Saturday, April 9, 2022

Weekly Indicators for April 4 - 8 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My Weekly Indicators post is up at Seeking Alpha.

After several weeks of tightening and then inversion, the yield curve in the US Treasury market un-inverted in a big way this past week - via higher long term rates which drove mortgage rates above 5%, which will have a decidedly negative effect on housing.

As usual, clicking over and reading should be educational for you, and will help me pay for dinner out if the weather is nice.

Friday, April 8, 2022

In the Paul Krugman vs. Nate Silver cage match, I’m on Team Nate

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Prof. Paul Krugman and Nate Silver got into a dust-up earlier this week about why so many voters seem to have soured on the Democrats. So that you don’t have to go digging through all the Twitter detritus, Alternet has a good write-up copying all the relevant tweets. (Apparently the two have been at odds at least since 2014, when Five Thirty Eight left The NY Times and went to ESPN; I do not know nor do I care who dissed whom first back then).


The dust-up started when Nate wrote:


Krugman responded:



Since how the average American is doing in the economy is something I’ve been obsessively following for about 20 years, and I’ve also spent a fair amount of time parsing what economic indicators appear to best forecast at least Presidential votes, I think I’m qualified to weigh in.

Sorry, Professor, I’m on Team Nate on this.

Yes, Nate Silver shouldn’t have said “some folks on here” without being able to back it up with at least one specific (Note: I’m not going to go digging for that either, but my recollection is that I have read tweets from partisans to the effect that “Actually the Economy is Great;” I think one such partisan may have been Dana Houle). But the *substance* of Nate’s criticism - that voters do not think the economy is going so great - is in my opinion on target. Krugman “straw man” criticism is actually something of a “straw man” itself, failing to come to grips with the issue.

First of all, I should point out that, as to Presidential elections, Silver himself did a regression on some 50 economic indicators to attempt to figure out which ones best predicted *Presidential* outcomes. But to my knowledge no such systematic review has taken place with regard to Congressional and State elections. So take the Presidential formula with a hefty grain of salt.

If this were a Presidential election year, the decline in the unemployment rate would be good news for Biden, because the unemployment rate is one of the best predictors of incumbent vs. insurgent Presidential vote. I was also able to determine that real retail sales were also a very good indicator. James Surowiecki has calculated that changes in real disposable personal income during the election year is also predictive. Finally, economists at the London School of Economics have calculated that the Index of Leading Economic Indicators through the first quarter of a Presidential election year work well.

The news with respect to the above statistics is mixed. The unemployment rate is clearly down, the index of leading indicators is still positive but has decelerated sharply through February, and real retail sales per capita and real disposable personal income are down.

Perhaps more importantly, as shown in the graph below, since last May (when the big stimulus effect first wore off), on a per capita basis, real personal income is down -1.6%, real *disposable* personal income is down -2.6%, real average nonsupervisory wages are down -1.9%, and real retail sales per capita are only up 0.1%:


These are averages; in other words, while median measures would be better if we had them, taking the vast mass of people together, about half of all of them have sustained *real* economic losses in the past 9 months since the stimulus wore off, and they are reining in their spending. 

By contrast, only 1.8% of the population in the entire age bracket from 16 through 65 who were not employed as of last May has gotten a job:


In other words, 1.8% have benefitted from less unemployment, while somewhere near 50% (again, we don’t have median measures so this is the best we can do) have sustained losses. On top of that, since some stimulus benefits have ended (the $3000 child care credit comes to mind), this has created a hole in lots of families’ wallets, and the evidence shows they are blaming Democrats (thank you, Manchin and Sinema).

The difference between how “the economy” is doing, vs. how average families are doing, is best shown by comparing real *aggregate* payrolls, up 3.0% since last May, vs. real  *average* wages:


In the aggregate, even after inflation payrolls are up 3.0%. But the average worker’s hourly wage is down -0.8%. The economy has been booming; the average worker’s wallet, not so much.

So I side with Nate Silver.

