Tuesday, April 16, 2024

Industrial production for March is positive, but the overall trend remains flat

 

 - by New Deal democrat


Industrial production, one of the premier series the NBER has historically used to declare recessions vs. expansions, has faded in importance since China was admitted to regular trading status in 1999. As you can see in the first graph below, both total and manufacturing production peaked in 2007. Further, manufacturing has continued to fade, as its post-pandemic peak has not equaled its 2010’s peak either:




In March, total production increased 0.4% from an upwardly revised, by 0.2%, February; but it is still down -0.6% from its September 2022 post-pandemic peak. Manufacturing production increased 0.5%, but is also down, by -0.2% from its post-pandemic peak as well:



Before the “China shock,” a YoY downturn in industrial production almost always meant recession. As the YoY graph below shows, there was a significant “industrial recession” in 2015-16 without any generalized economic downturn:



Whether the 2019 downturn would have resulted in a recession by itself had the pandemic not intervened will always remain an unanswered question. But again in 2023 production was again down YoY with no recession. As of March, manufacturing production is flat YoY, while total production is now up by 1.0%.

Bottom line: while March was positive, the overall trend remains generally flat.

Simultaneous declines in housing permits, starts, and units under construction in March suggests seasonality glitch, not a change in trend

 

 - by New Deal democrat


There was a big decline in housing starts last month, and a smaller but significant decline in permits. Whether that signifies a change in trend or just noise is the issue. I lean towards the latter. To wit, in reaction to both January and Feburary’s housing construction report I wrote, “To signify a likely recession, units under construction would have to decline at least -10%, and needless to say, we’re not there. With permits having increased off their bottom, I am not expecting such a 10% decline in construction to materialize.” I also indicated that I expected to see more of a decline in the actual hard-data metric of housing units under construction.

That is still the case.

To recapitulate my overall framework: mortgage rates lead permits, which lead starts, which lead housing units under construction, all of which lead prices. Of those metrics, the least noisy one that conveys the most signal vs. noise is single family permits.

In response to inflation data which generally stopped declining towards the holy 2%, mortgage rates have risen about .25% since the end of last year. For March as a whole, they averaged 6.82%. This is about average for the past 18 months, in which overall they have varied between 6.1% and 7.8%. In response permits have stabilized in the range of 1.42 million to 1.52 million units annualized. In March they declined -65,000 to 1.458 million annualized:



The relationship shows up even better when we compare the two series YoY:



With mortgage rates higher by a slight 0.25% YoY, permits went slightly positive YoY and are still higher by 1.5%.

As per usual, starts (light blue in the graph below) are the noisier of the metrics, declining 228,000 to 1.321 million annualized in March. Permits (dark blue) declined -65,000 to 1.458 million, and single family permits (red, right scale) declined -59,000 to 973,000:



These are among the poorest numbers for each in the past 12 months, but the simultaneity of the downturn (as opposed to a 1-2 month lag in starts) makes me suspect there may be a seasonal adjustment issue in play, perhaps having to do with Easter. Still, there isn’t enough there to break out of their range, and as discussed above mortgage rates have not suggested one is coming.

Next, to reiterate: housing units under construction (red in the graph below) are the best measure of the actual economic activity in the housing market. Here’s the long term historical view:



Those also declined, by -15,000, to 1.646 million units annualized:



Once again note the synchronicity of the downturn, making me suspect a seasonality glitch. Further, they are only down -3.7% from their peak, nowhere near the historical -10% most consistent with the onset of a recession.

Below I have broken out single vs. multi-family construction. Because, in response to record high house prices, builders turned to higher density, lower cost apartment and condo construction. Hence the record high last year in that metric. Last month multi-family construction faded slightly, while single family units under construction actually continued their slightly increasing trend:



As I wrote last month, I do expect a further gradual decline in total housing units under construction in the months ahead, to catch up with the decline in permits that bottomed one year ago. Here’s the post-pandemic view of starts, permits, and total units under construction:



But, as shown above, I doubt we will cross the -10% threshold that it would normally take to signal a recession, given the general stabilization of both permits and starts over the past 16 months.

Monday, April 15, 2024

Real retail sales rebound, forecast a continued “soft landing” for jobs growth

 

 - by New Deal democrat


As per usual, real retail sales is one of my favorite indicators, because it gives so much information about the consumer, and since consumption leads employment, it helps forecast the trend in the latter as well.


