Friday, November 20, 2026

Preliminary regional Fed manufacturing reports suggest inflation is spreading downstream

 

 - by New Deal democrat


In discussing the ISM manufacturing index several weeks ago, I concluded that it “reminded me of the regional Fed reports for the last month, which suggested that while the expansion is intact, the second derivative may be declerating, i.e., the rate of growth has been peaking; and further that its inflationary component is accelerating, which is not good for downstream consumer prices.”


Here’s what the new orders component of that index looked like:



Well, now we have three regional Fed bank reports for November: New York, Philadelphia, and Kansas City, which give us our first look at how manufacturing is doing this month. The first two do get picked up by FRED, so let’s see what their averages can tell us.

First of all, the headline numbers (bue) declined -6.2 to 7.0, which suggests at least that the growth rate is stabilizing and possibly decelerating somewhat.  But, unlike the ISM report at the beginning of this month, the average of the new orders component (red) was the lowest since last year, as it decelerated sharply, by -12.4, to 1.3:



Meanwhile, the respective numbers from the Kansas City Fed constrasted significantly, as the headline regional index rose 7 to 18, and the new orders component rose 13 to 16.

Put all three together and the picture is of a stabilizing topline, and at very least the proverbial bloom might be coming off the rose somewhat as to new orders.

There might be an even more significant amplification present is in the prices component, and specifically prices received from downstream customers (red in the graph below). Prices paid declined -1.3 to 52.0, suggesting the torrid spread of price increases in that component has persisted. But even more signficantly, prices received rose 1.2 to 37.1. The last two months have been the highest readings in that entire series since the start of the Millennium outside of the post-pandemic period:



The regional Kansas City index suggested the same, with prices paid declining -17 to 53, and prices received rising 4 to 30.

In short, producers appear more determined, and able, to pass on higher prices to downstream customers, suggesting that consumer inflation, at least in the goods sector, is not going to slow in the next several months, and may even increase further. And keep in mind that real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls may go negative YoY as early as next month if there is such a pass-through of inflation and a tepid employment report. In that regard, the best news in the surveys was that employment average rose 5.4 to 1.8:



All well and good for the present, but if corporate profits come under pressure, and real wages come under pressure as well, needless to say that would not be good.



Thursday, November 19, 2026

Jobless claims continue to demonstrate an expanding, and resilient, economy

 

 - by New Deal democrat


Let’s take our regular weekly look at jobless claims. As a reminder, these are an excellent short leading indicator for the economy, and along with stock prices are 1/2 of my “quick and dirty” forecast method.


The news continued to be excellent last week, as initial claims rose 1,000 to 203,000. The four week average rose 2,000 to 197,750. And continuing claims, with the typical one week delay, rose 70,000 to a still very low 1.763 million:



And here is the YoY% measure that is more important for forecasting purposes:



Initial claims were down -8.6% YoY, the four week average down -12.0%, and continuing claims down -9.5%. These continue to be very positive, indicative of continued expansion for the next few months.

Once again, as has been constant most of this year, jobless claims are forecasting a decline in the unemployment rate:



I realize this has been moving more slowly than I anticipated, but the fact remains that there is a good 60 year history of jobless claims leading the unemployment rate, and for the past few months they have indicated that unemployment is going to drop below 4%. While there has certainly been monthly noise, the trend continues to be downward.

Finally, here is the update of my “quick and dirty” forecasting tool (note that jobless claims are inverted in this graph, and adjusted so that any YoY change below +10% is a positive):



Even with the selloff of the past few weeks, stock prices are still about 10% higher than what they were a year ago. The US economy has many problems, mainly due to policy, or “policy” from the Administration in Washington. But it remains resilient.


Wednesday, November 18, 2026

The autumn skies have turned gloomy for housing

 

 - by New Deal democrat


The housing market, along with corporate profits and real retail sales per capita, is one of the three nonfinancial, or “real world” long leading indicators, that is of added importance for whether the US economy continues in expansion or falls into recession.