Thursday, April 7, 2022

Benchmark revisions, oh my! Four week average of jobless claims makes all-time 55 year series low

 

 - by New Deal democrat

The DoL made revisions to the last five years of jobless claims, in particular revising the seasonal adjustments, and the differences are eye-popping.

Last week initial claims (blue) were reported at 202,000. With the revisions, they are now 171,000! This week they declined -5,000 from that revised figure to 166,000, tying the revised number from two weeks ago. The 4 week average (red) for last week, originally reported at 208,500, became 178,000, and declined a further -8,000 to 170,000 this week. On the other hand, continuing claims (gold, right scale), originally reported last week at 1,307,000, were revised to 1,506,000, and rose 17,000 this week to 1,523,000:


But that’s not the biggest story. Not only are the initial and 4 week averages pandemic lows, with the revisions initial claims last week is the lowest for the entire series going back almost 60 years with the exception of one week - November 30, 1968, which saw only 162,000 layoffs. The 4 week average was even better: this week’s number is the all-time series low, including all of the 1960s back to the series inception in 1966, as shown in the below graph which shows the current week’s numbers normed to 0:


And remember, the US population in the 1960s was only half of what it is now, so as a rate, this is by far the fewest % of layoffs in the population ever recorded. By the way, the revisions also indicate that layoffs were even lower than we thought - significantly below 200,000 per week - in 2018 and 2019.

For completeness’ sake, continuing claims were lower throughout the 1960s:



Is it any wonder that wages have been increasing as sharply as they have?

Wednesday, April 6, 2022

Scenes from the March jobs report; and the Great Resignation as “Take This Job and Shove It!”

 

 - by New Deal democrat

It’s been a little while since I took a more in-depth look at the jobs market, so let’s take a look.

As I wrote last Friday, we are at historic lows in both the unemployment and underemployment rates. In the graphs below, the current values of each are normed to zero for easy comparison:




Historically few people are involuntarily unemployed.

So, how close are we to “full employment,” and what sectors haven’t caught up yet?

As I wrote Friday, as of March we are only 1.579 million jobs short of where we were in February 2020 just before the pandemic hit. But since the population, and in particular the working age population has changed since then, below I show the total labor force participation rate (that is, the % of the US population that is either employed or unemployed, vs. not in the labor force at all), and also the prime age (25-54 years old) labor force participation rate:


The total population LFPR is 62.4%, vs. 63.4% in February 2020, while the prime age LFPR is 82.5%. The former has declined sharply since 15 years ago, and has continued to decline, for a very simple reason: Boomers are old! When we focus on the prime age rate, that is only 05% short of its value as of February 2020. Since there are about 176 million Americans in that prime age demographic, that’s roughly a 0.9 million shortfall in that age group. If we figure there’s about another 60 million adults below the age of 65, the total is also probably around 1.5 million:
  

Similarly, when we look at the series “Not in Labor Force, Want a Job Now,” which is a pretty self-explanatory statistic, that is 5.737 million, also about 1.5 million above its best level just before the Great Recession:


In other words, all three ways of looking at the remaining jobs shortfall tell us that about 1.5 million more jobs need to be added to get to full pre-pandemic employment. We’ve been adding over 500,000 jobs a month, so if this continues for just 3 more months, we will have full employment.

Turning the second question, the BLS itself has helpfully prepared the below graph of the gains and losses of various employment sectors since the pandemic started:


The usual suspects of leisure and hospitality (including food and drink), government, and education are still there, and manufacturing is still lagging.

The above tells us the nominal shortfalls. What about the % of job losses? That’s what the below graph shows:


Surprisingly, on a %age basis, it’s mining and logging that has sustained the biggest losses, down -12.5%. Leisure and hospitality comes in next, down -8.7%. Government is down -3.1%, education is down -1.9%, wholesale trade is down -1.8%, and manufacturing is down -1.0%.

Finally, on the theme of “somebody is wrong on the internet,” Kevin Drum writes that “The Great Resignation was neither great nor a resignation,” citing work by the San Francisco Fed that “suggest that the high rate of quits is simply a reflection of the rapid pace of overall labor market recovery.”

