Very low jobless claims continue

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Jobless claims, along with stock market prices and upscale consumer spending (and recently, manufacturing orders) are one of the few important metrics holding up the economy. And the short summary of this morning’s data is: the new regime of very low claims continued.

Initial claims did rise 16,000 to a still very low 219,000, and the four week moving average increased 1,500 to 209,500. With the typical one week delay, continuing claims fell sharply to 1.794 million, the lowest number in two years:

On the YoY% basis more important for forecasting purposes, initial claims were down -1.8%, the four week moving average down -6.1%, and continuing claims down -3.1%:

This is very positive - in fact, jobless claims are probably the single most positive data point in the entire economy right now. If you have a job, there is simply very little chance you are getting laid off.

Finally, let’s take an updated view of how that played into the unemployment rate in last week’s jobs report for March. As anticipated, the unemployment rate declined, by -0.1%:

Jobless claims are forecasting further declines in the unemployment rate in the next several months.

Recessionary signals in February personal income and spending, but some bright spots as well

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Personal income and spending are among the most important monthly indicators of all, because they give us a detailed look at consumption by the broad range of American households. And since consumption leads employment, they also give us an idea of what is likely to happen with regard to jobs in the near future. This morning’s data was for February, so it is still several weeks later than usual. Keep in mind that this represents activity before the Iran war and its oil price shock. 

In February, nominally personal spending rose 0.5%, but personal income declined even nominally, by -0.1%. Since the PCE deflator increased 0.4%, real spending was only higher by 0.1%, while real income declined, after rounding, by -0.4%. Here is what they look like since the pandemic:

Note that real personal income has been flattening for almost a year, and February’s number was the lowest since last June.

Further, on a YoY% basis, both real income and spending have been decelerating since late 2024, income by more than spending:

Once we exclude government transfers — one of the important coincident metrics used by the NBER to date recessions, real personal income also declined -0.4% to the lowest level since last July:

On a YoY basis, this was up 0.5%. With only three exceptions —  2013 (which was an artifact of a change in Social Security withholding), 2022, and one month in 1995 — such a low rate has only happened during recessions:

In 2022, the economy was saved by the hurricane strength tailwind of deflating producer prices, which enabled a continued Boom in consumer spending. Needless to say, with the war with Iran that is not going to happen now. But despite the 0.4% increase in PCE prices for the month, the YoY% change remained at 2.8%:

Whether this suggests that the slowly increasing YoY trend over the pat 12 months will continue, or is flattening, is not at all clear.

Another important component of the data is spending on goods, and in particular durable goods, which is a leading indicator. Historically, the pattern has been that real spending on goods (red in the graph below) turns down in advance of recessions, and in particular spending on durable goods (orange), which tends to turn down first. Real spending on services (blue) has tended to rise even during all but the most prolonged or deep recessions. These have been flashing red warning signals. 

In February, there was something of a rebound. Real spending on services rose only 0.1%, but real spending on goods rose 0.2%, and on durable goods rose 09%. But neither of the latter two measures fully reversed their January declines. The below graph shows the post-pandemic record, normed to 100 as of January of last year:

The trend in goods spending was flat all last year. To smooth out some of the noise, I have been tracking the three month average. That average was almost completely flat in the period from July through December, peaking in November, and as of February is at a seven month low.

The updating of the PCE deflator also allows for an update to another important coincident indicator used by the NBER to consider whether the economy is in recession or not; namely, real manufacturing and trade sales, which is delayed by one additional month. These increased 0.4% in January to a new all-time high:

This is of a piece with the recent rebound in manufacturing data we have seen in things like durable and capital goods orders as well as manufacturing production. 

Finally, the personal saving rate - i.e., the portion of income left over after spending, declined in February back to 4.0% from its 4.5% reading in January:

Paradoxically, this is relatively good news, because a sharp retrenching by consumers is also something that typically happens just before the start of a recession. It looked like one might have been beginning in January, so February’s reversal means that consumers were a little more confident.

When we put all this together, we get a mixed picture. Real income has been stalling out, and declined in February, both before and after taking government transfer payments into account. So have real spending on goods and in particular durable goods. All of these are recessionary or near-recessionary. But consumers did not retrench, and the rebound in manufacturing sales continued in January.

But to reiterate, all of this predated the oil price spike in March. We will find out just how much that impacted consumers with tomorrow’s CPI report.

The consequences of mafia style bust-outs and military belligerence for interest rates

 

 - by New Deal democrat

While there isn’t any big economic news today, there certainly was action overnight in response to the latest TACO. As I type this, oil is back down to $90/barrel, and stock futures are soaring. This for something (correctly I think) framed as a “fragile cease fire” by J.D. Vance.

But let’s look at some of the economic damage that is likely to persist.

In the first place, the mafia-style bust out that is the ballooning US budget deficit has definitely put an end to the 40 year downdraft in Treasury yields. The below graph shows yields on the 30 year (dark blue) and 10 year (light blue) Treasurys as well as the Fed Funds rate (red):

Notice that the 10 year bond is about equal in yield to what it was during 2023-24 when the Fed funds rate was at its peak. And it did not react at all to the last two Fed rate cuts. The record of the 30 year is even worse, as yields have acutally trended higher even as the Fed funds rate has been cut. This is all about the “bond vigilantes” waking up and demanding more interest to hold on to bonds from a government that at the moment appears to think it can issue infinite amounts of paper. This can be laid squarely at things like the “Big Beautiful Bill” as well as the astronomical military build-up.

The increase in yields has also hit mortgage rates, which typically follow longer dated Treasurys. As of one week ago, they had risen about .5% to about 6.5%:

And with a several week delay, mortgage applications responded. They have been trending down for several weeks, and this morning’s update showed both purchase mortgage applications (blue) and refinance applications (gray) lower YoY:

Here is a five year view of the same data:

showing that, while the increase in mortgage rates has not knocked either type of application down to their 2023 nadirs, but has effectively halted the rebound.

