and banks either have or have not tightened terms and conditions since then. So I can safely look at the trends over the past 2+ years.

Many of the old metrics from this release were discontinued some years ago, and others do not have an extensive history, but there are two important metrics that have been reported consistently for 35 years. 

The first of those is demand for loans from producers. More demand is expansionary; less is constractionary. In the below graph, the thick lines are for loan demand from big firms. The narrower lines are demand from small firms:

Note that these turned down over a year before both the 2001 and 2008 recessions. They also turned down later during the 2010’s expansion that may or may not have been cut short by COVID. As indicated above, they also turned down during the period of COVID supply chain tightness.

But over the last several years the situation looked very much like the early recoveries from both the 2001 and 2008 recessions. Demand was still not strengthening, but it had stopped declining in relative terms. This needless to say was good.

Now let me focus in on the last 5 years of this data:

After being positive in Q4 2024, it turned down in Q1 of this year. Only one quarter, but if it does not turn back positive this quarter then we have likely broken the improving trend, and this metric becomes a negative for the economy one year plus out.

The second indicator with a long history of being leading is whether banks are tightening or easing loan terms for firms. In this metric a number above zero indicates more tightening and so is a negative for the economy:

There is less noise in this indicator, and only one significant false positive, in 2016. Like demand, it was getting better in 2023 and 2024 after the supply chain issue stopped, and looked very much like an early recovery chart.

But in Q4 of last year the decline stopped, and it reversed higher in Q1 of this year. This is significant tightening, a sharper increase than in 2016. Which means it is already a negative for the economy in 2026.

Finally there is one important caveat. The Chicago Fed publishes weekly figures for financial conditions, which while noisier in the past have generally tracked with the quarterly Senior Loan Officer numbers. These are another set of series in which a negative number means loosening, so good; a positive number tightening, so bad. 

In any event, they have not tracked with the most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey this year:

The weekly numbers indicate continued loose conditions, with only a very slight move to “less loose” in the past several months. I would expect these weekly numbers to turn positive (i.e., bad) significantly before the start of any recession.

Weekly Indicators for May 12 - 16 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

Changes due to Tariff-palooza! are happening very slowly. Most noteworthy this past week, rail traffic is still running ahead of rail traffic in the same week one year ago. But when we focus just on the intermodal container traffic, which is the main type coming from overseas, the growth rate of the volume - while still higher cumulatively than the first 4.5 months of 2024 - has slowed down comparatively almost every week since late March, suggesting that very slowly at least the backlog from front-running is being resolved.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the economy, and bring me a penny or two in lunch money.

Housing permits and starts still rangebound, but with units under construction down almost -20%, is the last shoe finally dropping?

 

 - by New Deal democrat

In April total permits (dark blue in the graph below) declined -69,000 on an annualized basis to 1.412 million, while the less volatile single family permits (red, right scale) number declined -50,000 to 922,000. The slightly lagging and much more volatile starts number (gray, narrow) rose 22,000 to 1.361 million annualized:

The same data on a YoY basis demonstrates how it has been rangebound:

This is of a piece - and largely caused by - mortgage rates (YoY change, inverted, *10 in the graph below), which have also been rangebound between roughly 6% - 7%:

You may recall several years ago, even though starts and permits had declined sharply, the number of housing units under construction - the closest proxy for the actual economic impact of new housing construction - continued to levitate at all-time record levels. But ultimately they declined sharply as well, Once that happened, ever since the beginning of 2024, I have paid ever more attention to how deeply it would decline. Typically it has taken about a -15% decline to be consistent with a recession. Once that happens, the last show to drop is the number of employees engaged in residential building construction (red, right scale in the graph below). In April, housing units under construction dropped another -9,000 to 1.382 million annualized, a -19.6% decline from their October 2022 peak, while residential construction employment finally did decline as well, if only by -700:

Last month I wrote that “Since the significant downturn in units under construction began about 18 months ago, I suspect the turn in employment will take place within the next few months.“ I suspect April did indeed mark the turn.

To better show the trend, here is the same data on a YoY% change basis, together with manufacturing employment (gray):

With the exception of one month in 1995, any time both housing units under construction have been joined by residential construction employment as YoY negative, a recession has followed within 12-18 months. When manufacturing employment is also down, recession has been inevitable.