Earlier this year housing construction had been most consistent with an economy coming out of a recession than going in to one. That was derailed by the decision of the Buffoon in Washington to start the Iran war, which caused inflation, and interest rates to increase. In particular, mortgage rates came close to a new multi-year high last month:



Which, unsurprisingly, has led to a sharp decline in mortgage applications, housing sales, and new permits and starts. While this morning’s report indicated that the relatively noisy housing starts (blue) for October increased 9.4% to 1.309 million units annualized, the three month average was the lowest since this past winter. The less volatile and slightly more leading permits (gold) declined -7.4% to 1.295 million. The least volatile metric of all, single family permits (red, right scale) declined -8.7% to 772,000:



Total permits made a new post-pandemic lows, and perhaps even worse, single family permits are the lowest in almost 10 years except for the two months of the pandemic lockdowns and two months at the end of 2022. Further, permits are down -15.% from their recent peak in February this year, and single family permits are down -16.9% from their similar peak. 

All three of these metrics had been trending essentially sideways since the summer of last year. But this month, permit are down -8.9% and single family permits are down -12.9%. Only the volatile starts measure is higher, by 2.8%:



This doesn’t mean housing is forecasting a recession yet since, while I won’t bother with the graph this month, in the past these three metrics have generally been down -10% or more YoY to be consistent with the onset of a recession. Per the above, however, single family permits are down more than -10% from their recent peak, so this raises the first yellow caution flag that we are probably going to have to restart watching for a recession signal in the near future.

Now let’s update the several “last shoes to drop” in the housing sector. In particular, housing units under construction (blue), which had been giving a recovery signal earlier this year by rising from its lows, something that it typically does after the end of a recession, has now stalled out again, declining -1,000 to 1.272 million units annualized. And the even later shoe to drop, employment in residential construction (orange, right scale), may have reversed its recent increasing trend as well:



In summary, while real retail sales continue to sail on, and the outlook for corporate profits is only partly cloudy, to paraphrase an apt seasonal lyric from the late Gordon Lightfoot, for housing the proverbial skies have turned gloomy.


Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Despite a decline in October, the AI data center driven growth trend in production remains intact

 

 - by New Deal democrat


The Boom in AI data center construction has been the centerpiece of one of the most important trends of the last year; namely, the rebound in manufacturing. This has been reflected in the outsized but very volatile growth of the utilities component of production. 


That volatility continued in October, as headline industrial production (blue in the graph below) declined -0.4%, driven by a -4.3% decline in utility production (gold, right scale). Meanwhile, manufacturing production (red) increased 0.3%:



Note that the above graph is normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic, showing that manufacturing production is up less than 1% since then, while utility production, up nearly 10%, has driven the headline growth, up 2%.

On a YoY% basis, headline production is up 2.1%, manufacturing production up 2.6%, and even after October’s big decline, utility production is up 1.7%:



In short, this month’s decline is not significant enough to signal any change in the underlying trend. I would need to see a sustained break in trend in utility production for me to think that the AI data center driven Boom, or bubble, is ebbing.


Real retail sales decline slightly in October, but forecast continued slow employment growth

 

 - by New Deal democrat


As per usual, real retail sales is one of my favorite forecasting tools, since it tells us a lot about the consumer on a timely basis, and since consumer spending leads employment, and real retail sales per capita are a good non-financial long leading indicator.


On a nominal basis, retail sales have tended to be very positive most of this year, in part due to depressed comparisons post-“Liberation Day” last year. Although I won’t show the graph this week, they have tended to track the weekly data published by Redbook, which has shown YoY sales up in the 8%-9% range nominally.

To cut to the chase, October was weakly positive nominally but negative on an inflation-adjusted basis. Sales were higher nominally by 0.2% m/m and 6.8% YoY. But consumer inflation was up 0.4% m/m, so after rounding real retail sales declined -0.1%. Here’s what real sales (red), and real sales per capita (blue) look like for the past several years (courtesy of Steven Miller and the T—-p Administration, US population growth has slowed to only 0.2% YoY, one of the lowest such rates in decades, so this year the lines are virtually identical) :



Note that one month ago, September, was also their peak, so neither one is even close to forecasting a recession at this time.

