Weekly Indicators for September 7 - 11 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

The story of this past week is the same story of the several preceding weeks; namely, increased interest rates across the board, driven by all of the inflationary “policies” of the current Administration, most especially its increasingly disastrous war, are turning more of the financial indicators negative.

Against this we continue to see AI data center construction-driven gains in several short leading indicators and in particular consumer spending.

As usual, clicking over and reading should bring you up to the virtual moment as to the state of the economy, and reward me a little bit for organizing the information for you.

August core inflation benign, but energy related prices make all the difference for headline

 

 - by New Deal democrat

After benign June and July consumer inflation due mainly to the temporary decline in energy prices, August inflation returned to its recent trend. On a monthly basis prices (blue) rose 0.4%, although on a YoY% basis, August equaled July’s 3.4%. But perhaps more importantly, core CPI excluding food and energy (red) rose 0.3%, and made a new post-pandemic YoY% low of 2.4%. Excluding shelter (gold), CPI rose 0.3%, but worryingly increased 3.6% YoY:

While I’ll go into more detail below, the good news on “core” inflation was mainly about a number of recent “problem children,” like transportation services and medical care, being somnolent, more than anything else. 

 But let’s start with shelter, which is 1/3rd of the entire index. It continued its deceleration, up 0.3% for the month, but up “only” 3.0% YoY (blue).  Of it’s two components, Owner’s equivalent rent rose 0.2% monthly and 3.1% YoY, tying its post-pandemic low, while actual rent of primary residence also rose 0.2% in August but was only up 2.7% YoY, the second lowest YoY advance since the pandemic:

As I indicated above, with the exception of a few salient smaller purchases like coffee, or dental care, almost no sector of purchases exceeded 4% YoY. One portion of the former problem child of transportation services, to wit motor vehicles repairs and maintenance, did continue to rise, up 1.1% in August and up 5.2% YoY; but motor vehicle insurance has also become well-behaved. So I won’t bother with graphs.

Another former problem child, motor vehicles, remained sleepy. New vehicles (red) rose 0.3% for the month, but were only higher 0.6% YoY, while used vehicles (gold) rose 0.4% for the month, but were lower in price YoY by -2.3%. The average for all motor vehicles (blue) was higher 0.3% monthly, and *down* -0.5% YoY:

But if shelter was only slightly elevated, vehicles actually experienced deflation, and the rest of core categories were generally well-behaved, that was absolutely not the case for energy or energy services. 

In the broad category of energy, prices in August rose 2.1%, and 16.3% YoY. Gas and oil rose 4.2% for the month, and were up 28.0% YoY:

Meanwhile, the AI data center related categories of electricity and utility services showed an actual decline of -0.4% monthly, but remained up 4.0% YoY%: 

Additionally, computer software and accessories rose 3.8% (!) for the month and are up 8.4% YoY:

Before I conclude, let’s update real nonsupervisory hourly wages (orange), which declined -0.1%  for the month and remain down less than -0.1% YoY; and real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls (red), which rose 0.1% for the month and are up 1.0% YoY, although both remain about -0.5% and -0.1% below their February and January peaks respectively:

Recall that real aggregate nonsupervisory wages are an excellent short leading indicators for recession. The current situation is almost sui generis. On the one hand, it is very rare for this metric to stay below peak for more than half a year without a recession occurring shortly thereafter. On the other hand, a good coincident marker for the onset of recession is when they turn negative YoY, and in that regard they actually improved this month:

On final very big caveat. This data does not include the big increase in the price of gas and oil we have seen in the last few weeks. With the situation in the Strait of Hormuz becoming chronic, and the strategic oil reserve close to empty for all practical purposes, this statistic could well be underwater by the end of this year.

The same suboptimal stagnant existing homes market continued in August

 

 - by New Deal democrat

For the last three years, the market for existing homes has been rangebound. While there may be some slightly upward pressure on prices, with the background financial fundamentals the same, the existing home market has reached a suboptimal equilibrium, with something like a -500,000 decline in housing inventory available compared with ten years ago; and rangebound sales as well.