The San Francisco Fed makes an interesting case, citing historical manufacturing data. But my bone to pick is with Drum, who claims that “the quit rate [from the JOLTS report] merely rebounded to its old Great Recovery trendline . . .[or] merely ... only very slightly above trend,” producing the below graph in support:


I submit that Drum’s choice of the bottom of the Great Recession as the starting point for his “trend” is performing some Olympic-level heavy lifting. By contrast, when we graph all the way back to the beginning of the statistic in 2000, here’s what it looks like:


The quits rate very suddenly jumped 25% higher than it had ever been in the previous 20 years (3.0%/2.4%=1.25). By contrast, hires, which had previously in Y2K been as high as 4.3%, and 4.1% in 2019, only increased to 0.2% above that to 4.5%.

So, hires barely budged, but quits jumped to all-time new highs by a very wide margin.

A better comparison is with job openings, which like quits soared to all-time highs as well, almost simultaneously with quits:


Drum’s claim is almost preposterous. The only difference is that the Great Resignation is less “I’m going to contemplate my navel” than “Take this job and shove it! [because I’ve found another one that pays way better].”


Tuesday, April 5, 2022

Coronavirus dashboard for April 5: BA.2 likely only causes a ripple; and on track for record low daily deaths

 

 - by New Deal democrat

This is a good time to look at the impact - or, better speaking, the lack thereof - of the BA.2 Omicron variant in the US.

Nationwide the 7 day average was 28,961 yesterday:



This is the lowest since last July, and lower than all but about 3.5 months since the end of March 2020. Only late spring 2020 and from mid-May through mid-July in 2021 were lower. In other words, on a national level, there is no BA.2 wave whatsoever yet.

The above graph comes from The NY Times, because the State of Kentucky decided to make an enormous data dump yesterday (like 190,000 cases and 2900 deaths!) yesterday, which is ruining the comparisons on my typical data source, 91-Divoc.

Omitting the South (and so KY), here are the regional breakdowns in cases, as well as NY, NJ, and MA, 3 of the States in the Northeast where there *has* been something of a BA.2 wave:


Note that for the Northeast as a whole, and NY in particular, cases are beginning to level off after 3 weeks. I mention this, because the BA.2 wave in Europe has set the pattern for BA.2 impacts. Below are cases in the 5 big countries in Europe, as well as the EU as a whole:


The BA.2 waves started between the end of February through the first week in March. In every country but Germany, they have already peaked. And Germany is misleading, because they had a data dump 6 days ago. Without it, cases there would only be where they were 2 weeks ago. In other words, in Europe BA.2 waves, where they occurred, have only lasted 2.5-3.5 weeks.

Further, in Europe, the BA.2 waves generally peaked once the variant reached the level of 80%-90% of all cases. With that in mind, here is today’s update from the CDC of variance prevalence in the US, showing that BA.2 is no 72% of all case, having risen about 15% in each of the past two weeks:


And here their map of the regional breakdown:


BA.2 makes up 75% of all cases on the West Coast (where there has been no discernible wave whatsoever) and 84% in the Northeast (New England + NY and NJ).

The Northeast is going to hit 90% or more BA.2 prevalence within a week. Above I mentioned that cases in the Northeast look like they are beginning to level off. I expect a peak to be obvious there within a week to 10 days. The rest of the country is probably about one or two weeks behind that.

Turning to hospitalization admissions, they are at their lowest level ever during the pandemic, averaging 10,744/day during the past week:


And finally, here are deaths, currently averaging 604:


This is the lowest level since last August, and lower than all but 4 months of the past two years.

In conclusion, it now looks nearly certain that, on a national level, at worst there is going to be just a BA.2 ripple, and maybe just a long tail of a very slow decline from 30,000 cases daily.

Further, while deaths have declined at a far slower rate than cases, because cases are down over 96% from their Omicron high, and at peak there were only 2600 deaths a day from Omicron, a 96% decline in deaths would take us down to only about 100 per day. And because victims are typically hospitalized before they succumb, and hospitalizations are at new record lows, this further supports the hypothesis that we are perhaps only a month away from a new record low in daily deaths from COVID.