With inflation estimated (due to the government shutdown one year ago) at 3.9% YoY, real retail sales YoY increased an estimated 3.0%, and on a per capita basis increased 2.8%. Note that the above graph, for the same reason, cannot show this month:



This remains very positive.

Since real retail sales tend to lead employment, here is the update on that relationship:



Again, this forecasts continued employment gains over the next few months. And again, almost all of this traces back to the AI data center Boom - or bubble.


Monday, November 16, 2026

If the AI data center Boom is a bubble, how quickly will the stock market and consumer spending follow any burst?

 

 - by New Deal democrat


I have written a lot this year about how the wealth effect from soaring stock market prices has been driving consumer spending, especially among the top-most incomes. It may be a Boom. But if it is a bubble, how soon after it bursts can we expect consumer spending to follow suit?


Unfortunately in the modern era for which we have decent statistics, there is only one example; namely, the dotcom bubble of the late 1990s. In that case, it appears that consumers did not react until it was clear that the bubble had burst, which took several months:



Which is important, because consumer spending, as shown in the YoY% change in real retail sales, below, typically peak on a per capita basis about a year before a recession, and turn negative YoY shortly before it begins:



There has been some choppiness recently, with some AI related stocks actually lagging the headline S&P 500 index (via Carl Quintanilla this morning):



And stocks are only up about 1% from six months ago:



Although on a YoY basis they remain higher by over 10%.

In the past, although it is a commonplace that the stock market anticipates corporate profits, on a quarterly basis the average YoY change in stocks has followed, rather than led, corporate profits. Since FRED isn’t allowed to post the full S&P 500 series, here is the NASDAQ composite going back 50 years compared with corporate profits:



Aside from the 1980s, typically (again, on a quarterly basis averaged), stocks have lagged corporate profits by about one quarter.

Here is the last 10 years, including the S&P 500:



So if the AI data center buildout is a bubble, it will probably show up in earnings first - to which the stock market will then react.

While “official” corporate profits as part of GDP for Q3 won’t be reported until the end of this month, over 90% of the S&P 500 have already reported earnings to Wall Street. Here’s what that looks like:



In Q2, not only did we have the effect of the AI Boom (or bubble), but we also had record profits in the Oil Patch thanks to the surge in prices due to the Iran War. At the moment, reported profits are down about -9% from Q2, although they are higher than any other preceding Quarter. Typically profit estimates for the next several quarters are lower than what the actual results will be - unless a recession starts, in which case all hell breaks loose!

Which brings me back to the current status of retail spending. Here’s what the recent YoY comparison looks like:



No recession risk showing there.

And here is the recent absolute value of real retail sales:



If the AI data center buildout is in fact a bubble, I would expect corporate warnings and substantial misses compared with estimates. Which the stock market will sniff out; and if the sell-off got serious and persistent, then (all else being equal) I would expect consumer spending to follow in short order. 

As to which, retail sales for October will be reported tomorrow.



Saturday, November 14, 2026

Weekly Indicators for November 9 - 13 at Seeking Alpha

 

 - by New Deal democrat


My “Weekly Indicators” post is up at Seeking Alpha.

This week’s theme is the same as the past few weeks: the long leading time horizon has become considerably more problematic, while the coincident present continues to feature strong production, transportation, and spending.

As usual, clicking over and reading will bring you all of the details in organized fashion and reward me a little bit for my efforts.



Friday, November 13, 2026

October producer prices confirm pressures spreading to services upstream

 

 - by New Deal democrat


I don’t normally pay that much attention to producer prices. Back in the day, producer prices used to lead consumer prices by several months or more. But since the turn of the Millennium, and in particular with “just in time” inventory management, somewhat attenuated since the pandemic, producer prices and consumer prices have risen more or less in sync.