That continued to be the case in August. Existing home sales declined a seasonally adjusted -2.0% monthly to 3.98 million annualized. Which continues to be well within its range of between 3.85 - 4.30 annualized for the past three+ years:

Historically prices follow sales, and so with rangebound sales, prices on a YoY basis have been relatively calm as well. These are not seasonally adjusted, so we look at them YoY. And since February of last year, there has been no YoY comparison higher than 3.0%. in August the YoY comparison was +1.9%:

This year the most lagging metric, inventory, has also fallen in line. In August, the YoY% change in existing home inventories was -0.6%. By contrast, as recently as last December it was up 7.9% YoY, and in March was up 4.5% YoY:

For the last two months, I have introduced my look at the existing home sales report as follows: “The housing market has reached a new, suboptimal equilibrium in sales, construction, prices, and inventory. Until some new positive or negative shock occurs (like a surprise new Fed hiking regimen), expect little change in this important leading sector of the economy, which is needless to say neutral for forecasting purposes.” That suboptimal static equilibrium continued again in August.

Continued very low jobless claims, and a note about vulnerability to a stock market shock

 

 - by New Deal democrat

With other news (finally!) out today, let’s take at least a brief look at jobless claims.

Initial claims declined -1,000 to 206,000, while the four week moving average declined -1,500 to 205,000. With the typical one week delay, continuing claims declined -1,000 as well to 1.774 million. These all continue to be extremely low numbers, close to the low end of the entire 60 year series:

I’ll dispense with the graph this week, but the more important YoY% changes are pretty dramatic, as they are in comparison to a Labor Day spike last year. Initial claims were down -21.5%, the four week moving average down -15,9%, and continuing claims down -7.9%.

Jobless claims, along with stock prices, compose my “quick and dirty” forecasting tool. With stock prices still up over 15% YoY, they continue to suggest a solid expansion over the next few months (oil price shock permitting). [Note: There is an issue with FRED updates today. If and when the information is posted there, I will update here]

Aside from the fallout from the Iran war, the one big thing that concerns me is just how much of consumer spending - which, again, is about 70% of the economy - has been dependent on the wealth effect from stock market gains this year. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time since the Roaring ‘20’s of 100 years ago that so much spending has been downstream of the stock market. While I am absolutely *not* forecasting any sort of similar crash, the fact is that this dependency creates a very real possibility of a stock market downturn feeding on itself via the effect it would have on consumer spending. 

Updating the potential for an Iran war oil shock

 

 - by New Deal democrat

When the Iran war started this past March, I wrote about the potential for an oil shock and a resulting recession. While it briefly looked like that could happen, Wall Street’s rose colored glasses approach to oil futures together with the gradual draining of the strategic oil reserve prevented that from happening. With renewed attacks on shipping, where are we now?

lmost all US recessions in the past 50 years have had a component of an “oil shock.” This has a stagflationary effect: driving up prices, and constricting the ability to spend on other things. Typically that stagflationary effect has kicked it at about a 40% increase in price YoY. For example, here is what YoY gas prices have looked like this Millennium:

While there’s no graph for gas prices going back before the 1990s, here’s the same comparison substituting oil prices instead, going back to 1970:

 

Typically it has taken an 80% or higher YoY spike in oil prices to correlate with a recession. Before the Iran war, oil was selling for about $60/barrel. That would imply that oil prices would need to rise to $108/barrel for a sustained period of time to be consistent with triggering a recession.

But it isn’t just the increase per se; rather, it is a function of how much that price increase hits consumers’ wallets. A 40% or 80% increase from a very low price is different from a 40% or 80% increase from a price that already was slightly constrictive. To show that, here is what oil prices look like divided by average hourly nonsupervisory wages. Think of this as “how many minutes of work would it take to by a barrel of oil:

As you can see, the big increase this past spring doesn’t look like much in comparison with several earlier oil prices shocks. 

Now here is the same graph using gas prices instead of oil prices:

Again, the spike earlier this year doesn’t even compare with the 2022 spike associated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, nor even the “oil choke collar” that typified the early years of the economic expansion after the Great Recession.

And indeed even with the increase in prices during August, the Cleveland Fed estimates that CPI inflation when it will be reported Friday is likely to only show an increase of 0.3%-0.4%, in line with my back of the envelope method for forecasting monthly inflation, which divides the monthly average gas price change by 16 and then adds 0.15% for the average background ‘core’ inflation:

But that only takes us through the end of last month. GasBuddy shows that as of this morning, average gas prices have risen to $4.22/gallon, still well below May’s peak of $4.50/gallon:

And per CNBC oil prices have risen to about $96/barrel as I write this:

But even the $112/barrel oil this past April and May, with gas prices briefly hitting $4.50/gallon did not create a recessionary shock. Compared with this past spring, the US economy (driven by manufacturing) is in somewhat stronger shape. Under those circumstances, for that to happen,such price levels would have to continue on a more sustained basis, and gas prices would probably need to exceed the $5/gallon level they reached in 2022. Engaging in a completely insane trade war with our biggest trading partner, Canada, certainly won’t help.