If April did indeed mark the turning point for residential construction employment, a loss of only -7,000 jobs in that sector over the next six months would be enough to set of recession alarm bells.

Industrial and manufacturing production suggest front-running production has peaked

 - by New Deal democrat

The final datapoint for today is industrial production, including its important manufacturing component. 

Last month I wrote that “I suspect the big increases in February and March in manufacturing, like this morning’s retail sales numbers, were about front-running T—-p’s tariffs. Which means that like retail sales, production might have been pulled forward from the next few months, which may lead to whipsaw declines.”

That probably started to happen in April, as total production (blue) was unchanged, while manufacturing production (red) declined -0.4%:

But improvement continues to show on a YoY basis:

This data was partially supported by the first two regional Fed manufacturing reports for May, from New York and Philadelphia, which came in at -9.2 and -4.0, respectively. But the new orders components of both the NY and Philadelphia surveys improved, however, to +7.0 and +7.5, respectively - which were sharp improvements from -8.8 and -27.2 last month.

I think it is safe to suggest that the front-running of tariffs on the production side may have peaked; but on the other hand there is no significant evidence of contraction beyond what may be monthly noise. The expansion continues, for now.

Real retail sales turn down in April, but continue to reflect consumers’ front-running of tariffs

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Next up in today’s slew of data is retail sales. This is one of the most important indicators I look at, because it tells us so much about consumers, and since consumption leads employment, it gives us information about the trend in that as well.

In April, nominally retail sales rose 0.1%. But because consumer prices rose 0.2%, real retail sales declined after rounding by -0.2% (blue in the graphs below). In recent months I have also been calculated real sales excluding shelter, because that has been distorting the CPI. This month the result was the same: real retail sales ex-shelter were down -0.2% (gold). In the below graph I also show real personal consumption expenditures for goods (red), which tends to track real retail sales well, but won’t be reported for several more weeks:

With rare exceptions - one of which was in 2023-24 - when real retail sales are negative YoY, a recession has followed shortly. In the past 12 months, real retail sales YoY have been positive, and was so again in April, up 2.8%. Excluding shelter, real retail sales were up 3.7%:

These are strong positive readings, and as so much I have reported on in the past few weeks, almost certainly have been affected by consumers front-running price increases and shortages anticipated from tariffpalooza.

Finally, let’s compare the YoY% changes with their potential effects on employment (red):

The good news is that these imply that the YoY% change in employment should hold steady or even improve a little bit in the next several months. Given that all but one month last spring and summer shoeed under 150,000 gains in employment, this implies job gains in the 150,000-200,000 range.

Jobless claims: more of the same

 

 - by New Deal democrat

After a long data drought, there are many releases today. I’ll start with jobless claims.

Initial claims were unchanged at 229,000, while the four week moving average rose 2,250 to 230,500. With the typical one week delay, continuing claims rose 9,000 to 1.881 million:

On the YoY% basis more important for forecasting purposes, initial claims were up 3.2%, the four week average up 6.1%, and continuing claims up 5.1%:

These YoY numbers are in line with what we have been seeing for the past eight months. They imply a relatively weak but expanding economy.

Finally, let’s take our first look at what this might imply for the unemployment rate in the next several months:

There is no upward pressure from either initial or continuing jobless claims, implying the unemployment rate will stay in the 4.1%-4.2% range.

Average and aggregate nonsupervisory real April wages continued to fuel the consumer

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Now that we have April’s consumer inflation data, let’s update real wages for average American families.

In April average hourly wages for nonsupervisory employees increased 0.3%, and aggregate payrolls for nonsupervisory employees increased 0.4%. Since CPI increased 0.2%, in real terms wages (light blue) increased 0.1% and aggregate payrolls (dark blue) increased 0.2%:

In the case of payrolls, this was a new all-time high. In the case of wages, it was an all-time high excluding April and May 2020, which were distorted by layoffs that concentrated on low wage service workers.

Here are the same metrics as YoY% changes:

Real hourly wages are up 1.7%, while real aggregate payrolls are up over 3%. 

The bottom line is that in April ordinary American consumers had more to spend in real terms, which is good for confidence and also means they had more of an ability to front-run tariff impacts by purchasing goods in advance.