And the news this morning was good, as nominally retail sales increased 0.7% in March, while February’s number was revised higher by 0.3% to 0.9%. After accounting for 0.4% inflation in March, real retail sales increased 0.3%, and February was revised up to 0.5%.

To the extent there was bad news, it was that January’s -1.2% decline has still not been completely erased.

To the graphs: first, below I show the historical record for the past 15+ years of both real retail sales (dark blue) and real personal spending on goods (light blue), a similar but more comprehensive measure. The two metrics tend to trend together over time, although the latter has tended to increase more (hence I adjust to bring the trends more in line):



Here is the close-up post-pandemic view:



Real retail sales are still -2.9% below their April 2022 peak, and also about -1% below their nearer term August 2023 peak. Real spending on goods has been more positive. More importantly for the long term trend, real spending on goods has now completely caught up with real retail sales. The bigger picture is that real retail sales have trended neutral, while real spending on goods has trended higher.

Turning to the effect on employment, here is the longer term YoY% gains in both spending measures /2, which is the best match to forecast the near term trend in jobs (red):



Employment doesn’t respond to every noisy move in spending, but does tend to peak and trough about 6 months after spending, and responds to the longer term trend. If FRED allowed 6 or 12 month moving averages, the correspondence would be much closer.

With that caveat, here is the post-pandemic close up:



Historically negative YoY comparisons in real retail sales have usually meant recession, while positive comparisons have almost always meant continued expansion. Needless to say, that didn’t happen in 2022-23. The overall trend since mid year 2023 has been “less negative” to neutral, while real spending on goods has remained positive.

And as those YoY comparisons in consumption have improved, we have seen the decelerating trend in employment shift to a more consistent “soft landing” scenario. Thus real retail sales are forecasting continued growth in the neighborhood of the last few months’ numbers going forward through most of this year.


Saturday, April 13, 2024

Weekly Indicators for April 8 - 12 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat


My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.


There has been a lot o churn in both the short leading and coincident indicators in the past few weeks, but the overall tone is towards a more positive economic environment.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment on the data, and reward me just a little bit for my efforts.

Friday, April 12, 2024

March consumer price inflation was still mainly about the dynamics of shelter and gas prices

 

 - by New Deal democrat


The one advantage of not reporting on the March CPI results for two days is I’ve had the opportunity to look at more data in depth and mull things over.


And I’ve decided that there really wasn’t much change from the pattern we’ve seen for about the past 9 months. Basically the month to month variation in inflation is a function of the interplay between shelter and gas prices. During late 2022 and early 2023, the latter were still accelerating or steady at a high rate of inflation, while the latter were falling. Beginning in late 2023, the dynamic reversed, as shelter inflation was slowly decelerating, while gas prices had bottomed.

The big takeaway for the last several month has been a renewed increase in gas prices, while the deceleration in shelter inflation has slowed. There have been a couple of other players in the process that I’ll also discuss below.

First, let’s look at the month over month change in inflation for shelter as a whole (dark blue) vs. rent of primary residence (light blue) and owners’ equivalent rent (red) for the past 6 years:



In the years prior to the pandemic, the three averaged +0.3% growth +/-0.1% each month. After the pandemic, they peaked at roughly .75%, and in the past 12 months have slowly declined from an average of +0.5% per month to +0.4% per month. 

On a YoY basis, the various measures of shelter have decelerated from roughly +8% to just over 5.5%:



Because house prices lead shelter inflation with a 12-18 month lag, here’s the update of that metric:



Since house prices are presently increasing at 2.5% YoY, about average for the pre-pandemic period, I expect OER and the other measures of shelter inflation to continue to decelerate YoY, but probably at a slow pace compared with their initial rapid decline, because they will be compared with +0.5% monthly increases 12 months before vs. 0.7% at their peak.

Now let’s take a look at monthly gas prices (dark blue in the graph below) vs. energy prices generally (light blue). On a monthly basis, these had mainly declined beginning in mid-2022, but in the last two months have increased at more than their pre-pandemic average:



On a YoY basis, both are now higher, by 1.3% and 2.1% respectively:



This contrasts with their negative YoY readings for almost the entirety of the previous 16 months. 