Monday, April 4, 2022

Manufacturing positive, but no longer red hot; inflation-adjusted construction spending is flat

 

 - by New Deal democrat

[Programming note: I’ll discuss some of the innards of the March jobs report in further detail in the next day or two, as well as update the Coronavirus dashboard, with particular emphasis on the likely trajectory of BA.2. Since most States don’t bother any more to report on the weekends, there’s no point in doing that today.]

In addition to the jobs report, Friday gave us updates on manufacturing and construction.

The ISM manufacturing index, and especially its new orders subindex, is an important short leading indicator for the production sector. While the index remained positive, its more leading new orders component stumbled.

In March the index declined from 58.6 to 57.1, and the new orders subindex declined from 61.7 to 53.8, the lowest since 2020. Since the breakeven point between expansion and contraction is 50, these remain positive, (note the graph below does not contain the latest numbers):




This forecasts a continued expansion on the production side of the economy through summer.

Meanwhile, construction spending for February rose 0.5% in nominal terms for overall spending including all types of construction, while the leading residential sector also rose 1.1%, both thus making new highs:


Adjusting for price changes in construction materials, which for the first time in six months actually declined, by -1.2%, “real” construction spending rose 1.7% m/m - also the first increase since last August. In absolute terms, “real” construction spending has declined sharply - by -17.8% - since its peak in November 2020,  while “real” residential construction spending has declined -12.6% since its post-recession peak in January of last year:

Blah


While total construction spending has declined by more than the -10.4% it did before the Great Recession, the decline in residential construction spending, while increasingly substantial, remains nowhere near the -40.1% decline it suffered before the end of 2007.


There were some positive revisions to the past several months which helped out these comparisons this month, and reinforced that while down, they are not recessionary at this point. But with mortgage rates rising to nearly 5%, I would expect these metrics to deteriorate further later this year, after new home permits, starts, and sales.

Saturday, April 2, 2022

Weekly Indicators for March 28 - April 1 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My Weekly Indicators post is up at Seeking Alpha.

The big news of the week was the spreading yield curve inversion in the Treasury market.* Needless to say, that puts another bullet in the body of the long leading forecast - but it’s still not negative.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment on the economic data, and my forecast both the short and long term, and I’ll get rewarded with a penny or two.


*Not to get into too much detail here, but just how negative an indicator a yield curve inversion is depends on (1) how long along the yield curve does it extend? (2) how deep is it? And (3) how long does it last.

Well, it just happened, and it’s pretty shallow for now. But it has definitely spread out along the yield curve. The entire curve from the 3 to 10 year maturity is inverted. The 2 to 10 year spread inverted yesterday. The 2 through 7 year maturities are even inverted vs. the 30 year.

Friday, April 1, 2022

March jobs report: yet another strong showing for jobs and unemployment; while strong wage growth nevertheless likely lags inflation

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Here are the three main trends I was most interested in this month:

1. Is the pace of job growth beginning to decelerate? 
2. Is wage growth holding up? Is it accelerating?
3. Are the leading indicators in the report beginning to flag?

The answers were:
1. The 6 month average of monthly gains, which was running at 585,000 in the prior 6 months, increased by 2,000 in March to 587,000, although, pending revisions - which have almost all been upward in the past year - this month’s number was the lowest in the last 6 months.
2. Wage growth, which averaged 5.9% in the 2nd half of 2021, for the 2nd month in a row has been up 6.7% YoY. Aside from April 2020, this is the highest wage growth in *40 years.* 
3. A majority of the leading indicators within the report were positive. There is no sign yet of any major impending slowdown in the economy, particularly in the goods producing sector.

We still have 1.579 million jobs to go, or 1.0%, to equal the number of employees in February 2020 just before the pandemic hit. At the current average rate for the past 6 months, that’s 3 more months.

