1.) The economy slows down. In other words, GDP growth turns negative and unemployment increases. Also of importance during this step of the process: interest rates drop. Why? Lack of demand. Who wants to take out a loan when the economy is in a recession? This is why the yield curve inverts just before a recession
(Actually, what really happens is traders realize that risk based assets are at minimum going to tread water and at worst are going to fall. Hence they sell equities and buy bonds. Also note that in a recession, there is lower inflation, so interest rate payments from bonds are going to have a higher rate of return.)
2.) Now, the government borrows money to invest in two things, the first of which is social welfare payments such as unemployment benefits, food assistance etc... Why? Because people lost their jobs in a recession and they need money. This also adds to the amount of money in the economy, keeping some movement of funds moving, thereby at minimum limiting downside economic movement. Also note that PCEs comprise about70% of GDP, so bolstering this number helps.
Next, the government invests in infrastructure like roads, power grids, public works projects etc... Why? Because investment pays amazingly large dividends over an extended period of time like decades. In this article, I highlight how Houston, Texas could not be the fourth largest city in the US without major infrastructure investment, but here's the short version.
There are four areas around Houston that are growing strongly: the Woodlands, Cy-Fair, Katy and Sugarland. All are located on major highway arteries (45N, Highway 290, Highway 10 and highway 59, respectfully). All are now their own little communities with the requisite tax base to go with it. All have developed over time and now feed into the downtown area in some way, thereby creating a metroplex. And none of these developments would have happened without the highways. Also note -- the development took decades. (The same thing is happening between San Antonio and Austin, along highway 35).
Now -- let's look at what we've done by borrowing money, paying unemployment and building useful public works projects, by looking at the GDP equation: C+I+X+G=GDP.
C, or consumer spending: by providing unemployment insurance we've probably kept this figure barely positive or slightly negative thereby contributing some to growth or preventing a massive contraction. Obviously, PCEs will decrease as people start to limit their purchases, but, at minimum, they have to spend on basic things like food and shelter.
I, or investment: Since private investment will be negative during this time, we've at minimum bolstered this number somewhat by building infrastructure. But, we've also added paychecks to the economy since we're hiring people to do this work. That increases C.
Exports -- aren't part of this.
G, or government spending: first, according to the CBO, government spending has comprised about 20% of US GDP for the last 30 years. Yes, this whole project will probably increase this percentage for 3-5 years (maybe longer). But, who else is going to do it? Private demand is slowing down or negative. By filling the vacuum, we're preventing a much worse economic situation from developing. We're also preventing a deflationary spiral from taking hold.
Now, the standard response to this plan is this: you're borrowing money we don't have to increase the size of government. Yes, we are borrowing money. But --
We're doing it when interest rates area cheap: remember what I mentioned above about the inverted yield curve before a recession? That allows this to be done at cheap rates. That means when we calculate the return on investment (ROI), we're doing it from a pretty low base. Also note that the payoff period for this type of investment is decades, as demonstrated by the Houston, Texas example. So, we borrow today at cheap rates, build the infrastructure from which future growth will occur, and then let it payoff over decades. Done property, there is no way this does not prove beneficial in the long run.
Now, here's the payoff. In the short run, we're increasing the debt/GDP ratio. However, once we get growth back to the 3%+/year rate, the denominator of the equation (GDP) starts to grow faster than the rate of growth of the debt (the numerator). In short, over the medium term, the debt/GDP ratio stabilizes and then decreases.
That's the short version.
How do I know this works?
During the Depression, we see the first use this theory? Let's look at GDP growth:
By 1937, we see that GDP has returned to pre-recession levels.
In the 1950s, the government starts to build the inter-state highway system. Let's look at total real GDP in the 1960s, then the payoff started:
Since goods can now more efficiently move through the US, the economy can grow faster.
Class dismissed.
From the comments (some great points about construction projects during recessions):
Also, when you pay for infrastructure development during a recession, the costs are significantly lower.
There's more bid competition, contractors will take any job just to keep busy, their workers will work for less, and the cost of raw materials (e.g. steel, copper, concrete) is a lot lower - both due to lowered demand and the recession's destruction of the speculative premium.
So it actually makes strong fiscal sense for governments to concentrate infrastructure development in recessionary troughs.




10 comments:
Also, when you pay for infrastructure development during a recession, the costs are significantly lower.
There's more bid competition, contractors will take any job just to keep busy, their workers will work for less, and the cost of raw materials (e.g. steel, copper, concrete) is a lot lower - both due to lowered demand and the recession's destruction of the speculative premium.
So it actually makes strong fiscal sense for governments to concentrate infrastructure development in recessionary troughs.
As opposed to... y'know... just giving a trillion dollars to the effing banksters.
I'm pretty sure everyone gets that part of Keynesian econ. The real trick is getting the extra spending paid for once the recession is over.
I disagree that anyone gets that part of Keynesian economics, because this last time round they GAVE A TRILLION DOLLARS to a bunch of idiot bankers, while telling Main Street to go to hell.
The effects of a policy of austerity on GDP seems to look too obvious to be missed. A cynical observer might even think that there are folks in Congress who are being paid not to notice.