So, to summarize: the deceleration in shelter inflation has slowed, while gas prices have reversed higher. This explains most of the increase in monthly inflation in the past several months, as is shown in the graph below comparing energy inflation (grey), headline (blue), core (gold), and inflation ex-shelter (red) YoY:



The reversal in gas prices has caused a similar, albeit smaller, reversal higher in both headline inflation and inflation ex-shelter. But it is noteworthy that, simply by excluding shelter, inflation is still only higher by 2.3%. 

In other words, it remains the case that, except for shelter, US consumer inflation is well-behaved.

As noted above, let me also take a look at several other sectors of note. Although I won’t bother with a graph, the former problem children of new and used vehicle prices have reached a new equilibrium. New car prices have actually *declined* -0.1% YoY, while used vehicles are down -2.2% YoY.

The remaining problem areas of inflation are:



 (1) food away from home, which peaked at 8.8% YoY one year ago, and is now down to 4.2%, close to its pre-pandemic average of 2.5%-3.0%;
 (2) electricity, which has followed gas prices higher, rising from 2.2% YoY last August to 5.0% in March; and 
 (3) transportation services - mainly car repairs and insurance - which has rocketed from its pre-pandemic range of 2.5%-5.0% to as high as 15.2% in October 2022, and is now still up 10.7%.

I’m not sure if there is more to the electricity story than the price of gas-powered turbines. But car repairs are up 8.2% YoY, and motor vehicle insurance is up a whopping 22.2%! Based on the past inflationary period of 1966-82, it is clear that transportation services lags increases in vehicle prices by 1-2 years and even more, sometimes increasing right through recessions:



So while I expect food away from home to continue to revert to its prior average, and perhaps electricity as well, price increases in transportation services may remain a problem for quite some time.

Real average wages and aggregate payrolls signal continued growth

 

 - by New Deal democrat


On Wednesday I was traveling so I didn’t get around to writing about the important CPI release. Let me start my delayed response by updating real wages and payrolls for non-supervisory employees.


Historically, as I have pointed out a number of times, real aggregate payrolls (red in the graph below) have a flawless record over the past 50+ years of peaking in the months ahead of a recession (Note: I show the last 30 years below. From the late 1960s through early 1990s, real wages declined almost relentlessly as the combination of the huge Baby Boom generation plus women entering the workforce applied potent downward pressure on wages, but increased aggregate payrolls and household income as there were many more two wage-earner households):



and turning negative YoY close to simultaneously with its onset. Real nonsupervisory wages (blue) have a less stellar record, but have almost always sharply decelerated or turned negative before or shortly after the onset of a recession, because inflation typically has accelerated faster than wage growth late in expansions, while the Fed has raised rates to tamp down demand:



Last Friday we found out that wages rose 0.2% for the month and 4.2% YoY, continuing their pattern of slow deceleration. Aggregate payrolls rose a strong 0.7% for the month and 6.1% for the year. With Wednesday’s 0.4% increase in consumer prices, real wages actually declined by -0.1% for the month, while real aggregate payrolls rounded up to 0.4%. On a YoY basis, real wages are up 4.2%, and real aggregate payrolls rose 6.1%:



Here are the real absolute numbers, norming inflation to “1” as of last month:



Real wages have declined in the past several months, but they have not broken trend yet. Meanwhile real aggregate payrolls set yet another all time record high. With this new high, and with real aggregate payrolls up close to 2% in the past year, continued expansion in the immediate future remains almost certain. 

Thursday, April 11, 2024

Initial claims continue to be rangebound, and a positive for the near term forecast

 

 - by New Deal democrat


[NOTE: After traveling all day yesterday, I decided to put off any comments on the CPI upside surprise until later today. Short version is that shelter continues its slow decent, gasoline picked up, and services are accelerating as one might expect in a strong economy with the supply chain tailwind having dissipated.]


Initial claims continued to be rangebound this week, declining -11,000 to 211,000. The four week moving average declined -250 to 214,250. With the usual one week delay, continuing claims increased 28,000 to 1.817 million:



On the YoY% basis more important for forecasting purposes, weekly claims were down -4.1%, the four week average down -4.4%, and continuing claims up from last week’s 12 month low to 7.1%:



While continuing claims are a negative, they are much less so than they were during the last nine months of 2023. The more leading initial claims remain firmly positive.

One week of data doesn’t give me enough information to make it worth updating the Sahm rule forecast, but here is the YoY% comparison through the end of March:



For the month, initial claims were down -5.9% YoY, while the unemployment rate was up 5.6% (note this is a ‘percent of a percent’). Because the YoY comparisons in both initial and continuing claims have improved since late last year, I expect the YoY comparison in the unemployment rate to follow suit, meaning a slight decline in that rate is more likely than a return to its recent peak of 3.9%.