Here’s my in depth synopsis of the report:

HEADLINES:
  • 431,000 jobs added. Private sector jobs increased 426,000. Government jobs increased by 5,000 jobs. The alternate, and more volatile measure in the household report indicated a gain of 736,000 jobs, which factors into the unemployment and underemployment rates below.
  • U3 unemployment rate declined -0.2% to 3.6%, just 0.1% above the January 2020 low of 3.5%.
  • U6 underemployment rate declined -0.3% to 6.9%, equaling the January 2020 low of 6.9%.
  • Those not in the labor force at all, but who want a job now, rose 382,000 to 5.737 million, compared with 4.996 million in February 2020.
  • Those on temporary layoff declined -101,000 to 787,000.
  • Permanent job losers declined -191,000 to 1,392,000.
  • January was revised upward by 23,000. February was also revised upward by 72,000, for a net gain of 95,000 jobs compared with previous reports.
Leading employment indicators of a slowdown or recession

These are leading sectors for the economy overall, and will help us gauge whether the strong rebound from the pandemic will continue.  These were mainly positive:
  • the average manufacturing workweek, one of the 10 components of the Index of Leading Indicators, rose +0.1 hours to 41.7 hours.
  • Manufacturing jobs increased 38,000. Since the beginning of the pandemic, manufacturing has still lost -128,000 jobs, or -1.0% of the total.
  • Construction jobs increased 19,000. All of the jobs lost during the pandemic, plus another 4,000, have now been made up. 
  • Residential construction jobs, which are even more leading, fell by 2,600. Since the beginning of the pandemic over 50,000 jobs have been gained in this sector.
  • temporary jobs rose by 4,900. Since the beginning of the pandemic, almost 250,000 jobs have been gained.
  • the number of people unemployed for 5 weeks or less increased by 158,000 to 2,289,000, which is 164,000 higher than just before the pandemic hit.
  • Professional and business employment increased by 102,000, which is about 700,000 above its pre-pandemic peak.

Wages of non-managerial workers
  • Average Hourly Earnings for Production and Nonsupervisory Personnel: rose $0.11 to $27.06, which is a 6.7% YoY gain. 

Aggregate hours and wages:
  • the index of aggregate hours worked for non-managerial workers rose by 0.1%, which is a  loss of -0.7% since just before the pandemic.
  •  the index of aggregate payrolls for non-managerial workers rose by 0.5%, which is a gain of 11.7% (before inflation) since just before the pandemic.

Other significant data:
  • Leisure and hospitality jobs, which were the most hard-hit during the pandemic, rose 112,000, but are still -1,474,000, or -8.7% below their pre-pandemic peak.
  • Within the leisure and hospitality sector, food and drink establishments added 61,300 jobs, and is still -819,900, or -6.6% below their pre-pandemic peak.
  • Full time jobs increased 912,000 in the household report.
  • Part time jobs increased 101,000 in the household report.
  • The number of job holders who were part time for economic reasons increased by 35,000 to 4,170,000, which is still below their level before the pandemic began.

SUMMARY

This was another very good jobs report. There is no sign of any significant slowdown in hiring at this point. Leading sectors like manufacturing, construction, and temporary help continued to improve. Also, wage gains among non-supervisory workers continued to rise sharply. Aside from 3 months in 2019 and 2020, the unemployment rate was the lowest (or equal to it) in over 50 years. Similarly, the underemployment rate was the lowest for its entire 28 year history except for two months.

There were a few blemishes, most notably the decrease in residential construction jobs (more evidence of a housing slowdown) and the likely real, inflation-adjusted decline in aggregate payrolls, which means that probably real aggregate payrolls for the American working class have only risen by 1% or less in the last year in total.

Two months ago I wrote that “Because real sales and income have not improved in over half a year, I expect the pace of job gains to slow considerably in the coming months.” For the second month in a row, I have been wrong - and happily so! But I continue to think job gains will slow (but not reverse) shortly.