But at very least producer prices as reported for last month confirm continuing inflationary pressures, with final demand prices (gold) rising 0.3% for the month, although raw commodity prices (red) declined by -0.2%, as compared with headline consumer prices (blue), which earlier this week were reported up 0.5%:



On a YoY basis, final demand prices were up 6.5%, and commodity prices up 12.8%, vs. an estimated 4.0% for consumer prices:



Decomposing producer prices further into prices for goods (purple) vs. services (orange), the former rose 0.5% and the latter rose 0.2%:



Note that on a monthly basis, for most of this year producer goods inflation is as bad as it was during the post-pandemic bottlenecks, while producer services inflation is up much less. On a YoY basis, the former is up 10.2%, and the latter up 5.0%:



Again, I don’t think this gives us a lot of predictive informatioin like it might have once upon a time. But at very least it confirms that there is widespread inflation at all levels, and to the extent there may be a leading/lagging relationship, I would worry that goods inflation has been spreading to services, and might further show up in the next several months in consumer prices as well.

Next week we’ll begin to get the November regional Fed reports, which will give us considerably more insight into whether further consumer price hikes are on the horizon.


The 3+ year equilibrium in the existing home market has broken - to the downside

 

 - by New Deal democrat


I’ll discuss this morning’s producer price index release later. First, though, let me catch up on yesterday’s report on existing home sales for October.

For the last three years, the market for existing homes has been rangebound, first in sales, then in prices, and finally this year in inventory as well, in what I have described several times as a “suboptimal equilibrium,” since existing homes have been unaffordable compared with any time outside of the housing bubble before the pandemic. Last month I concluded that, downstream of the increase in interest rates, September might be the last month for this equilibrium.

And it was, as existing home sales broke out of their three year+ range of between 3.85-4.30 million units annualized, declining a seasonally adjusted -5.5% monthly and -8.8% YoY to 3.75 million annualized, the lowest level in over 10 years:



Downstream of sales, prices on a YoY basis (which are not seasonally adjusted, so this is the best comparison) have been relatively calm as well. Since February of 2025 there has been no YoY comparison higher than 3.0%, and in October there was the lowest such comparison since, up only 0.4% YoY from $420,200 to $421,900: 



The most lagging metric, inventory, is still increasing, although tepidly. In October, the YoY% change in existing home inventories increased by 4.6%. As shown in the below graph, this year’s inventory has been the highest since the pandemic, but still below its 2016-19 baseline by about 500,000 units:



As I have been saying all year, until this inventory shortage is taken care of, the housing market will continue to be tight, and largely unaffordable for new buyers.

But the big takeaway has to be that the equilibrium has broken to the downside, along with most of the financial long leading indicators. It remains to be seen whether the crucial non-financial long leading indicators (corporate profits and real retail sales per capita) follow suit.


Thursday, November 12, 2026

It’s still a historically low-fire economy; and the trend in the unemployment rate is still downward

 

 - by New Deal democrat


Let’s take our regular weekly look at jobless claims. Additionally, let me use this as an opportunity to delve a little further into the unemployment rate as reported in last Friday’s jobs report.


Last week initial jobless claims rose 9,000 to 200,000, still an excellent number. The four week moving average was unchanged at 195,250, close to its all time historical lows. And with the typical one week lag, continuing claims declined -20,000 to 1.697 million, also an excellent number:



As usual, the YoY% changes are what tell us what is likely ahead in the near term for the economy as a whole. On that basis, all were -here’s that word again - excellent! Initial claims were down -12.3%, the four week average down -14.0%, and continuing claims down -12.8%:



While I’m at it, let me update my “quick and dirty” forecast, including the YoY% change in stock prices (note that jobless claims are inverted in the below graph):



Despite the recent AI-related sell-off, the S&P 500 is still up almost 10% YoY, so the “quick and dirty” forecast is for continued expansion in the next few months.