Tuesday, April 9, 2024

Travelin’ man: Weekly Indicators for April 1 - 5 at Seeking Alppha

 

 - by New Deal democrat


I neglected to post this over the weekend, so I will post it now….


My “Weekly Indicators” update is over at Seeking Alpha.

There was lots of churn under the surface last week, but it continues to point towards general improvement.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to date through last Friday, and reward me with a little lunch money as well.

Also, tomorrow morning the CPI for March will be reported. I’ll be on the road, so I won’t be able to do any in dept post, but I’ll try to give you a quick paragraph or two covering the high (or low) points as I can.

Monday, April 8, 2024

Scenes from the robust March jobs report

 

 - by New Deal democrat


As I wrote Friday, the news from the employment report was almost all good. Let’s follow up on the most important points today.


First, the thre month average of new jobs added rose to a 12 month high, meaning Q1 of this year was the best quarter since Q1 of last year (dark blue, below, vs. monthly jobs light blue):



And the unemployment rate ticked down 0.1%, meaning that the three month average is 3.8%, or 0.3% higher than the 12 month low of 3.5% set one year ago:



This means that the Sahm rule is not close to being triggered.

And while average hourly wages for nonsupervisory personnel decelerated further to 4.2%, this remains very high by the standards of the past 40 years:



Remember that typically inflation increases faster than wages in the year heading into a recession. So with inflation at 3.1% YoY, this is not in play.

As I wrote last month, real aggregate payroll growth has a flawless record going back over 50 years of distinguishing expansion from recession. At 6.1% growth YoY, this is 3.0% higher than the last CPI reading:



It also made a new all-time high in real terms (not shown). Further, the monthly trend has been increasing in the past few months, so unless there is a big spurt in inflation, we are going to set yet another new record high this month:



All of this is simply potent evidence of an employment economy that is humming along.

Last month I wrote that the Household survey contained some numbers that were simply recessionary. Let’s update that.

In contrast to the Establishment survey, which showed 1.9% growth YoY, which is healthier than almost all times during the past 25 years, the Household survey remained stuck at 0.4% growth YoY. Here’s the longer term graph, normed to the current YoY numbers:



This metric does remain recessionary, but I expect it to resolve in the direction of the Establishment survey.

As indicated, the unemployment rate was 0.3% higher than one year ago. The U6 underemployment rate was higher by 0.6%:



Over the 30 year history of the U6 rate, this has heretofore meant recession. In the case of the U3 rate, there have been a number of instances where it just meant slow growth, although it too more often than not meant a recession was on the way.

Unless we start seeing weekly unemployment claims heading higher, I expect the unemployment rate to remain stable or even decline slightly in the months ahead. This will make the YoY comparisons better, removing that metric from one of any concern.

So while some poor spots remain, as I wrote on Friday, this employment report made the “soft landing” scenario the default setting going forward.

Friday, April 5, 2024

March jobs report: almost uniformly positive, making a “soft landing” the default 2024 scenario

 

 - by New Deal democrat


In the past few months, my focus has been on whether jobs gains are most consistent with a “soft landing,” i.e., no further deterioration, or whether deceleration is ongoing; and more specifically: 

  • Whether there is further deceleration in jobs gains compared with the last 6 month average, vs. a “soft landing” stabilization.
  • Whether the unemployment rate is neutral or decreasing; or whether there is further weakness. The recent excellent reports in initial claims suggested this rate would decline. After a contra-trend jump last month, this month the unemployment rate did decline.
  • Based on the leading relationship of the quits rate to average hourly earnings, whether YoY wage growth would continue to decline slightly. It did continue to decline to a new post-pandemic low - but still above 4%.

In other words, all three focus points were as expected or better. Here’s my in depth synopsis.


HEADLINES:
  • 303,000 jobs added. Private sector jobs increased 232,000. Government jobs increased by 71,000. 
  •  January was revised upward, while February was revised downward, by 27,000 and -5,000 respectively, for a net of 22,000. The pattern from nearly every month in the past year, has been a steady drumbeat of downward revisions, so this mixed result is a slight positive.
  • The alternate, and more volatile measure in the household report, showed a 498,000 increase. Still, on a YoY basis, in this series only 642,000 jobs, or 0.4%, have been gained. This is tied with last month for the lowest since the pandemic lockdowns.
  • The U3 unemployment rate declined -0.1% to 3.8%, down from last month’s 2 year high.
  • The U6 underemployment rate was unchanged at 7.3%, 0.8% above its low of December 2022.
  • Further out on the spectrum, those who are not in the labor force but want a job now declined -229,000 to 5.443 million, vs. its post-pandemic low of 4.925 million set 12 months ago.