Thursday, March 31, 2022

Consumer spending continues OK, while income continues its seemingly relentless decline


 - by New Deal democrat


Nominally personal income rose 0.5%, and spending rose 0.2% in February. That’s the good news. 

The bad news is the personal consumption deflator, i.e., the relevant measure of inflation, rose 0.6%, so real income declined -01%, and real personal spending declined -0.4%.

While both real income and spending are well above their pre-pandemic levels, I have stopped comparing them with that, but instead with their level after last winter’s round of stimulus. Accordingly, the below graph is normed to 100 as of May 2021: 



Since then spending is up 2.3%, while income has declined -1.4%.

Comparing real personal consumption expenditures with real retail sales for February (essentially, both sides of the consumption coin) reveals small declines in each:


Meanwhile, the personal saving rate increased 0.2% to 6.3% in February. The below graph of the last 30 years subtracts 6.3% from all months, so that the current reading is shown as 0 (before then all values were higher than 6.3%): 


Note that the savings rate has tended to decrease as expansions grow longer, leaving consumers more vulnerable to shocks (e.g., vehicle and gas prices). The current value is the lowest since 2013 (when a different stimulus program ended). In other words, so far consumes are making up shortfalls by digging into savings or tapping a source of credit.

One of my recession models - the “consumer nowcast” - is based on such a shock that is unable to be made up from increased real income, or an increased source of wealth to be cashed in. Income has clearly faltered, and stocks have not made a new high in almost three months. That leaves housing equity. Whenever the housing price spiral ends, unless something reverses, consumers are in trouble.


Jobless claims continue near or at record lows

 

- by New Deal democrat


Initial claims (blue) rose to 14,000 to 202,000, just above last week’s 50 year low. The 4 week average (red) declined 3, 500 to 208,500 (vs. the pandemic low of 199,750 on December 25). Continuing claims (gold, right scale) declined 35,000 to  1,307,000, the lowest number since December 1969:



With Omicron in the rear view mirror, and BA.2 more of a ripple so far, we are having a COVID respite, and basically nobody is getting laid off. 


As once again demonstrated in the February JOLTS report released earlier this week, the number of jobs available relative to the number of applicants remains tight, meaning there will be continuing upward pressure on wages.


Wednesday, March 30, 2022

The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent

 

 - by New Deal democrat

I have a new post up at Seeking Alpha.

The US Treasury yield curve is fully inverted between the 3 and 10 year maturities.

And you probably have an idea what that means, dearest readers.

As usual, clicking over and reading should be educational for you (if nothing else, by teaching you what the title saying means!) and help inform you of what is likely ahead at some point in 2023. 

And reward me with a penny or two for my troubles.

Tuesday, March 29, 2022

February JOLTS report: the game of musical chairs in the jobs market goes on

 

 - by New Deal democrat


This morning’s Census Bureau JOLTS report for February shows that the game of musical job chairs continues.  

As a refresher, several months ago I introduced the idea of a game similar to musical chairs, where employers added or took away chairs, and employees tried to best allocate themselves among the chairs. Because of the pandemic, there are several million fewer players trying to sit in those chairs, leaving many empty. As a result, wages have continued to increase sharply, as employers attempt to attract potential employees to sit in the empty chairs.

This pattern has continued, indicating if anything a general plateauing of all the numbers.

Layoffs and discharges (violet, right scale in the graph below) declined 17,000 to 1.386 million, slightly above their record low of 1.262 in December. Total separations (blue) rose 48,000 to 6.092 million (graph starts in June 2020 for reasons of scale):


Layoffs continue to be extremely rare.

Meanwhile, job openings (blue in the graph below) declined 17,000 to 11.266 million, a small decline from their record peak of 11.448 million in December. Openings had been gradually increasing to repeated record highs in the previous 6 months, but now appear to have leveled off. Voluntary quits (the “great resignation,” gold, right scale) rose 94,000 to 4.352 million, 158,000 below November’s record high, and again, possibly leveling off. Actual hires (red) rose 263,000, to 6.689 million, only 16,000 below November’s record high of 6.705 million:


In summary, we continue to have near-record high job openings, hires, and quits, together with near-record low layoffs - but we now see evidence that the numbers are no longer increasing or decreasing. Little progress is being made towards establishing a new equilibrium, but on the other hand, the situation is not getting more *out* of equilibrium.