Scenes from the good August employment report

 

 - by New Deal democrat

The late Jeff Miller (“Old Prof” at Seeking Alpha) used to say that you have to leave your ideological priors at the door in order to properly analyze the stock market. The same is true in analyzing incoming economic data. In particular, despite the fact that, unlike T—-p 1.0, T—-p 2.0 knows where the levers are to affect economic policy, and he has been doing his chaotic best to pull and push all of them, the US economy has refused to be driven into a ditch. At least, so far.

Which is an introduction to what was undeniably a good jobs report last Friday. I’ve read a little skepticism that the numbers weren’t fudged by the T—-p Administration, but any such attempt would undoubtedly be leaked. Indeed, there is an online community called “Friends of the BLS” to which I belong, which was organized early last year for the precise reason of providing pushback and communication should any such attempt be made. 

So without further ado, let’s look at some of the leading indicators and otherwise important trends from the report.

First of all, in every monthly summary I write, I highlight the leading jobs sectors. These are all in the goods-producing (and transporting) sectors of the market. Historically going all the way back to World War II, they turn south first. That’s not what’s happening now: with only one exception, every single one has been trending higher since late last year. That includes manufacturing, trucking, general construction and goods production as a whole:

Even residential construction employment (right scale), which has continued to deteriorate this year, turned up in August.

Further, hours worked in manufacturing employment is one of the 10 “official” leading indicators, and it too has turned higher in the last 24 months, and at 41.7 hours is not just at its post-pandemic high, but among the highest readings in the past 40+ years:

Another indicator that leads going into recessions, although it lags coming out, is the unemployment rate. Below I show the “official” rate of 4.1% as reported (blue), together with the two datapoints (number unemployed divided by civilian labor force, red) that make up the rate, since they go out several decimal points further than the official rate:

I’ve been pounding the table for months that the very low numbers in the weekly jobless claims report forecast continued downward pressure on the unemployment rate, and the red line in particular makes clear that that is exactly what has been happening.

The one area of concern in the report continues to be income-related, in the form of average hourly wage growth YoY and real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls. Here’s the long term historical look at the YoY% change in average nonsupervisory hourly wages:

At 3.3%, although it is about average for the past 45 years, it is at its lowest growth since the pandemic, and the big decline is of a piece with what happened during and after every recession during that time period except for COVID.

Additionally, as shown in the graph below, nominal YoY% growth in nonsupervisory payrolls is at 4.3% (dark blue). Inflation (red) is currently at 3.3%:

The below bar graph shows the same information monthly for the past year. If inflation is higher than 0.3% for August, then real aggregate nonsupervisory wage growth will decline close to its post-pandemic low point:

Currently the Cleveland Fed estimates that this Friday’s inflation report will come in at 0.4%. If so, it will be the 7th month that real payrolls have been lower than their peak in January. And real payrolls could turn negative YoY, an excellent coincident recession market, as soon as November.

Obviously the Joker in what happens with all of this data is the price of oil, with no sign whatsoever that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is set to reverse, and US strategic reserves having been drained to multi-decade lows.

For Labor Day 2026: on the banana republic-ization of the US economy

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Several times this year I have ruminated about the US turning into a “banana republic,” in both political and economic terms. As I wrote several months ago, 

“About a decade ago economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson wrote “Why Nations Fail,” positing that countries with a strong rule of law and a widespread distribution of benefits, succeeded, while “extractive economies” typified by a ruler at the top who is above the law who along with his cronies siphons off as much created wealth as possible, fail.”

Not only does that fit the T—-p Administration to a “T,” but once again in the past week the GOP majority on the Supreme Court has opined that a(-t least a Republican) President can simply ignore laws passed by Congress and proceed however he chooses.

On this Labor Day, let’s see how far the US has slid towards banana republic status in economic terms in the past 40 years since the Reagan Administration.