As I usually note, new jobless claims have a 60 year history of leading the unemployment rate. Here’s the update on that, including (orange) the two numbers that make the unemployment rate: the number of unemployed divided by the number of people in the labor force, which last month was 4.14% rounded to 4.1% in the official rate:



While the unemployment rate seems to be a little stubborn about following the number of newly laid off workers down, the downward trend is nonetheless apparent. Interestingly, by looking at the component parts: the number of unemployed and the number of people in the labor force, here:



It appears that in the last few months there has been a rebound in the number of people in the labor force, suggesting there have been new entrants to the labor force who may be having a little more difficulty than in the past several years securing employment to their liking. In any event, as I wrote above, the overall downward trend is intact, and all things being left to themselves, I continue to expect a sub-4.0% unemployment rate in the months ahead.


Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Leading employment indicators, real wages and payrolls, and the consumer nowcast recession indicators

 

 - by New Deal democrat


Typically in the quiet week after the jobs report, I take an extended look at some of the trends. With the significant “hot” CPI print yesterday, I am splitting that up. Tomorrow I’ll take a look at the unemployment side, as part of my weekly update on jobless claims. Today I’ll briefly update the leading employment indicators, which will segue into an important discussion of the health of the average American consumer in view of the recent acceleration in inflation. In particular, I will update my “consumer nowcast” recession system.


First, let’s take a look at the leading employment sectors, almost all of which are in the goods producing secotr (blue). This includes manufacturing (gold), construction (orange), and the more leading residential construction (red):



As you can see, with the exception of residential construction, all of these bottomed roughly at the end of last year, and have improved this year. Residential construction has reversed again in the past several months, but that hasn’t been enough to undo the wider, positive signal. And although I won’t show it, the remaining portion of construction is nonresidential construction, which includes things like AI data centers.

Two other items are the average weekly hours of manufacturing workers (red, right scale) and truck driving (blue, left scale):



The former has been very positive for many months, while the latter has improved slightly even with the burden of the spike in diesel prices due to the Iran war.

These positive leading sectors tell us that, left to its own devices, the economy - and overall employment - should continue to expand over the next 4-8 months.

But yesterday’s CPI print tells a very different story of different employment indicators; namely, real wages and payrolls.

First here is what average hourly (blue) and weekly (orange) wages look like deflated by CPI, normed to their highs in February of this year:



Both metrics are down -0.8% from that peak. Further, the former is now down an estimated -0.4% YoY, while the latter is down -0.8%. While these aren’t strong recession indicators, their turning down often does presage one.

More importantly, as I’ve written any number of times, is real aggregate payrolls. In particular, I track real aggregate nonsupervisory payrolls (red), which have a 60 year history of being an excellent leading and coincident indicator. In the below graph, I also include total payrolls including supervisory jobs (blue). Both of are normed to 100 as of their peak this past January:



The former is down -0.2% since then, and the latter is down -0.3%. While this is a long period of time to be down from peak before a recession, typically the retreat is on the order of -0.6% before a recession actually begins. Additionally, within +/-2 months of a recession onset, typically these turn down YoY. As of next month, if there is no improvement from this month, the former will be down -0.2% YoY, and the latter by -0.1% YoY.

The above discussion is very important on its own for forecasting purposes, but on a more fundamental level, if wages and payrolls are not going up in real terms, where is growth in consumer spending coming from?  Which leads me to my “consumer nowcast,” which holds that if real incomes aren’t going up, then spending must be fueled by either refinancing at lower interest rates (needless to say, not happening now!), or spending equity from increased home or stock prices. If neither of those is available either, then consumers are likely to retrench (i.e., their aggregate savings rate will increase), bringing about a consumer-led recession.

So the next graph includes the above two real payrolls data, and also adds house prices as measured by the FHFA (gold), and the S&P 500 stock prices index (purple), both also normed to 100 as of January of this year:



As you can see, house prices have barely increased also. As a result, home equity loans have increased relatively modestly, by 5.4% YoY through Q3:



But as you can also see, stock prices are up over 10% from the beginning of this year. In fact, on a YoY basis, up until several weeks ago, they were higher by 15%-20% YoY. And this is the only significant remaining source of consumer spending.