In preparing this post, I wondered how much it was a feature of earlier recessions that low wage employees bore te brunt of layoffs. So the below two graphs compare real average hourly wages (light blue) and real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls (dark blue) since the 1960s.

Looking in reverse chronological order, we see that low wage workers appear to have borne the brunt of recession layoffs in both the 2001 and 2008 recessions as well:

But in the 1970s through 1991, both aggregate real payrolls and average real hourly wages moved more or less in tandem:

Note by the way that over time aggregate payrolls increase more than wages, because of populations and labor force increases. In other words, if real wages are unchanged, but more people are earning those wages, then the aggregate goes up while the average does not. And when we are talking about whether the economy as a whole is improving or contracting, the aggregate amount is more important.

In any event, the above suggests that those earlier recessions hit the spectrum of wage earners more equally; but it is also possible that it is not a coincidence that this earlier period is when women entered the workforce in huge numbers, so that recessions exacerbated the securlar downtrend in real wages that lasted until women were fully absorbed into the labor force by around 1995.

In any event, the news for April suggests that American consumers are not ready to roll over into a cautious recessionary ball.

April CPI: the second victorious report in a row

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Last month, I wrote that the March CPI report was the one we had been waiting for for the past three years. April’s was the second one in a row.

To cut to the chase, there were no major components besides shelter which qualified as “problem children,” i.e., sectors with 4.0% YoY inflation or more, and these were minor components: meat, motor vehicle repairs and insurance, and gas utility service. Even eggs no longer qualified. In the aggregate, consumer prices ex-shelter were once again totally somnolent.

Here’s my more detailed look.

First, here are the headline (blue), core (red), and ex-shelter (gold) m/m numbers m/m for the past two years:

For prices ex-shelter, which rose 0.2% last month, only May and June of last year, in addition to one month ago, were comparably low. Headline and core inflation, both also up 0.2% for the month, remain low for the last 24 months, but not totally sanguine.

Here is the same data YoY:

On a YoY basis, headline prices were up 2.3%, the lowest since February 2021. Core prices were up 2.8%, tied with last month for the lowest since November 2021, and CPI less shelter was up 1.4%, the lowest since last October.

The recalcitrant sector of shelter increased 0.3%, tied for the 2nd lowest monthly increase in the past 2.5 years. Breaking shelter down further, rent increased 0.3% for the month, and owner’s equivalent rent increased 0.4%, the same as in March. These were all slightly above average for the past 12 months, but all slightly lower, by less than -0.1%, than last April:

On a YoY basis, the increase of shelter at +4.0% was the lowest in almost 3.5 years, as was rent. Owners equivalent rent has been even more recalcitrant, at 4.3%, but is still at a 3 year low on a YoY basis:

For comparison, here is the YoY change in repeat home sales in the FHFA index vs. OER:

I continue to expect slow disinflation winding up somewhere around the 3.5% range within the next year.

The even more lagging problem child, transportation services (blue in the graph below), mainly motor vehicle insurance and repairs, increased 0.1% for the month, after decreasing -0.7% in March. On a YoY basis it was up 2.5%, the best reading in 4 years:

This deceleration has been driven mainly by a decline in airfares. Unfortunately FRED does not break out motor vehicle insurance, but they increased 0.6% for the month and 6.4% YoY, while the the cost of repairs (red above) increased 0.7% and 5.6%, respectively.

Further, the former problem children of both new and used vehicle prices gave further evidence that they appear to have nearly completed their normalization process. New car prices were unchanged for the month and up only 0.3% YoY, while used car prices declined -0.5% in April after a -0.7% decline in March, and are only up 1.5% YoY:

Finally, although energy prices rose 0.7% for the month, they are down  -3.5% YoY:

As indicated in the intro, the only other remaining problem children are gas utilities, up 15.7% YoY, and meats and poultry up 7.0% YoY. Even eggs declined -12.7% for the month.

  

All is not rosy, since grocery prices for meats and eggs are an important basic group. But they are a very small share of total prices. The only significant problem children are either lagging (shelter vs. home prices; motor vehicle repairs vs. new vehicle prices), and even more lagging (motor vehicle insurance vs. repair costs). Indeed, ex-shelter consumer inflation has not even reached 2.5% in almost 3 years.

This was another good report which ought to allow the Fed to declare victory, if it chose to.