Let’s start with a statistic you may have seen graphed several times in the past few weeks: the labor share of GDP (blue in the graph below), which cliff-dived to an all time low in Q2 of this year, down about -16% compared with 1986. The mirror image is just as salient: in the past 40 years, corporate profits (red) have soared over 20x:

They doubled from 1986 to 1993, doubled again by 2002, doubled *again* by 2005, and doubled *yet again* by 2021. In the five years since, so far they are up *another* 50%.

As a result, the Gini coefficient, an international measure of economic equality (where “0” means perfect equality, and “100” means maximum concentration) rose rapidly during the Reagan Administration, and has continued to rise since:

Keep in mind that the above graph does not include this year, when it likely is rising more.

Similarly, in the past 40 years average hourly earnings for nonsupervisory workers (gold) have risen 2.67x, while corporate profits (blue) have risen almost 20x. But even that pales in comparison to stock prices. During the same time, the S&P (not shown) has increased more than 30*, and the Nasdaq composite index (red) has risen 70x!:

Just in the past 12 months, for example, while nominally nonsupervisory wages are up 3.3%, both the Nasdaq and the S&P 500 are up about 20%:

And that’s just the past year. Over the past 40 years, on average, the Nasdaq composite has increased 10% more per year than wages. In the past 10 years, the S&P 500 gains have exceeded nominal wage gains by about 8% on average every year:

In other words, those who primarily rely on stock price appreciation for gain have seen their wealth explode away from those who earn income from labor.

Let’s consider two hypothetical people: Ralph Kramden and Reginald K. Failson III. Ralph entered the workforce in 1986 and in each year has earned the average wage for nonsupervisory workers. Reginald was gifted the same amount Ralph earned in 1986 as a stock trust fund, and hasn’t worked a day in his life, prefering to sip martinis at the yacht or country club. For simple comparison, I have normed each to $10,000 in 1986.

By 2026, Ralph’s cumulative earnings over 40 years total $770,273. Reginald’s stock portfolio, if invested in the S&P, is worth $318,227, or about 40% of Ralph’s total lifetime earnings from work. If it were invested in the Nasdaq, it would be $558,676, or almost 75% of Ralph’s total lifetime earnings. Put another way, if Reginald were gifted 2.5x Ralph’s yearly salary in 1986, Reginald would have as much wealth accumulated passively as Ralph earned from his labor during his whole lifetime!

This by no means is a perfect analogy. For example, after paying all his expenses, Ralph might put a little aside in a stock market mutual fund (but bear in mind that the average savings rate over the past 40 years has only been about 5%). To have the same lifestyle as Ralph, the 1986 trust fund set up for Reginald would have to be about $200,000. For a luxury lifestyle, it would have had to be about $1,000,000.

And by the way, if during this past 40 years Reginald Failson III had passed away, his son Reginald Failson IV, courtesy of the pass-through exemption, could inherit the entirety of III’s stock portfolio without paying a dime in Estate Tax.

In short, for 40 years, the US has inexorably drifted - and then galloped - towards banana republic status in economic terms. Happy Labor Day.

Weekly Indicators for August 31 - September 4 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

There are some emerging bends in the trends in both the long leading and short leading indicators. The longer term indicators - and here I am talking primarily about bonds - are signaling that higher interest rates are necessitated by both the fiscal and demand components of the economy. In the shorter term, the resurgence of the manufacturing sector continues to be supported by multiple data sources.

As usual, clicking over and reading should bring you thoroughly up to date as to the state of the economy, and reward me a little bit for obtaining and organizing the data in a useful format for you.

August jobs report: possibly the best report so far all year

 

 - by New Deal democrat

My Big Theme for the past few months has been that the AI Boom (or possibly bubble) is counterbalancing a stagnant or even shallowly recessionary rest of the economy. Last month I wrote that July’s poor jobs report, which showed a -23,000 decline, had “a MAJOR caveat. Take out the -49,600 loss in local government education jobs, and we eked out a +27,000 gain for the month.” This month had the same caveat in reverse. Take out the 41,900 gain in local government jobs, and this month’s gain, while still good, was +120,000.

Below is my in depth synopsis.

HEADLINES:

• +162,000 jobs gained. Private sector jobs increased 127,000, while government jobs added 40,000, all of which were in local education. The three month average rose to 71,000.
• The pattern of downward revisions to previous months was reversed this month, as June was revised higher by +11,000, and July was revised higher by +44,000 (from a decline to a gain of +21,000) for a total increase of +55,000.
• The alternate, and more volatile measure in the household report, rose sharply, by +569,000 jobs. On a YoY basis, this series which had been negative for six months in a row, is now higher by 1.414 million. 
• The U3 unemployment rate remained steady at 4.1%, its lowest level in two years. 
• The U6 underemployment rate declined -0.2% to 7.7%, its lowest in over 12 months.
• Further out on the spectrum, those who are not in the labor force but want a job now declined -173,000 to 5.747 million, the lowest number in the past 12 months..