While credit card debt has increased by roughly 4% YoY, and population growth has not been a significant factor (thanks to actual and threatened deportations, as well as the complete shutdown of the asylum system (except for White South Africans), the US population has only grown 0.2% YoY so far this year). Aside from that, credit growth has mainly tracked inflation:



Finally, despite the bad news on real incomes, consumers have not pulled in their horns. The savings rate, which just declined to 3.8%, is among the lowest levels since the onset of the pandemic, and although I won’t show the longer term graph, it is also among the lowest readings outside of the 2000’s housing bubble period:



Pulling this all together, I see an economy which is improving - for the moment - but almost entirely based on AI data center construction and its related stock market Boom. Should this reverse, consumers will have no new source left to fuel increased spending, and then I would expect the negative signal in real aggregate payrolls to come to fruition.


Tuesday, November 10, 2026

October CPI: another hot month for inflation; plus, the last revenge of last year’s government shutdown

 

 - by New Deal democrat


One year ago we were in the midst of the longest government shutdown on record. As a result, there was no consumer inflation report for last October. Which means that this month is the last revenge of that shutdown - for all but a few items, there is *no* official YoY measure. 

But as usual, I have a workaround that will at least enable us to estimate all YoY% changes +/-0.1%. Except as noted, the YoY growth in all items below is based on the average of last year’s September and November reports, normed to “1”. Thus, e.g, a 4% rise in headline inflation shows as “1.04.”

And what it shows is that this October was yet another “hot” month for inflation, revealing higher numbers spreading out into more areas.

With that out of the way, let’s begin. In October, consumer prices (blue) rose 0.4%, and on a YoY% basis accelerated an estimated further 0.3% to 4.0%. Core CPI excluding food and energy (red) rose 0.3% for the third month in a row, aceelerating 0.2% on an estimated YoY basis to 2.8%. Excluding shelter (gold), CPI rose 0.4%,  and accelerated sharply on an estimated YoY basis from 3.5% to 4.2%:



Energy remained the main culprit, as prices rose 0.7% for the month, and were up an estimated 20.3% YoY:



There was good news and bad news for shelter, which is 1/3rd of the entire index. The good news is that it is now running significantly lower than headline inflation. The bad news is that it accelerated on a YoY basis for the second month in a row. Specifically, after rising 0.4% in September, it rose another 0.3% in October, and on an estimated YoY basis, rose  another 0.1% to 3.3% YoY (blue).  Of it’s two components, Owner’s equivalent rent rose 0.3% monthly and accelerated 0.2% to 3.5% estimated YoY, while actual rent of primary residence rose 0.2% and accelerated 0.1% to an estimated 2.9% YoY:



Electricity prices also continued to be a significant problem child, as prices rose a sharp 0.9%, although they only rose an estimated 3.7% YoY against very good comparisons last autumn. On an estimated YoY basis, they are higher by 20.4%:



Transportation services - mainly motor vehicle maintenance and repair, and insurance  - also continued to be a problem child, up 0.6% for the month, although only an estimated 3.8% YoY:



Last month’s silver lining continued this month, as motor vehicle prices continued to be somnolent. New vehicle prices (red) rose 0.2% for the month, and were only higher 0.7% YoY, and while used vehicle prices (gold) declilned -1.2% for the month, and they were once again lower YoY by -3.3%. The average for all motor vehicles (blue) declined -0.5% monthly, and was unchanged YoY. Note that this is one category for which the source data is not from the government, and thus we have actual YoY comparisons. The below graph is normed to 100 as of just before the pandemic:



Now that we have the inflation report, tomorrow I will take a closer look at some fallout from last Friday’s employment report. Teaser: this is not going to be good for real wages and payrolls.