"The economy slows down. In other words, GDP growth turns negative and unemployment increases. Also of importance during this step of the process: interest rates drop. Why? Lack of demand. Who wants to take out a loan when the economy is in a recession? This is why the yield curve inverts just before a recession"
The yield curve usually inverts many months before the economy officially goes into recession. Often it inverts during mid-cycle slowdowns, where there is no recession.
"Actually, what really happens is traders realize that risk based assets are at minimum going to tread water and at worst are going to fall. Hence they sell equities and buy bonds. Also note that in a recession, there is lower inflation, so interest rate payments from bonds are going to have a higher rate of return.) "
The stock market sells often sells off once or twice by 10% or more every year during a typical business cycle.
"Next, the government invests in infrastructure like roads, power grids, public works projects etc... Why? Because investment pays amazingly large dividends over an extended period of time like decades. In this article, I highlight how Houston, Texas could not be the fourth largest city in the US without major infrastructure investment, but here's the short version. "
Government (stimulus type) investment in infrastructure only sometimes happens during a recession.
"Now -- let's look at what we've done by borrowing money, paying unemployment and building useful public works projects, by looking at the GDP equation: C+I+X+G=GDP."
You're forgetting the time factor. Infrastructure spending is often not favored, because most projects take a very long time to get started. Often they don't even get started until the economy is already recovering. Stimulus checks and unemployment benefits, for example, are often favored because they get money into the economy very quickly. If the goal is to increase consumer spending, then infrastructure projects is a very poor way to accomplish that.
"In the short run, we're increasing the debt/GDP ratio. However, once we get growth back to the 3%+/year rate, the denominator of the equation (GDP) starts to grow faster than the rate of growth of the debt (the numerator). In short, over the medium term, the debt/GDP ratio stabilizes and then decreases."
In this recovery GDP has not grown faster than the increase in debt. There is no given that this will happen, especially considering that most infrastructure spending achieves zero return on investment.
What will always astonish me is that neither left nor right seem to understand that government spending is like any other investment: if it makes the country richer by improving efficiency, producing research, making the populace healthier or better educated, it pays itself off in time. If it spends money digging ditches and filling them up, it can keep people employed-- which is better than having millions of unemployed workers wondering whether they should take up larceny as a second career-- but the investment will not pay itself off. If it spends money sending soldiers to distant lands to get their eyes and limbs blown off for no obvious purpose, it ends up poorer.
True, the left at least gets the economics right, while the right thinks that up is down and down is up, but until the left starts explaining this more clearly, the American people will remain confused.
Anonymous: what do you think the effect on the American economy of having all the major investment banks become insolvent at the same time would have been? I am no defender of the bailout, but (a) I do know the answer to that question, and it's a lot larger than TARP, and (b) the real problem with the bailout is that the banks didn't make any concessions that would have ensured that the problem did not recur.
Anon
The yield curve usually inverts many months before the economy officially goes into recession. Often it inverts during mid-cycle slowdowns, where there is no recession.
It has done this twice in the last 70 years. And it has still inverted before every recession, making it a very good indicator.
You're forgetting the time factor. Infrastructure spending is often not favored, because most projects take a very long time to get started. Often they don't even get started until the economy is already recovering. Stimulus checks and unemployment benefits, for example, are often favored because they get money into the economy very quickly. If the goal is to increase consumer spending, then infrastructure projects is a very poor way to accomplish that.
Immediately helping people with funds is a way to keep the economy moving and prevent things like food riots.
In this recovery GDP has not grown faster than the increase in debt. There is no given that this will happen, especially considering that most infrastructure spending achieves zero return on investment.
I presented an example of the massive return on investment for the highway infrastructure investment in Houston. I also showed two decades (20+ years) of growth helped by infrastructure spending. Your examples of no return? None.
Yes, infrastructure spending takes awhile to start. What exactly is the problem with that? None.
I'd encourage you to investigate Modern Monetary Theory, and the modern Keynes: Steve Keen.
See http://www.youtube.com/v/qvBuK8yQxbY?version=3&hl=en_US for a nice summary of what they're talking about.
"The yield curve usually inverts many months before the economy officially goes into recession. Often it inverts during mid-cycle slowdowns, where there is no recession."
Hale Stewart said, "It has done this twice in the last 70 years. And it has still inverted before every recession, making it a very good indicator."
Here are some cut and pastes (from Seekingalpha) which prove my point:
There were only 8 years (10% of the 80 years) when the average weekly yield curve status was inverted for the year: 1927, 1928, 1929, 1966, 1969, 1980, and 1981.
There were 17 years (21% of the 80 years) when there was at least one week of inverted yield curve: 1927, 1928, 1929 1930, 1959, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1981, 2000, and 2006 (but 9 of those 17 years had a positive average for the year).
As for infrastructure projects, the vast majority of them don't involve the construction of brand new highways.
Dear anon --
Regarding the yield curve
I would highly suggest you read Frank Fabozzi's Fixed Income books to get a better understanding of the yield curve dynamics.
Obviously, if the yield curve is inverted for a week and then de-inverts, you keep an eye on the other macro stats along with the overall environment. But, you don't take it as gospel.
You'll also note that all but one of your year long inversions presaged a recession.
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