Tomorrow we will get personal income and spending for February, and on Friday we will get the March CPI. Both will be important, and the latter is likely to be absolutely lit!

March ISM reports show stagflationary expansion — light on the “stag-,” heavy on the “-flation”

 

 - by New Deal democrat

 

As I’ve previously noted a number of times, one of the more surprising developments in the past few months has been the resilience of manufacturing. After taking a beating following “Liberation Day” one year ago, companies adapted and resumed production if anything at an even more brisk pace.

That was apparent as recently as the preliminary data on new factory orders released this morning for February. While overall new orders for durable goods declined -1.4% for the month (blue, right scale), core capital goods orders rose 0.6% to a new post-pandemic record (red, left scale):

On a YoY basis, headline new orders were up 7.3%, while capital goods orders were up 5.1%, continuing the last six months’ trend of the best YoY growth since the beginning of 2023:

A similar, and more complex, story was told by the ISM manufacturing and services indexes for March. The headline number for services declined to 53.9, still a good showing (recall that any number above 50 indicates expansion), and for manufacturing came in at 52.7, the best number since the summer of 2022 (in the graphs below, the services number is in blue, the manufacturing number in gray):

And the more leading new orders subindexes showed even more strength, with services coming in at a very strong 60.6, the highest reading in three years, while manufacturing new orders declined to a still expansionary 53.5:

For forecasting purposes, I use the three month average of the series, with a 25% weighting to manufacturing and 75% to services. The weighted average of both the headline and new orders components are the strongest in three years.

If the present and leading conditions are without doubt positive, what about the stagflationary scenario?

Well, the prices paid components both came in sharply strong, with services at 78.2, and manufacturing even slightly higher at 78.3, both the highest since June 2022:

If both the goods producing and services providing sectors of the economy were being clobbered by inflation in March, the picture for employment was considerably weaker. While the “less bad” trend in manufacturing employment continued, with a slightly contractionary 48.7, still its second best reading in the past 12 months after January’s, the employment subindex in services declined sharply to 45.2, its worst reading since the pandemic except for December 2023:

This is somewhat foreboding for the official employment metrics for the next several months. According to Jill Coronado of the University of Texas at Austin, “the ISM non-manufacturing employment index, particularly the three month average has some significant predictive power.” Here is her accompanying graph:

The three month average of 49.1 isn’t as low as it was last summer, but nevertheless predicts slight contraction, particularly of services providing employment.

To summarize, on the bright side, left to their own devices the manufacturing and services data indicate not just continued expansion, but even more robust expansion. But it is a stagflationary expansion, with simultaneously moribund employment and widespread price increases.

And of course, neither have been left to their own devices. Even the March data only marginally reflects the impacts of the Iran war. Those are likely to show up much more drastically in the April and May reports. To put it another way, “Buckle your seatbelt, Dorothy, ‘cause Kansas is going bye-bye.”

The “real,” wage adjusted price of gas isn’t at privation levels yet

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Back in the “before” days, as in January, before the Iran war, I wrote about how low gas prices were actually a tailwind for the economy. Because since the start of the Millennium over 25 years ago, they had only been so low compared with average hourly wages on only 3 occasions: after the 2001 recession, late in the Great Recession, and during the COVID lockdowns. Put another way, it only took about 7 minutes of work to buy a gallon of gas. This leaves a lot left over for other consumption - just as it did at the end of the two non-COVID recessions.

Needless to say, that has changed. But by how much, really? On the one hand, as I’ve pointed out previously, on a percentage basis this is the biggest one-month spike in gas prices since the 1970s. We’ll find out just how badly that effected the CPI for March this coming Friday.

But how much of the “tailwind” has been taken away? That’s what the updated graph below, of the “real” cost of gas compared with average hourly nonsupervisory wages, shows:

The “size” of the spike is about equal to the 2005 Katrina spike, and less that the 2022 Ukraine invasion spike. But in relative terms, it has not come anywhere close to the 2008 spike that helped exacerbate the Great Recession, nor the Ukraine invasion spike. Nor, for that matter, what I used to call the “Oil Choke Collar” of the early 2010’s, when gas prices put a lid on the velocity of any expansion in the early years of the last recovery. In order to approach the level of those shocks, we would need to see gas prices of $5/gallon, at minimum.

The gas price information doesn’t go all the way back to the 1970’s, but the price of oil, specifically West Texas Crude, does. So here is the same graph, of oil prices relative to average hourly nonsupervisory wages, going all the way back to before the first oil shock:

Here you can see that just before the start of the Iran war, the “real” price of oil was equivalent to the levels it was at from 1986-99, when gas prices were not a consumer issue at all. The current spike has not taken us back up to the levels of either the first Gulf War spike of 1990 nor the second oil shock of 1979-80.

The bottom line here is that, although this price spike is enough to marginally change consumer behavior, it isn’t yet at the point where in the past it has created a sense of real privation (in 1974 the spike was accompanied by an embargo that resulted in gas rationing). That isn’t to say it couldn’t get there in another month or two. Although I won’t bother with a graph, according to GasBuddy the national average has risen as much as another $0.12 in April up to $4.11. To reiterate, my sense is that a real sense of privation isn’t likely to kick in unless gas prices reach $5/gallon.

Weekly Indicators for March 30 - April 3 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

After zigging upward last week, interest rates zagged downward - but not as much - this week, enough to change the ratings on some interest rate sensitive indicators, like mortgages. And consumers continue to spend, despite all the shocks and sluggishness in things like the labor market in the past 15 months.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and give me a little extra jingle in my pocket next time I go to the local bookstore.