- by New Deal democrat
We’ve entered our post-employment report lull in new economic data, so let’s take a further look at the leading indicators contained in that report. Generally speaking, this includes the more cyclical sectors like construction and manufacturing, and goods production in general; real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls; and, during expansions leading up to recessions, the unemployment rate (vs. immediately after recessions, when they lag).
Let me start with the last metric first. Almost every week I write that initial jobless claims lead the unemployment rate. Recently I’ve been writing that new jobless claims forecast further downward pressure on the unemployment rate, to the point of declining below 4.0%. Well, in Friday’s report the rate rose 0.1% to 4.2%. So is the forecast busted?
Hardly. That’s because when we take the raw numbers going into that rate, and extend them another decimal point, they only went up 0.03% from 4.14% to 4.17%, as shown in dark red in the graph below. The lighter, thin orange line is the “official” employment rate, vs. the four week average of initial claims (purple, right scale):
The unemployment rate has drifted higher from its low in July, but the downward trend is intact. There is every reason to expect the unemployment rate to decline further over the next several months.
Next, let’s look at the leading employment sectors. These include manufacturing (gold), residential construction (red, right scale), and goods production as a whole (blue). Also included is nonresidential construction, which includes construction on AI data centers (purple, right scale). All four lines are nomred to 100 as of just before the pandemic:
With the exception of residential construction, the trend line in all of these sectors is up. Even residential construction employment appears to have made a temporary bottom at least in July.
Another leading subsector is trucking employment. This too appears to have bottomed at the beginning of this year and has trended higher since:
Average hours worked in manufacturing is also an “official” leading indicator from the employment report. That increased 0.2 hours in the report to 42.0 hours, not just the highest number since the pandemic, but one of the highest numbers in the entire past 80 years:
Only one month in the 1990s was equal to this number, and most of 2014 and 2018 had higher numbers. In other words, the manufacturing sector is running “hot,” likely in main part due to AI data center related employment. I should point out that the secular increase over the decades probably has much to do with the tilting of the balance of power towards employers vs. employees as part of the general decline of unions that began with Ronald Regan’s presidency. In other words, rather than hire more employees, employers simply work their existing employees harder.
Finally, let’s take a look at real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls.
To begin with, average hourly earnings on a YoY basis are only equal to the inflation rate:
If workers are taking home more money in real terms, it would have to be via an increase in hours. So here is the long term historical view of aggregate nonsupervisory hours:
Note this is in log scale to better show the earlier historical data; and also note that with population increase we would expect hours to increase as well. Anyway, what I wanted to point out is that this is generally a coincident indicator, flattening out and peaking within several months before or after the onset of recessions.
Now here is the same data from the past 3.5 years:
Note that since May the number of hours worked has been all but flat. This indicates profound weakness, but such pauses have also occurred in economic slowdowns that have not resulted in recessions, such as in 1966, 1995, and 2016.
Total hours * wages = aggregate payrolls. Then we adjust for inflation for the “real” number. Here is what they look like for the past 3.5 years, also normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic (ending with August, because September inflation hasn’t been reported yet):
As of August, real nonsupervisory payrolls were up only 0.1% in the 9 months since last November.
Further, the Cleveland Fed estimates that September inflation is likely to come in at +0.5%. So here are the last 12 months of the monthly changes in nominal aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls (blue) and inflation (red):
Last September, both payrolls and inflation rose 0.3%. With payrolls only rising 0.2% in September, if the Cleveland Fed’s estimate proves correct, real nonsupervisory payrolls will decline -0.3%. If that happens, real nonsupervisory payrolls will only be up about 0.65% YoY, the lowest since the pandemic, as shown in the below graph which subtracts -0.65% to show the likely September value at the “0” line:
Not only that, but in the past 60 years YoY increases of 0.65% or less have only occurred in 4 months without having indicated an oncoming or existing recession: once in 1968, once in 1995, and twice in 2011:
We’ll have problems calculating this over the next several months because of the blank October value last year due to the government shutdown, but since CPI only increased 0.3% last November over last September, that averages only 0.15% each month. Should the oil shock from the Iran war continue, it is at least possible that there could be *no* YoY increase in real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls by December, which would be a strong coincident indicator of recession.
With one important caveat: pace last week’s major positive revisions to personal income, keep in mind that employees’ earnings will be subject to benchmark revisions next February based on the QCEW. And one very good proxy we have for that is withholding tax payments. While those are extremely noisy on a weekly or even monthly basis, once we use the entire past 3 months, they become much less noisy. And for the three month period of July through September, withholding tax payments were higher 5.6% YoY (not shown). vs. 4.2% for aggregate payrolls (blue in the graph below):
This suggests that the last few months, at least, of aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls could be revised higher in the benchmarking process early next year.
Here’s the conclusion: with one important exception - real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls - all of the other leading indicators contained in the employment report were either positive (e.g., manufacturing and construction indicators) or at least consistent with an ongoing positive trend (the unemployment rate).
Additionally: as I cautioned last month, leave your ideological priors at the door before evaluating the data. The US economy is extremely resilient, and so far it has found work-arounds for the incompetence and irrationality coming out of Washington.