Leading employment indicators of a slowdown or recession

These are leading sectors for the economy overall, and help us gauge how much the post-pandemic employment boom is shading towards a downturn vs. rebounding. These were almost entirely positive for the second month in a row.

• The average manufacturing workweek, one of the 10 components of the Index of Leading Indicators, was unchanged at 41.7 hours, equal to the highest number in 5 years, just surpassing its 2021 peak.

• Manufacturing jobs rose +16,000, the 5th increase in the last 12 months.
• Truck driving reversed its decline for the second month in a row, increasing by +4,800.
• Construction jobs rose +22,000.
• Residential construction jobs, which are even more leading, rebounded their 3 year low last month, up +7,300.
• Goods producing jobs as a whole rose +41,000. 

• Temporary jobs, which had declined by over -650,000 since late 2022, rose by another +6,800, continuing to improve from their post-pandemic low set last October.
• The number of people unemployed for 5 weeks or less rose +40,000 to 2.000 million, still very low compared with the last 3 years.

Wages of non-managerial workers 

• Average Hourly Earnings for Production and Nonsupervisory Personnel increased $.11, or +0.3%, to $32.53, for a YoY gain of +3.3%. Except for last month’s +3.2%, and several months affected by pandemic shutdowns, this is the lowest since December 2019. This is equal to the 3.3% YoY inflation rate as of July.

Aggregate hours and wages: 

• The index of aggregate hours worked for non-managerial workers rosse +0.1%, and is up 0.9% YoY, about average for the past 12 months.

• The index of aggregate payrolls for non-managerial workers rose a sharp +0.5%, and is up 4.0% YoY, tied for the lowest comparison for the past 5 years, but up 0.7% above the YoY inflation rate through July.

Other significant data:

• Professional and business employment rose for the fifth month in a row, by +10,000. These tend to be well-paying jobs. This remains above its low from last October, and has turned higher YoY as well.
• The employment population ratio reversed its recent declines, rising +0.2% to 59.1%, vs. 61.1% in February 2020, and its lowest since October 2021.
• The Labor Force Participation Rate rose +0.2% to 61.6% , vs. 63.4% in February 2020, and the lowest since February 2021. IMPORTANT: both the EPOP and LFPR are greatly affected by the retiring Boomer population. In the prime age 25-54 demographic, they are virtually unchanged.

SUMMARY

Yesterday “finance bro” George Peakes commented on Bluesky that “People really want Trump to be an economic disaster and sorry, it's just not playing out that way;” and more succinctly agreed with a response that “He is an economic disaster (over the long term, given plausible models and parameters) but not the short term (recessions are not caused by vice).” This month’s jobs report is potent evidence of that point.

Most importantly, not only was the headline positive, and not only was the unemployment rate tied for a two year low (in accord with what I’ve been writing almost every week as a trend telegraphed by low jobless claims), but as indicated above, almost *all* of the leading indicators in the report, chiefly dealing with the goods-producing sector, continued to be positive, of a piece with the positive trends we have seen in the ISM and regional Fed manufacturing indexes for almost a year. And several “problem children,” i.e., professional and service jobs and temporary help, continued their rebounds. There is more tenuous evidence of a rebound in trucking as well.

To the extent there was a significant negative, it was that nonsupervisory wages continue to grow at a relatively low rate, and if inflation in August picked up again with gas price increases, meaning that real, inflation adjusted wages could be negative YoY for the 4th month in a row.

But given the breadth of the gains, and the positive leading signals going forward, this was probably the best report so far this year. More evidence of an inflationary expansion.

The economically weighted ISM indexes for August continue to show a stagflationary expansion

 

 - by New Deal democrat

The economically weighted ISM manufacturing + services indexes continue to be the best timely snapshot of the US economy. On Tuesday the manufacturing sector was updated; this morning services were.  The weighting, based on their impact on the economy, is 25% manufacturing and 75% services. Further, to cut down on monthly noise, I particularly look at the three month averages.