Leading employment indicators of a slowdown or recession

These are leading sectors for the economy overall, and help us gauge how much the post-pandemic employment boom is shading towards a downturn. These were almost all either positive or neutral:
  • the average manufacturing workweek, one of the 10 components of the Index of Leading Indicators, increased 0.1 hours to 40.7 hours, but is still down -0.8 hours from its February 2022 peak of 41.5 hours.
  • Manufacturing jobs were unchanged.
  • Within that sector, motor vehicle manufacturing jobs rose by 900. 
  • Construction jobs increased by a strong 39,000.
  • Truck driving increased 5,100.
  • Residential construction jobs, which are even more leading, rose by 5,500 to a new post-pandemic high.
  • Goods jobs as a whole rose 42,000 to another new expansion high. These should decline before any recession occurs.
  • Temporary jobs, which have generally been declining late 2022, fell by another 1,300, and are down about -420,000 since their peak in March 2022.
  • the number of people unemployed for 5 weeks or fewer declined -137,000 to 2,189,000.

Wages of non-managerial workers
  • Average Hourly Earnings for Production and Nonsupervisory Personnel increased $.07, or +0.2%, to $29.79, a YoY gain of +4.2%. This is the lowest YoY gain since June 2021, vs. its post-pandemic peak of 7.0% YoY in March 2022.

Aggregate hours and wages: 
  • the index of aggregate hours worked for non-managerial workers increased 0.5%. This metric is now up 1.7% YoY.
  •  the index of aggregate payrolls for non-managerial workers rose 0.7%, and is now up a very strong 6.1% YoY. This is 2.9% above the most recent YoY inflation rate. This is powerful evidence that average working families continue to see gains in “real” spending money.

Other significant data:
  • Leisure and hospitality jobs, which were the most hard-hit during the pandemic, rose another 49,000. Both leisure and hospitality and its sub sector of food and drink establishment jobs, which gained 28,300 this month, have now completely recovered from their steep pandemic downturn. As a result, I will henceforward discontinue this comparison.
  • Professional and business employment increased another meager 7,000. These tend to be well-paying jobs. This series had generally been declining since last May, but in the last 4 months has resumed its increase.
  • The employment population ratio rose 0.2% to 60.3%, vs. 61.1% in February 2020.
  • The Labor Force Participation Rate also rose 0.2% to 62.7%, vs. 63.4% in February 2020.


SUMMARY

This month’s report hit on nearly all cylinders, with both the Household and Establishment Surveys participating. About the only negative was the continued poor YoY performance in the Household Survey, which number is close to recessionary (but it’s the only one), as well as the punk professional and service sector gains, and the continued slide in temporary help services.

By contrast, almost all of the leading metrics in the survey were positive, or in one case neutral. Aggregate payrolls also increased sharply again, and both the E/P ratio and the LFPR participated in the advances. Manufacturing at least held steady, and construction continues its surprising strong gains in both the residential and nonresidential sub-sectors. The unemployment rate declined as anticipated by the recent jobless claims reports. The three month average of job gains was the highest in the past 12 months, firmly halting the recent decelerating trend. Even average hourly wages for nonsupervisory personnel, which continued to decelerate YoY, remain high nominally, and probably were close to unchanged for the month.

In sum, this month’s report was very much consistent with a “soft landing” scenario, which must be regarded as the default outcome at this point.

Thursday, April 4, 2024

Decline in continuing claims, stability in initial claims suggest downward pressure on the unemployment rate

 

 - by New Deal democrat


Initial claims in the last week rose 9,000 to 221,000, while the four week moving average increased 2,750 to 214,250. With the usual one week lag, continuing claims declined 19,000 to 1.791 million:




On the more important YoY% basis for forecasting purposes, initial claims are up 2.3%, while the four week average is down -4.5%. Continuing claims are still up, by 5.1%:



The important takeaways are that the four week average is still giving a positive signal, while the YoY% change in continuing claims is the lowest increase since the beginning of March 2023. The net is a slightly positive continuing signal for economic expansion.