Measures of median wage growth show why consumers have still been able to outpace tariff increases

 

 - by New Deal democrat

We’re still in a new data drought. CPI gets released tomorrow, and then a slew of data on Thursday. In the meantime there is one more data point that helps explain why consumers are still powering the economy forward.

The Atlanta Fed maintains a “wage tracker” that measures wage growth, most importantly sliced between “job stayers” and “job leavers.” In general people switch jobs for better wages so unsurprisingly the latter make out better than the former, who take whatever their current employer gives them.

On of the important reasons why many people were so down on the economy last year is that outrunning 20% inflation by 1% is far less attractive than outrunning 3% inflation by 1%, which a recent Fed study reinforced. Further, job stayers typically didn’t outrun inflation at all! It was job switchers who came out ahead.

Well, the Atlanta Fed updated their data a couple of weeks ago. It showed that on a three month average basis, job switchers’ wages were growing at a 4.3% annual rate, which job stayers’ wages were actually growing slightly better, at a 4.4% annual rate. The below graph shows the historical basis by subtracting the current figures so that they show at the 0 line:

Although wage growth has slowed considerably from its torrid days of 2022 and 2023, on a historical basis job switchers are still seeing wage growth better than about 3/4’s of the time between the turn of the Millennium and the pandemic. Job stayers are making out better than at *any time* between 2001 and the pandemic. So while I read some commentary last week about how wages are growing at a much slower rate than recently, they are still growing at a historically high rate.

But how does that play out in “real” terms? In the below graph I add on the YoY% growth in CPI (red) for comparison:

In the decade between 2004 and 2014, wages grew barely more than inflation for either group. One reason the first T—-p term may be remembered fondly by some in economic terms is that wages substantially outperformed inflation from 2015 through 2019.

Now let me take the same data focused in on the post-pandemic era:

In 2021 and 2022, neither job stayers nor switchers were able to keep up with inflation. By the end of 2022, job switchers started pulling ahead, but job stayers did not do so until four months later. Since 2023, wages for both groups have consistently grown more than inflation by about 2%-3%.

This has been giving consumers a lot more leeway to spend on stuff, up to and including now.

Finally, here are a couple of median, rather than average, wage metrics adjusted for consumer inflation:

One important difference is that the Employment Cost Index is adjusted for the type of job performed, while usual weekly wages are not. Since many low-paid service workers were laid off during the COVID lockdowns, the latter metric was distorted by the job mix, whereas the former measure was not.

This is important, becuase even with improvement, adjusted for inflation, the median E.C.I. has still not made up all of the ground it lost after the outset of the pandemic.

Weekly Indicators for May 4 - 8 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

Unsurprisingly, the big news this week from the high frequency indicators is what I have been writing about almost all week; namely, that consumers still have money to spend, and they are spending it front-running the impacts from T—-p’s tariffs.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and reward me a little bit for organizing and presenting it to you.

More fuel to help consumers deal with tariffs: real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls likely increased again in April

 

 - by New Deal democrat

One of my favorite indicators is both a significant update from last week’s jobs report, as well as a good explanation for why therre has been no “instant recession” due to “Liberation Day” Tariff-palooza. Namely, real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls.

To quickly recap, this tells us in real, inflation-adjusted terms how much money average Americans have to spend in the aggregate. When the total amount of money goes down in real terms, a recession is almost always at hand.

Here is the historical relationship measured as YoY% changes up until the pandemic (side note: I really wish FRED would add on a feature allowing ranges to be capped, so that the pandemic lockdown months don’t make everything else look like squiggles):

The metric is flawless. Every time inflation went up more than aggregate payrolls YoY, it marked the beginning of a recession +/- 2 months. The only qualification is that “jobless recoveries” show up as continued negative comparisons.  But when inflation increases past aggregate compensation, that marks an imminent recession; and when it crosses to the downside, it is always during a period of expansion.

Here is the same relationship post-pandemic:

Aggregate payrolls have consistently increased more YoY than inflation. At the end of 2022 they came close, but no cigar. In fact, since the beginning of 2024 the comparison had become more positive.

Finally, here is the month by month percentage change for the past year:

In last week’s jobs report, aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls increased 0.4%, about average for the past 12 months. Only once in the past twelve months have consumer prices increased more than that. 