Finally - again as I have been pointing out for the last few months - because of the continuing yawning gap in job-takers vs. job openings, wages have continued to soar. Below is a graph of job openings divided by actual hires (blue, right scale). This gives the rate at which openings are above or below hires, where 1.0 represents the level at which the number of openings and hires are equal. As you can see, this rate increases as expansions go on, and in the last 18 months has repeatedly made new all-time high, the last of which was in December.

YoY wage gains for non-managerial workers (red, left scale) are a “long lagging” indicator, typically turning up well after an expansion is underway, and typically when the U-6 underemployment rate falls below about 9.0% (currently at 7.2%, the lowest except for the year 2000 at the end of the tech boom, the last 8 months before the pandemic, and in February):


In short, wage growth has responded to the favorable game of employment musical chairs by spiking to 6.7% YoY. I expect wages to continue to rise at this strong rate until potential employers can no longer make any profit from hiring potential employees.

I expect strong wage gains to continue until we see a *significant* decline in the ratio of openings to hires; and at the same time, or shortly thereafter, a significant decline in voluntary quits. As indicated above, while the situation is no longer getting more extreme, it isn’t getting any less extreme yet either. So the game of musical chairs in the jobs market continues.


Monday, March 28, 2022

Coronavirus dashboard for March 28: I’ll take the “under” for the severity of any BA.2 wave

 

 - by New Deal democrat


Very few US States reported over the weekend. The decline in new cases has stalled at roughly 30,000 per day. Deaths are still declining, and currently just below 800 per day.

Since the BA.2 variant continues to generate new headlines, with just about everybody warning of a new wave in the US, let’s take a look at what actually happened in Europe (and remember: there was no new BA.2 wave in South Africa, the Philippines, India, and a number of EU countries where BA.2 took over from BA.1 early).

BA.2 started a new wave in Europe beginning in the last week of February through the first week of March:



A week or two ago, the poster children for Europe’s big outbreak included countries like the UK, Germany, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and Greece. Here’s what they (plus the other major countries of Italy and Spain, plus Portugal), look like now:

Declines everywhere. Italy just peaked earlier during last week, and the UK probably did as well (there was a data dump last Monday which will go out of the average tomorrow).

Here is where BA.2 is still increasing in Europe:


In short, four weeks after Europe’s BA.2 wave started, cases are already declining everywhere except France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta. The last 4 countries have a combined population of 6.5 million. There may be a few small countries I’ve missed, but they wouldn’t materially affect the result.

Last Tuesday, the CDC reported that the BA.2 variant was a majority of new cases in the Northeastern Census region, 40% along the West coast and the upper Midwest, and 30% or below everywhere else. Here’s what cases in the US Census regions look like as of now:

Remember that the appropriate comparison with the CDC report is cases one week ago. Since then, the percentage of BA.2 infections has probably risen by about 15% (but we won’t know until at least tomorrow). One week ago cases were flat to declining everywhere except for the Northeast, where they were up 10%. Cases are still declining in the West, flat in the Midwest, and rising in the South and Northeast now.

For the EU as a whole, cases rose 50% from their bottom since then, and appear to have peaked in the last week. In the US, that would translate to 45,000 cases per day in about 2.5-3 weeks. The worst case countries saw their cases roughly double, which in the US would be 60,000. I’m more inclined to go with the former estimate than the latter.

And since, as of now, there is no new variant on the horizon, I expect a fast decline from peak just as we are seeing in the European countries now.

Saturday, March 26, 2022

Weekly Indicators for March 21 - 25 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My Weekly Indicators post is up at Seeking Alpha.

The walls closed in a little more on the long leading forecast this week, as now real money supply is beginning to falter.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you thoroughly up to date, and will reward me a little bit for giving you a heads up as to what awaits, economically, in the future.