Tuesday, June 11, 2019

April JOLTS report: a mixed bag consistent with the strong jobs report one month ago


 - by New Deal democrat

The jobs report one month ago was a blowout to the upside, so I expected the JOLTS report for April, reported yesterday with a one month lag, to follow suit. And generally it did.

Because this series is only 20 years old, we only have one full business cycle to compare. During the 2000s expansion:

  • Hires peaked first, from December 2004 through September 2005
  • Quits peaked next, in September 2005
  • Layoffs and Discharges peaked next, from October 2005 through September 2006
  • Openings peaked last, in April 2007
In yesterday’s report:
  • Hires made a new expansion high
  • Quits were only 1000 off their expansion high
  • Layoffs and discharges backed off from interim lows in January and March
  • Openings continued to fade from their expansion high last November:
Here’s the composite graph (with layoffs and discharges inverted, since fewer is better):


And here are the YoY% changes, better to show the underlying trend (minus hires, which I’ll break out separately below:


You can see that openings are weak, and quits actually went negative, while layoffs have improved from a year ago. 

Next, here is the update of the “hiring leads firing (actually, total separations)” metric:


And here is the same data measured as a YoY% change:


Hires bounced back strongly in April, while total separations continue to show weakness but are not negative.

To sum up, this was a strong report, on par with the strong April jobs report, with hiring and quits consistent with a strong employment picture, while other metrics showed varying degrees of weakness, but no impending doom. The report may also have been affected by residual seasonality due to the very late Easter. If so, there will be payback one month from now.

Monday, June 10, 2019

Scenes from the May employment report: expect more lackluster reports, and layoffs in manufacturing


 - by New Deal democrat

Three months ago when the poor February jobs report came out, I was just about the only commentator who saw it as a harbinger rather than an outlier. On Friday the naysayers got silenced.

Let’s see how the more leading aspects of the employment report played out, with an eye towards the near future. To cut to the chase, expect more lackluster total payroll gains in the coming months, and further, it is a near certainty that there will be layoffs in manufacturing, probably totaling at least 50,000.  

But first, let’s take a quick look at wage growth, which has pulled back slightly from the beginning of this year. Nominal wage growth is significant because employers do not give out inflation-indexed wage increases, and the pattern is that, as underemployment decreases below about 9%, wage growth increases:


That isn’t cause for concern yet, given the noise in the series, including at least two prior temporary downturns in this expansion alone. But on the other hand, note that an extended period of a slowdown or flatness in growth has tended to occur in the final stage of expansions. This is best shown when we track the YoY change in percent of wage growth itself (i.e., the second derivative), averaged quarterly in the graph below:


After a mid- to late-cycle acceleration in wage growth, there has been a sharp deceleration to near or past zero in each of the last three cycles. So far there is no significant such deceleration, but if growth-in-the-growth falls to 0.5% or below, that would be a yellow flag for wages and for an oncoming downturn in the economy.


Now let’s turn to the “leading” metrics in the report. Here is the alternate household report jobs number (blue) vs. the establishment report jobs number (red):


While the headline establishment report is much less noisy, it is thought that the household report may lead at turning points. If that is so at present, we can expect more poor headline jobs numbers in coming months to “resolve” the disparity.


Next, here’s an update on the m/m% change in manufacturing, residential construction, and temporary employment:


The sharp slowing since the beginning of this year is apparent. Still, manufacturing and temporary jobs held on to positive numbers in May. Earlier this year when I took a lengthy look at those sectors, I suggested that gains of less than 0.2% m/m were a yellow flag, while negative numbers by at least two sectors over a number of months were a red flag. For now, we have a slowdown, but no imminent sign of recession.

Here is the broader goods sector of which manufacturing and construction are big parts vs. the service sector:


Note that goods-production jobs are much more cyclical, and have turned negative YoY before each of the last three recessions. They are still well into positive territory now.

Finally, expect significant layoffs in manufacturing.

The most leading metric of all is the manufacturing workweek. This turns down before manufacturing jobs themselves turn down (I.e., hours are cut back before jobs are cut back). These are now down -0.8 hours from peak (blue). The below graphs compares them with manufacturing employment (red):



While a downturn of -0.8 hours is significant, there have been six prior occasions (1952, 1966-68, 1978, 1985, 1996, and 1998-99) when there were declines of at least as much for more than one month without a recession ensuing. Unsurprisingly, these have usually coincided with economic slowdowns and yield curve flatness and inversions.

On the other hand, as you can see (if you squint a little!) all of these occasions, including those that did not result in recessions, have coincided with an actual decline in manufacturing employment. The smallest of these was a loss of -85,000 jobs in 1995 vs. for example, a loss of -170,000 in the 2002-03 slowdown.

This is a warning that manufacturing jobs, which have not turned down yet, are likely to do so in the months ahead. Since only about 2/3’s as many people work in manufacturing as in the 1990s, an equivalent loss to the 1995 loss would be a little less than 60,000 jobs.

Another way to look at the same relationship is the YoY% change in each (averaged quarterly to cut down on noise, hours*2 for scale):


Going back 70+ years, every time there has been a cumulative YoY decline of 2% in hours, a YoY decline in manufacturing jobs has followed, on all but two occasions between zero and two quarters after YoY hours turned negative. [In 2015-16, there was a cumulative -1.9% decline in hours, and just barely a YoY loss of manufacturing jobs four quarters later.] If there is no improvement in the manufacturing workweek in June, that 2% threshold will have been reached. In that case we should expect at least about 30,000 job losses in manufacturing by the end of this year.

To sum up, Friday’s jobs report showed us multiple signs of present weakness in leading sectors, suggesting continued and more widespread weakness to come, and while there are no signs of an imminent actual downturn in the economy, if past patterns are followed, there will be significant losses in manufacturing employment in the months to come.

Sunday, June 9, 2019

For party voting preference, which is more important, age or education? Looks like we have an answer


 - by New Deal democrat

For all the slicing and dicing that has been done in voting metrics for 2016 and 2018, one quandary has stood out. We know that higher educational attainment has strongly correlated with voting for Democrats, and we also know that there was a stark age difference in votes between Clinton and Trump in 2016: a majority of voters younger than 45 voted for Clinton, while a majority over 45 voted for Trump.

But the level of educational attainment has not remained static over time. With each passing generation, more and more students are getting a college degree, and advanced degrees as well.

So are the voting patterns mainly showing us that more younger voters have college degrees? Or is it really about generational experience? For example, is a Silent Generation or Boomer college graduate more likely to vote Democrat than a GenXer or Millenial with no college? This week I finally saw a graphic that spells out the answer, and here it is:



Age is more decisive, hands down. The only anomaly that even comes close is that voters aged 30 to 44 with a high school degree were only slightly more likely to vote Democratic than voters aged 45 to 64 without a high school degree.

Now, before you draw the conclusion that voters grow more conservative with age, remember that the Greatest Generation voted Democratic until the day they died. And keep in mind this demographic of the 2014 vote:


Mid-GenXers voted GOP just as much as early Boomers, and moreso than mid-Boomers (who have always skewed slightly Democratic). And late Boomers and early GenXers have voted more GOP than either early or mid-Boomers. The same pattern also shows up in the demographics of the 2012 Presidential vote:



By 2020, most of the very-right wing (and very pro-Trump) Silent Generation cohort is going to have passed from the scene.