Consumer inflation for April will be reported next Tuesday. Unless there is a major surprise, real aggregate nonsuperviosory payrolls will be shown to have increased again. And this in turn gives consumers more ability to deal with tariff-related price increases. Which means the Tariff recession will likely continue to be delayed.

New jobless claims well-behaved, but continuing claims trend higher

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Initial jobless claims returned to a well-behaved range this week, down -13,000 to 228,000. The four week moving average was in line, increasing 1,000 to 227,000. Continuing claims, with the typical one week delay, declined -37,000 to 1.879 million, which is still near the top end of their 12 month range:

The one significant item from the above is that continuing claims have definitely been in a slowly increasing trend over the past eight months, indicating a slow weakening of the labor market.

In the more important for forecasting purposes YoY% comparisons, initial claims were actually lower by -0.4% than the same week last year, while the four week average remained higher by 5.8%, and continuing claims higher by 5.3%:

Again, this indicates the labor market was not as strong as last year, but it still denotes expansion.

This is also the indication from the “quick and dirty model” of the S&P 500 YoY compared with the 4 week average of claims (inverted):

It will take a couple more weeks of data before we know if the big jump in claims one week ago was just an outlier, or the beginning of a higher trend.

Leading employment sectors from the April jobs report - no definitive signs of peaking

 - by New Deal democrat

Let’s take a belated look at some of the more important datapoints that came out of last Friday’s employment report for April.

To start with, as I’ve mentioned numerous times, frequently service jobs (blue in the graph below) continue increasing all the way through recessions. It is goods producing jobs (red) that turn down in advance. As of now, both are still increasing:

In the fifty years after WW2, manufacturing employment turning down was an excellent indicator of an oncoming recession. But since manufacturing fled first to Mexico and then to China and other points in Asia, it is no longer sufficient; construction employment must also turn down. And while manufacturing jobs did peak in early 2023 (blue) but show signs of stabilizing in the past six months, construction jobs (gold) have continued to increase:

And the most leading sector of construction is residential building. These jobs (red) did decline in April, but it is far too soon to determine if that is just noise or not. The other “last shoe to drop” in the housing sector before a recession starts is new homes for sale (blue). These have shown signs of peaking over the past six months, and may have made their cycle peak in January:

Note that all of the above numbers are “organic,” as they don’t reflect the impact of T—-p’s tariffpalooza. At least, not yet.
 

Consumers continue to front-run tariffs, now with an energy tailwind

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Back in March I took a look at how producers and consumers reacted to periods of high political policy uncertainty, concluding that usually in the past consumers had reacted first, somewhere between almost simultaneously to with a one quarter delay, and producers reacted afterward to the downturn in demand by cutting back on new orders, especially for durable goods.

The interesting twist this time is that consumers are bracing now for an upturn in prices, and even more for some empty store shelves. So this time around, rather than pulling in their horns, consumers are front-running tariffs and shortages by stockpiling supplies.

This has been showing up in the weekly Redbook consumer spending updates, which track retail spending YoY. For the last five weeks, it has had among the highest YoY readings since late 2022:

Some of this in the first several weeks probably had to do with Easter week being three weeks later this year than last year, but the surge in spending has continued for several weeks beyond that period, so clearly more is going on - and it is almost certainly front-running of expected supply disruptions. 

Consumers have also continued to spend on restaurants, typically one of the first places where they cut spending:

Again, there was a big YoY spike in early April due to the YoY change in Easter week, but the pattern of 7%-8% or so increases YoY has continued.

Another tailwind for consumers is that oil prices have fallen below $60/barrel, the lowest price in over four years:

This is likely to result in gas prices back under $3/gallon shortly.

The other reversal from past episodes of uncertainty is that it is importers and producers relying on those importers who have cut back. Yesterday I noted that the ISM services index had rebounded somewhat in April over March. But the S&P has a competing Purchase Managers Index, which only has about a 20 year history; and one difference there is that they do calculate a composite manufacturing + services economically weighted index.

And in April that composite index declined to a two year low:

The index is still slightly above 50, so it indicates a slightly expanding economy, which is the same result I came to using an economically weighted average of the ISM indexes.

In any event, although the economy remains at heightened risk, the “instant recession” some saw in early April has not materialized.