With tomorrow’s jobs report, including the unemployment rate, we’ll get the “official” monthly update to the Sahm rule. Since initial (and continuing) claims both lead the unemployment rate, here’s that updated forecast.

On a monthly basis, initial claims were down -6.0% for March. Continuing claims were higher by 6.7%. This suggests downward pressure on YoY comparisons in the unemployment rate in the next few months:



On an absolute basis, initial claims are down significantly since last summer, while continuing claims have been stable. This likewise suggests either downward pressure on the unemployment rate to 3.7% or even 3.6%, or at worst stability at 3.9%:



The forecast is that the Sahm recession rule is not going to be triggered in the months ahead. Additionally, per my posts earlier this wee, tomorrow I expect to see a continued decelerating trend in YoY wage growth. 

Wednesday, April 3, 2024

Does consumer sentiment correlate with the real economy?


 - by New Deal democrat

No big economic news today, so let me update a correlation with information from last Friday’s personal income data. To wit, is consumer sentiment about the economy tied to any real metric? With a lot of noise, it does appear to be correlated.

The University of Michigan has been measuring consumer sentiment for over half a century. The last 45 years are available on FRED. The below graph compares this with real disposable personal income per capita. Basically, what we are looking for is, if people have more (or less) money to spend on things other than necessities, is their feeling about the economy better (or worse)?

Both data sets, but especially consumer sentiment, are very noisy on a monthly basis, so the below graph averages both over a quarter:



While there is certainly not a 1 to 1 relationship, and the YoY% change in real disposable income can vary widely with tax law changes, but over the longer term it is pretty clear that both move in the same direction, and more or less at the same turning points.

Now here is the same information zoomed in over the past 5 years through the end of the 4th quarter of last year:



Again, far from a 1 to 1 relationship, but (aside from the stimulus quarters) both have moved generally in the same direction at the same time.

Finally, let’s take the last 10 years and show the same data monthly:



I wanted to include this last graph for two reasons. First, it does show the increasing partisanship of consumer sentiment, with a notable tick up right after Trump’s election at the end of 2016, and with the exception of the 2021 stimulus months, a huge decline after Biden took office in 2021. Second, it picks up the substantial increase in the last two months. Under the circumstances, it should be no surprise that Biden’s poll numbers have recently improved.

Tuesday, April 2, 2024

February JOLTS report: soft landing-ish? - except for a noisy jump in layoffs

 

 - by New Deal democrat


The JOLTS report for February showed stabilization or slight improvement to all but one of its components, generally suggesting, well, stabilization in the overall jobs market.

Starting with the monthly changes, job openings (blue in the graph below), a soft statistic that is polluted by imaginary, permanent, and trolling listings, increased 8,000 from a sharply downwardly revised January number to 8.756 million, over -100,000 lower than where we thought we were in January. Actual hires (red) rose 120,000 from a slightly upwardly revised January to 5.818 million. Voluntary quits (gold) rose 38,000 to 3.484 million from a slightly downwardly revised January. In the below graph, they are all normed to a level of 100 as of just before the pandemic:



All of these are slightly off their lows from the last quarter of 2023. Perhaps most significantly, while quits are 0.7% higher than they were at the beginning of 2020, actual hires are still -3.0% below the level they were at just before the pandemic hit.

Meanwhile, for the month layoffs and discharges (blue in the graph below) rose sharply, by 128,000 to an 11 month high of 1.724 million:



This is out of sync with the recent decline in more timely, and leading, weekly initial jobless claims (red, right scale). This is likely just noise, but it certainly helps explain last month’s jump in the unemployment rate.

For a more historical perspective, the below graph norms the rates of hires, quits, and layoffs and discharges to 100 as of this month’s readings, and shows their record in the 20 years before the pandemic:



This shows that actual hires and quits remain at levels better than at any time in the 20 years prior to the pandemic except for 2018-19. And layoffs and discharges are lower than almost any time during that pre-pandemic period. 

Finally, I have noted for a number of months now, since the quits rate (blue in the graph below, right scale) tends to lead average hourly earnings (red), it is worth noting that although the quits rate did not decline in February, it remans at its lowest level in 6 years, thus suggesting that the trend of deceleration is continuing:



This implies that average hourly earnings, which tied its post-pandemic low on a YoY basis in February, will likely decelerate further in coming months, if not necessarily this Friday.