The summary version is that both the headline and the more leading new orders components continue very positive, but the prices paid component indicates that if anything inflationary pressures are increasing, while employment is showing outright contraction.

To the numbers: the headline services index rose 0.8 to 55.4 [recall that any number over 50 indicates expansion]. The three month average was 55.2. Since the three month average for manufacturing was 54.5, the economically weighted average was 55.0 [note: in all of the graphs below, the manufacturing number is blue, and services gray]:

New orders rose 3.7 to a very strong 60.9, its most positive reading in over three years. The three month average was 557. The three month average for manufacturing was 55.5, so the economically weighted of this most forward looking component was 57.2:

So far, so good. But employment in the services index was contractionary for the second month in a row, rising 0.4 to 47.8. The three month average was 48.8. Since the manufacturing employment subindex averaged a slightly positive 51.2, the economically weighted average was below 50 for the second month in a row as well, increasing 0.2 to 49.4:

Importantly, although it has been better than summer of last year, the ISM weighted average has only shown expansion in two month this year: February and June. The authoritative QCEW metric, which suggested that nonfarm payrolls overcounted employment in the first three months of this year, thus also suggests that we may see more weakness in both the monthly and benchmark revisions of that metric. And we’ll see how August compares tomorrow.

Finally, widespread price increases continue to be a problem, with the prices paid index for services rising 2.3 to 72.6, with the three month average at 70.2. The three month average for manufacturing did ease a little this month at 71.7, but the economically weighted average increased 1.2 to 72.4:

This isn’t quite as bad as during the post-pandemic inflation, but not by much. Indeed, This is the worst reading since mid-year 2022 (note that unlike the other three graphs, this one shows the last five years for better comparison).

To recapitulate, the economically weighted ISM averages indicate that as of August, the economy remained in reasonably strong expansion, and new orders suggest it might get even stronger. But inflationary pressures are getting even stronger, and employment is not increasing at all. In other words, as I’ve written before, a stagflationary expansion.

(Almost) nobody is getting laid off - still

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Let’s take our regular weekly look at jobless claims, a very good short leading indicator. To cut to the chase, nobody is getting laid off - still.

Initial claims rose 2,000 to 206,000, while the four week moving average rose 1,500 to 207,250. Both of these remain very low numbers on a historical basis. With the usual one week delay, continuing claims rose 8,000 to 1.779 million, typical for the post-pandemic era:

On the YoY% basis more important for forecasting, initial claims were down -12.7%, the four week average down -10.1%, and continuing claims down -8.2%:

These are *very* positive numbers, consistent with a good economic expansion.

Finally, let’s take our last look at what this suggests about the unemployment rate over the next few months:

All of the pressure is to the downside, i.e., the unemployment rate declining towards 4.0% or even lower. We’ll find out if that was the case in August tomorrow.

July manufacturing core capital goods order add to evidence of manufacturing rebound; while transportation (for June) flags

 

 - by New Deal democrat

Yesterday our month started out with reports that manufacturing in August was less positive than in the several months prior, while construction (ex-AI data centers) was absolutely recessionary. This morning was followed up by the final July report on manufacturers’ durable goods orders, a short leading indicator. 

While total durable goods orders (blue) rose, core capital goods orders (red), which are much less volatile, backed off slightly from record levels:

The YoY comparison shows, particular with regard to core capital goods orders, that expansion in the sector is still accelerating, with core orders up 12.6%, the biggest increase in four years, and only slightly behind June’s level:

Meanwhile the Freight Transportation Services Index for June (so lagging by several months) showed a -0.3% decline to the lowest level since December 2022:

It is interesting to compare this with sales of heavy weight trucks, which I find very useful because they generally decline sharply, and with much less noise, well ahead of recessions, as well as increasing a number of months into expansions:

For oncoming recessions, sales of heavy weight trucks have given the better and more leading signal. Interestingly, though, on a YoY basis, the freight index has tended to turn negative a number of months before sales of heavy weight trucks do:

For the last two months, truck sales have turned slightly positive YoY, in accord with their general recovery this year. But the freight services index is down -1.7%. That’s not recessionary (for that I would expect to see readings worse than -2.0% YoY on a three month average basis), but it does raise the question of whether sales of heavy weight trucks might turn back down in the next several months.

In general, this is confirmation that manufacturing has been doing well this year, while transportation, which includes construction materials as well as manufacturing inputs and outputs, has been much more mixed.